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This thesis study focuses on political-economy of the Kurdish Question in Turkey. The current 
study focusing on the political, economic, and socio-cultural causes and outcomes of the 
ongoing Kurdish Question since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 presents 
the political economy of the question by emphasizing the underdeveloped structure of the 
Kurdish Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia region (the ESA, Northern Kurdistan) compared to 
other regions of Turkey. In this study, which identifies the effects of Turkish nationalism, the 
Turkish state's being a unitary nation-state in terms of organization, economic policies of the 
state to establish and develop the national Turkish capital and capitalists, and the effects of all 
these policies on the emergence, development, and structuralization of the Kurdish poverty and 
Kurdish Question as the problem statement, a century-old state policies towards the ESA region 
were examined in depth. In addition, the ongoing internal conflict/war intensifying from time 
to time between the Turkish state and the Kurdish military movement organized as a result of 
the Kurdish discontent that has emerged in response to totalitarian policies aimed at establishing 
a full dominance over the ESA since the establishment of the Turkish state were examined 
within the context of the regional development issues. 
Finally, this thesis study claims to make a significant contribution to the literature in this field 
with an objective and academic perspective by addressing the ESA's underdevelopment within 
the historical context of the social, political and economic causes as well as providing a 
paradigm examining the emergence and development of the Kurdish Question that cannot be 
solved (or is not solved) until today.  
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           As will be seen in the following chapters, this master's thesis study focuses on the 
influence of economic development in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia (ESA), which is 
known as the northern part of the very old Kurdistan in the literature and located within the 
borders of the Republic of Turkey today, on the emergence and evolution of the Kurdish Issue 
in Turkey. While the study mainly focuses on the state's economic policy in the ESA since the 
establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 until today and its effect on Kurdish Issue, the 
traces of historical and ethnological factors causing the Kurdish Issue to emerge and deepen are 
also comprehensively put forward in chronological order. 
         Development, which is the fundamental concept of the study, refers not only to an 
economic dimension, but also to the social, cultural and political aspects of the content of 
structural change and transformation that have extended over a long time period (Rapley, 2007, 
pp. 1-10). In relation to that, development is not only regarded as a concept that requires 
productive performance of the economy to meet basic human needs, but also a concept that 
makes sense of a diverse process enabling the diversification of political freedom and human 
preferences through the abolition of totalitarian suppression over society and dependence 
(Oakley & Gartforth, 1985). Hence in this thesis, development is considered as a dynamic 
concept that implies a positive change by moving away from the current situation or previous 
position (ibid.). In this this study, which presents a broad analysis of the current social, 
economic, political and cultural structure in the ESA, the concept of development is analyzed 
within a large-scale economic context due to the effects of economic factors on the socio-
political structure and a broad assessment of other factors that gathered around this concept is 
also provided. In this study providing a detailed analysis of the Kurdish Issue as an unsolvable 
issue within its historical background, the social, cultural, political and economic factors that 
have created and deepened the issue are considered as a result of the simultaneous and 
sequential interactions. 
           The purpose of this thesis study examining development disparities between the Kurdish 
region ESA and the other regions of Turkey is to understand and interpret the economic causes 
of the Kurdish Issue continuing since the establishment of Turkish state in 1923 along with its 
ethnic, geographical, social, and political causes within a historical context.  It is crucial to 
investigate and present historical developments that triggered the emergence of the Kurdish 
Issue to understand the political economy of the Kurdish Issue in order to gain an in-depth 
understanding and interpretation of the issue. Therefore an in-depth historical analysis revealing 
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the dynamics of the Kurdish issue is presented and significant cases that triggered one another 
are discussed within the historical context by examining the roots of the issue as of the 19th 
century, in which administrative and economic centralization policies were initiated in the 
Ottoman Empire. Thus, it is aimed to understand and interpret the issue through an exhaustive 
analysis of the ethnological, geographical, social, economic, and political causes of the 
historical developments leading to the emergence of the Kurdish Issue that has evolved and 
continued until today. In this thesis study, the state policies were primarily examined as the 
dominant factors causing the issue and the influence of the actors/leaders or resistance 
movements in Kurdish community becoming prominent in different periods on the emergence 
and evolution of the issue was examined in depth while addressing the Kurdish issue being one 
of the oldest issues of the century-old Turkish state. The main reason for examining state 
policies as the main causes of the issue while addressing the Kurdish issue is that both the 
centralist policies of the Ottoman Empire as of the 19th century and the policies positioning 
Kurdistan as a colony instead of an autonomous structure, and the establishment of its 
predecessor, the Turkish state, as a unitary nation state as well as the policies aimed at 
integrating Northern Kurdistan/ESA with the center through economic, political, cultural, 
social and geographic integration/rehabilitation and assimilation policies following the 
disintegration of Kurdistan (as discussed in the third chapter). 
Two main research questions and several research questions related to these main questions 
have been structured to provide a road map for this thesis study examining Turkey's Kurdish 
issue within the historical context mentioned above: 
1. Do the Kurdish Issue and the underdevelopment in the ESA stem from the Kurdish policy 
based on the old Turkish nationalism pursued by the Turkish state to this day?  
2. What is the relationship between the emergence of the Kurdish Issue which still cannot be 
solved today, the underdevelopment of the ESA compared to other regions of Turkey and the 
civil war/conflict between the Kurdish movement and the Turkish state that has continued from 
1923 until today? The questions related to these research questions are as follows: What are the 
political and economic developments that triggered the emergence and persistence of the 
Kurdish Issue in Turkey? Is the relatively poorer status of predominantly Kurdish-populated 
provinces compared to the rest of the country an outcome of the uneven capitalist development 
between regions in Turkey? Or is the main reason for poverty in the Kurdish provinces due to 
the lack of transformation in the inimical social structure? Alternatively, can social, economic, 
political realities of the ESA be attributed to the discriminatory policies of Turkish state against 
Turkey’s Kurds? In spite of the occasional intervals, is the domestic conflict that have continued 
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since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey both in political and military terms a result of 
the state's Kurdish policy? Or, does the Kurdish Issue arise from the revolt of some Kurdish 
separatist groups against the state, as accepted by the dominant authority? What changes have 
occurred in the state's social, political and economic policies regarding the ESA and the Kurdish 
issue along with Turkey's coming under the influence of neoliberal development economy? 
          The socio-economic inequalities between the ESA provinces and the rest of Turkey, the 
Turkish state's denial of the Kurds' identities and cultural rights arising from their ethnic and 
geographical belongings and the imposition of Turkish identity on the Kurds through 
authoritarian and totalitarian policies, as well as the armed Kurdish resistance that started 
against the Turkish state in 1984 and still continues its activities as a result of the reactions of 
Kurdish people to seek political pluralism and/or autonomy in response to these policies, are 
the constituent elements of the Kurdish Issue in Turkey. The Kurdish resistance carried out by 
the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkarên Kurdistan, PKK) became a component of 
relevant political debates in Turkey in not-so-late 1984, but the Kurdish issue, as will be seen 
in the third chapter of this study, has always been of a central importance in the political debate 
in Turkey since the mid-19th century, especially since the beginning of the 20th century. 
Although this long-term resistance initiated by the PKK in response to Turkey's totalitarian 
Kurdish policies in 1984 is not the first Kurdish resistance against the Turkish state, it has been 
the last and longest Kurdish resistance that emerged as a result of the evolution of other 
resistance movements that first started with the Resistance of Bedirhan Beg (Mîr Berdîrxan), 
the leader of Botan Emirate, (Ozoglu, 2004, p.60) in the ESA against the Ottoman Empire in 
the 19th century and the other movements that emerged throughout the 20th century. That is 
why analyzing the events and policies that occurred before 1980 that led to the emergence of 
the Kurdish issue will facilitate the understanding of its historical political economy in order to 
provide a comprehensive understanding and interpretation of the issue in Turkey. 
As you can read the detailed analysis in the second chapter of this study, the project of founding 
a Turkish nation-state taking over the Ottoman Empire involved a process of building a unitary 
nation-state that necessitated economic, political and social reforms implemented by the 
Turkish nationalist elite who pursued policies aimed at creating a demographically 
"homogeneous", "secular" and "Westernized” Turkish nation. In the state-building process of 
the Turkish nation state to be established after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, it was 
necessary to make the people living in the territories of the state a part of the state's survival 
with "patriotism" and loyalty to the new state and thus to create a "nation" which was the main 
component of the nation-state idea or "collective national consciousness” (Bill & Springbord, 
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1990, p. 40 cited in Yadirgi, 2017, p. 3). The Turkish nation-state established in 1923 where 
the national identity was limited to being Turkish and the minorities' identities and public rights 
were not recognized, was attempted to be consolidated through unitary and authoritarian 
policies. At this point, the following statements of İsmet İnönü, the first Prime Minister of the 
Turkish state, can be the key to understand the ideology of the founding nationalist elites and 
the structure of the Turkish state:  
“We are frankly [n]ationalists . . . and [n]ationalism is our only factor of cohesion. In the face 
of a Turkish majority, other elements have no kind of influence. We must turkify the inhabitants 
of our land at any price, and we will annihilate those who oppose the Turks or ‘le turquisme’ 
[Turkism].” (Barkey and Fuller, 1998, p. 10 cited in Yadirgi, 2017, p. 3). 
          The establishment of the authoritarian Turkish nation state that is analyzed in detail in 
the second chapter of this study, occurred in the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th 
century, during which the Ottoman Empire suffered demographic changes and territorial losses 
as well as becoming peripheralized within the capitalist world economy. While the Ottoman 
Empire gradually lost its power against European countries, it failed to keep up with the rapid 
capitalist developments taking place in Europe in the 18th and 19th century, it was involved in 
the capitalist world economy gaining momentum in that period. During this period, the empire 
was subjected to the economic and political hegemony of the most powerful economies of the 
period such as Great Britain, France, Austria, and Russia, and the empire was included in free 
trade relations in 1838 as those states had provided loans and developed their trade relations 
with the empire. 
           As you can read in detail in the third chapter that includes the findings of this study, the 
structural reforms implemented in the time of Mahmud II (1785-1839) in the 19th century when 
Kurdistan lost its autonomous status in the Ottoman Empire and was completely colonized, 
enabled a radical reconstruction of the empire.  The most important development that pioneered 
the reforms was the promulgation of the Imperial Edict of Reorganization (Tanzimat Fermanı) 
(Ozoglu, 2004; Yadirgi, 2017). In this period, the empire enacted central policies that imposed 
compulsory military service on the population living in the autonomous regions under its rule 
(ibid.). In addition, provinces were administratively attached to the center through practices 
aimed at strengthening the central authority over the provinces and weakening the financial 
resources of these provinces by developing policies aimed at changing the political, economic, 
administrative and social structure of the empire in accordance with the international capitalist 
system of the period (ibid.). All these centralized reforms of the empire and the spread of 
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nationalism led to a series of revolts not only among non-Muslim communities such as Serbs, 
Greeks, and Bulgarians, but also among communities that got used to self-governance in 
Kurdistan (Ozoglu, 2004; Yadirgi, 2017). These developments taking place within the empire's 
borders since the beginning of the 19th century resulted in two events that would determine the 
fate of the state: The idea of nationalism spread among the Muslims, from whom the state 
derived its legitimacy, and the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) was established in 
1889 (as discussed in detail in the second chapter). This movement, also known as the Young 
Turks, was primarily an intellectual and progressive movement that brought the citizens of the 
empire around values such as "freedom", "equality" and "justice" and carried out activities to 
prevent the collapse of the empire. Then, it adopted an aggressive, totalitarian and exclusionary 
form of Turkish Nationalism by being radicalized in response to the demands for rights among 
the Armenians, Greeks, Kurds and other Ottoman minorities. Along with these developments, 
some pro-self-rule Kurdish resistance movements such as Baban, Bitlis and Barzan revolts 
occurred and the unjust policies of the CUP towards the Kurds caused the emergence of some 
Kurdish resistance movements in the Kurdish emirates of the Ottoman (Ozoglu, 2004; Üngör, 
2012; Yadirgi, 2017). When pan-Turkist policies against the Armenians, the Greeks and the 
Kurds by the CUP that acted with a strict and violent nationalism combined with the devastating 
consequences of the First World War costing the empire, the territory, especially the Kurdistan 
lands, were divided. Thus, the ESA (that is, Northern Kurdistan) was positioned as a region 
within Turkey's borders with the approval of international colonial powers such as Europe and 
America in the Conference of Lausanne held on July 24, 1923. (This issue is addressed in detail 
in the third chapter). However, administrative autonomy had been granted to Kurdistan with 
the Amasya Protocol dated 22 October 1919 between the regional Kurdish allies and the 
Turkish elites who were the administrators of the CUP and the founders of the Turkish State 
established in place of the Ottoman Empire, and the Treaty of Sevres signed on 10 August 1920 
(Yeğen, 2007, p. 127; Yeğen, 2014, p. 42; Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 5, 35, 164, 236). After these two 
treaties, which guaranteed that Kurdistan would have administrative autonomy in the new 
Turkish state, the authoritarian nationalist elites of the Republic, such as M. Kemal and İsmet 
İnönü, did not recognize the existence of a country/region called Kurdistan and the Kurdish 
geography was positioned as a region under the Turkish state as of 1923 when the republic was 
founded. (Yeğen, 2007, p. 127; Yeğen, 2014, p. 42). While the organization of the state as a 
unitary nation-state played a dominant role in the Kurdish policy of the nationalist Turkish 
elites, the fact that Armenians and Greeks outside of the central Turkish identity, who were one 
of the important factors that caused the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, first demanded 
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equality, freedom and autonomy and then became independent states, and the trauma caused to 
the state mentality by such events played an important role as well. While the Treaty of 
Lausanne, which determined the current borders of Turkey, is regarded as one of the political 
achievements of Atatürk, who is considered as the founder and first president of the Turkish 
state that was established in 1923. The Kurdistan territory was divided between Turkey, Iran, 
Iraq and Syria in the Lausanne Conference (the issue is discussed in the third chapter in detail).  
The Kurds organized successive resistance movements and sometimes included tens of 
thousands of Kurdish soldiers against the intimidation policies of the Kemalist state that gained 
momentum after the Lausanne. The Kurdish question was introduced under the "Eastern 
question" during the one-party rule of the Republican People's Party (1923-1950), which was 
founded by Atatürk, and social engineering policies such as reforms, forced migration and 
settlement were implemented by addressing the issue as a cultural backwardness and ignorance 
issue.  
In accordance with the unitary nation-state structure established with an emphasis on the unity 
and indivisibility of the state, Kemalists launched a strict assimilation policy in the ESA in 
order to dissolve all the linguistic and cultural characteristics of the Kurds that are different 
from the central Turkish identity into Turkishness. Apart from these social engineering policies, 
the Kemalist government utilized the resources of Northern Kurdistan (ESA) as a key to involve 
in international capitalist relations by cooperating with international colonial powers such as 
the British Shell Company to access the copper, chrome, boron and oil mines owned by the 
Kurdish region and thus to strengthen the newly established state in economic terms (Sönmez, 
1995; Üngör, 2012; Yadirgi, 2017). Since its establishment, the Kemalist state used the mineral 
resources of the ESA and its lands suitable for agriculture and husbandry as a catalyst in the 
economic development of the state and it constructed railways and roads connected to the center 
from the ESA, like the branches of a tree, in order to reach these resources more easily. With 
these economic policies, the state positioned the ESA as an internal colony and made the region 
dependent on the center of the state through investment policies that would position the region 
as a peripheral economy (the issue is explained in detail in the third chapter). These centralist 
reforms and colonial policies implemented in the ESA during the single-party period led to 
socioeconomic destruction, causing a conflict between the Kurds and the Turkish state.  In 
response to the totalitarian policies of the Turkish state, several resistance movements, notably 
the Sheikh Said (1925) and Seyit Rıza/Dersim (1936-1938) Rebellion, were initiated by the 
tribal and other regional leaders in the Kurdish region. 
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As discussed in detail in the third chapter, after the end of the single-party period, the freedoms, 
albeit limited, granted by the 1961 constitution enabled the reorganization of the Kurdish 
movement, which developed and evolved over time and the organization of meetings known as 
the “Eastern Meetings” led by intellectuals and university students such as Musa Anter in some 
Kurdish cities (Yadirgi, 2017, p. 6). In these meetings, Kurdistan’s colonial status was based 
on the intellectual level and civil protests to be held against both totalitarian state practices and 
the hegemonic order established by the tribes and other interest groups cooperating with the 
Turkish state in the ESA were discussed. When the protests of the Kurdish activists criticizing 
the policies of the official authority and the interest groups in the region disturbed both the state 
and the collaborating groups in the ESA, the state murdered the activists in military operations 
called “Commando Operations” in the Kurdish region during the 1960s and 1970s, and then 
several deaths were registered as murders by “unknown assailants” as many bodies were 
disappeared by the state (Bozarslan, 2015). Some Kurdish activists, who believed that civil 
protests against all these totalitarian policies of the Turkish state were insufficient, founded 
Kurdistan Worker's Party (Partîya Karkeren Kurdistan, PKK) led by Abdullah Öcalan in the 
mid-seventies, which is still active today. The gains achieved by some socialist and activist 
Kurdish politicians, who continued their civil political activities by not joining the PKK and 
taking up arms, were completely eliminated along with their organizational existence as a result 
of the arrests and suppression imposed on them by the military coup in 1980. 
          The PKK's guerrilla warfare against the Turkish state in 1984 mentioned in the third 
chapter analyzing the political economy of Turkey's Kurdish policy is the most crucial part this 
study. Hamit Bozarslan explains the changing policy of the Turkish state towards the Kurds as 
of this date and the influence of the PKK insurgency as follows: ‘1980 is a turning point in 
Kurdish history in Turkey: all nationalist activity was suspended following the military coup, 
and the subsequent return to civil administration has been marked above all by a continuing 
guerrilla warfare’ (Bozarslan, 2003, p. 15 cited in Yadirgi, 2017, p. 7). As Bozarslan explains, 
the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state intensively continued until the early 
2000s. While tens of thousands of civilian Kurds and PKK guerrillas were killed by the Turkish 
state during the civil war that continued in the mountainous and rural areas of the ESA, the 
Turkish army also suffered tens of thousands of casualties. The ESA suffered a great socio-
economic destruction during this civil war since thousands of Kurdish villages and properties 
were burned down and the Kurds were subjected to forced migration due to the Turkish state's 
policies that considered the ESA as a complete terrorist zone and criminalized the vast majority 
of Kurds. In addition, the civil war against the PKK led to a great cost in the state capital.  
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Although partial changes occurred in the state's Kurdish policy due to a short-term ceasefire 
started with the capture and imprisonment of the  PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, as well 
as the election AKP government, which is still in power today, headed by Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan and Turkey's EU candidacy in the same year, such policies have reached the present 
day in a very tense and unstable way. 
             Important developments such as the civil war between the PKK and the Turkish state 
and the rising Kurdish nationalism since the 1980s soon attracted the attention of many people 
working in the field of social sciences, and not surprisingly, the number of academic studies on 
the Kurds have begun to increase. When academic studies on this issue are examined, it is seen 
that the majority of studies have been carried out in the field of sociology, anthropology, 
linguistics and history. While the studies in the field of sociology mostly focus on the political 
causes of conflict, its sociocultural effects on society, the impact of conflict on the demographic 
structure in the Kurdish geography, and trauma and memory studies, studies in the field of 
anthropology concentrate on the issues such as the social ties and cultural rituals of Kurds 
originating from their ethnic identity, the linguistic studies focus on the Kurdish language and 
the diversity of dialects and the reasons for this diversity, and finally, the studies in the field of 
history focus on issues such as the administrative and political status of the Kurds in the 
Ottoman Kurdistan, their autonomous structure, the historical evolution of the conflict and its 
political causes (van Bruinessen, 1988, 2000; Izady, 1994; Sirkeci, 2000; White, 2000; 
McDowall, 2000; Ozoglu, 2004; Üngör, 2012; Ünlü, 2018). However, none of these studies 
provided a detailed analysis of the historical journey of the economic policies towards the ESA 
in Turkey and economic factors that have led to the emergence of the Kurdish Issue, which still 
remains unsolved today. The studies on the economic structure of the ESA either generally 
focus on the economic destruction arising from the conflicts in the region, or focus on the 
economic reasons of the Kurdish Issue by concentrating on the socio-economic backwardness 
created by these economic factors in the ESA (Sönmez, 1995; Bozarslan, 2003, 2008, 2015; 
Yadirgi, 2017). That is why this thesis study attempted to analyze the causes of economic 
underdevelopment of the ESA and the ESA's unequal economic development among the other 
regions in Turkey within a historical context by establishing a bridge between the studies 
focusing on socio-political and historical reasons of the Kurdish Issue in the ESA and Turkey 
and the studies focusing on the economic reasons of the issue. Unlike previous studies carried 
out in the field, this thesis study does not only draw a historical framework of the economic and 
political developments causing the emergence and development of Kurdish issue but also puts 
an emphasis on the ethnological bases of the issue by examining Kurdish poverty within the 
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framework of identity politics of the unitary Turkish state. Thus, this thesis study claims to fill 
in a significant gap in the field of Kurdish studies that has gained popularity in the social 
sciences in recent years. 
2. Study Area (Geographical Setting) 
       In this study whose general framework is presented in the introduction chapter, the study 
area is Northern Kurdistan where its historical and geographical existence was evidenced by 
previous works on Kurdish Studies and which is known as the Eastern and Southeastern 
Anatolia (ESA) region of Turkey today (Bitlisi, Vol. 1, 1975; Beşikçi, 1991; Izady, 1992; 
McDowall, 2000; Ozoglu, 2004; Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 17-30). Territorially, historical existence 
of Kurdistan lands have been evidenced by several academic studies in the field. (Bitlisi, Vol 
1, 1975; Beşikçi, 1991; Izady, 1992; McDowall 2000; Ozoglu, 2004; Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 17-
30).  On the other hand, the geographical extent of Kurdistan has varied significantly due to 
various political, economic and social reasons and its borders have been a matter of debate 
among the researchers. The ongoing debate regarding the geographical extent of Kurdistan can 
be grouped under four items (O’Shea, 2004 cited in Yadirgi, 2017, p. 25): 
i. It is not, and never has been, recognized as an independent state; 
ii. It does not constitute an economically distinct area from other countries in the region; 
iii. The Kurds living in Kurdistan have never been entirely related to each other linguistically 
(dialectically), religiously, and ethnically. 
iv. Kurdistan lies on the major overland trade routes between Asia, Europe, Russia and the Arab 
Middle East, as well as being home to rich oil and water resources, prompting outside powers 
to become involved in its fate. 
         Historically and culturally, the Kurds were organized as sub-national tribes based on 
kinship in terms of social structure and organization (Bruinnessen, 1992; Ozoglu, 2004). The 
tribal system was a traditional form of organization led by a chieftain as well as consisting of 
relatives having a blood-relation (Bruinnessen, 1992; Ozoglu, 2004). The system that controlled 
the tribes regionally was the Kurdish emirates. The Kurds were ruled by a range of emirates 
between the 15th and the early 19th centuries, during which they became affiliated to the 
Ottoman and remained autonomous administrations in the region (Bruinnessen, 1992; Ozoglu, 
2004). While the Kurdish emirates affiliated to the Ottoman Empire operated independently in 
their internal affairs, they provided the Ottoman army with soldiers in the Ottoman wars of 
conquest (Bruinnessen, 1992; Ozoglu, 2004). In the 19th century, the relations between the 
Kurdish emirates and the state deteriorated and resulted in many conflicts primarily due to the 
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nationalization policies of the state actors, and secondly due to the state's colonial activities in 
the Arab and Kurdish territories, as it failed to continue war looting based on conquests 
(Bruinnessen, 1992; Ozoglu, 2004). During this period, Kurdistan lost its autonomy due to the 
colonial activities on the Kurdish territories (Ozoglu, 2004, p. 60). Eventually, as a result of the 
First World War, Kurdistan lands were divided between Britain and France that aimed to benefit 
from rich oil and underground sources of the region in line with the Sykes-Picot Agreement 
signed in May 16, 1916. Then, it was divided into four parts between Turkey, Syria, Iran and 
Iraq in the Lausanne Conference held in July 24, 1923 (Izady, 2015, pp. 61; Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 
5-6, 118-120).  
          The Turkish state, which was established following the collapse of the Ottoman state, 
aimed to change the ethnic, historical and cultural identity of the region through its policies 
aimed at establishing military, political and economic dominance over this region by annexing 
the northern region of Kurdistan (Beşikçi, 1992; Izady, 2015; Yadirgi, 2017; Yarkın, 2019). 
Today, Northern Kurdistan is formally known as the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia (ESA) 
regions of Turkey (Yadirgi, 2017). As shown by the maps presented in the studies carried out 
in situ, there is a general agreement on the issue that there are at least 24 provinces in the ESA 
today, which are; Diyarbakır, Urfa, Antep, Kilis, Maraş, Adıyaman, Mardin, Batman, Malatya, 
Elazig, Tunceli, Erzurum, Erzincan, Sivas, Siirt, Bitlis, Kars, Ardahan, Ağrı, Iğdır, Hakkari, 
Şırnak, Muş and Van (Bitlisi, 1975, p. 20; Bruinessen, 1992, pp. 11-13; Izady, 2015, p. 66; 
Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 25-30, 250). Institut Kurde de Paris, February, 2019). According to the data 
shared by the Institut Kurde de Paris in 12 January 2017, there are 20 million Kurds living in 
Turkey (Institut Kurde de Paris, January, 2017) and 14,2 million Kurds living in the ESA (ibid.). 
Based on this source providing the most current scientific data regarding the Kurdish population 
in Turkey, the Kurds constitute 25% of the total population in Turkey (ibid.).  
          The Kurds speak Kurdish language which belongs to the Iranian branch of the Indo-
European family (Bruinessen, 1992, pp. 21-22; Yadirgi, 2017, p.25). Being a rich and ancient 
language, Kurdish has many different dialects. Kurmanji is the most widely spoken dialect by 
the Northern Kurds (in Turkey) and by the Western Kurds (in Syria) as well as by the Kurds 
living in the Former Soviet Republics (Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan) (Bruinessen, 1992, pp. 
21-22; Yadirgi, 2017, p. 24). In addition, the Southern Kurds (Iraq) mostly speak the Sorani 
dialect of Kurdish, while the Eastern Kurds (Iran) mostly speak the Kirmanshani, Gurani 




           In terms of religion, an overwhelming majority of the Kurds are Muslims. The majority 
of the Kurds are Sunni Muslims who are a part of the Shafii school of Islam, unlike their Arab 
and Turkish Sunnis, who mainly adhere to the Hanafi school (Bruinessen, 1992, pp.    23-25; 
Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 24-25). The majority of the Kurds living in the ESA belong to this group 
(Bruinessen, 1992, pp. 23-25; Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 24-25). However, Kurds living in the 
provinces of Maraş and Dersim (Tunceli), in particular, adhere to the Alevi belief (Bruinessen, 
1992, pp. 23-25; Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 24-25). 
          The regions with a temperature of 5° Celsius (40° Fahrenheit) constitute 15% of the 
region (Izady, 2015, pp. 16-17). These regions include mainly the ESA (Northern Kurdistan) 
and Eastern Kurdistan (ibid.). These regions can have snow 7 months a year (ibid.). Especially, 
Kars and Ardahan located in the ESA are the cities with the most snowfall (ibid.). Regionally, 
the ESA has productive climatic and geographical characteristics in terms of livelihood. 
Generally, the ESA has a climate characterized by hot and dry summers and cold and wet 
winters (ibid.). On average, the ESA has got colder climate conditions than Alaska in the winter 
season (ibid.).  
          Agriculture and animal husbandry are the main sources of income in the region which 
has fertile and extensive agricultural lands (Sönmez, 1995; Bruinessen, 1992, pp. 32-36; 
Yadirgi, 2017). The advantageous position of the ESA in terms of agriculture and animal 
husbandry has led to the emergence of a division of labor as the region has been positioned as 
the internal periphery for the Turkish state, and the investments made by the state have focused 
on these areas (Sönmez, 1995; Yadirgi, 2017). While the agricultural and animal products 
obtained from the region substantially meet the needs of the western part of the country, they 
also increase the export share in the country (Sönmez, 1995; Yadirgi, 2017). In addition, the 
ESA region has a strategic importance in terms of rich mines and other underground resources 
(Sönmez, 1995; Ungor, 2012; Yadirgi, 2017). Having a rich topography in terms of valuable 
underground sources such as chrome, copper and oil, the ESA was subjected to exploitation 
within the scope of European colonial activities that started in the last period of the Ottoman 
Empire, and it has been subjected to internal colonial activities to strengthen the country as well 
as increasing the export share since the establishment of the Turkish state in 1923 (Sönmez, 
1995; Ozoglu, 2004; Ungor, 2012; Yadirgi, 2017)  
        All these social, political, economic, geographic and geological characteristics of the ESA 






             This thesis study has been formed and shaped around a certain paradigm and method 
as a result of an in-depth reading of a large body of literature. Both the master’s programme, 
Development Studies, and personal academic interest have been effective in determining the 
research topic for the thesis study. My interest in Kurdish Studies since the first years of my 
undergraduate studies in Sociology has enabled me to do extensive reading and research in 
order to have a good knowledge of the academic studies conducted in this field. The fact that 
Northern Kurdistan has been named as the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia (ESA) by being 
included in Turkey's territorial borders since the establishment of the Turkish state in 1923 
and ongoing totalitarian and colonialist states policies based on Turkish nationalism that 
started to be implemented intensively in those years have stratified the Kurdish Question into 
many different stages and the layered structure of this question has increased my academic 
interest. This academic curiosity allowed me to focus on political and economic causes of the 
Kurdish poverty in Turkey as a result of the readings I did during the master's programme 
along with my curiosity about issues such as social trauma, social memory, oral history, and 
abstract borders between Kurdish and Turkish society. Thinking about the Kurdish poverty in 
Turkey through the lens of social sciences helped me to discover the multilayered structure of 
the Kurdish issue.  Although there are a limited number of studies carried out in this field, it is 
seen that many studies do not provide an in-depth analysis of the issue and the administrative 
and political structure of the Turkish state. In this thesis study, unlike previous studies, the 
Kurdish issue has been framed in a way that considers the ethnic causes of the issue based on 
the policies of the unitary Turkish nation-state aiming to create a homogeneous nation and 
national Turkish economy as well as utilizing the capital as a component ensuring the survival 
of the state.  
The formation process of the study, which determined the methodological aspect of this 
study, has led to the decision of selecting secondary data analysis as the main methodology 
of this thesis. 
            Secondary data analysis method, which is one of the most fundamental research 
methods in social sciences, is a method through which researchers reinterpret the data from a 
previous research to use it in their own research (Blaikie, 2009, p.160; Bryman, 2012, pp.312-
320). Secondary data refers to government data, other official government statistics or data 
collected by someone else for a scientific research project (ibid.). Secondary analysis may be 
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based on the analysis of quantitative or qualitative data (Bryman, 2012, p. 212). In fact, both 
quantitative and qualitative data from primary sources were obtained and reinterpreted within 
the context of this research (Blaikie, 2009, p. 204-218) The data might have been used in a 
different context in the primary study but the researcher should place the data obtained from 
another source in his own study in a meaningful way (ibid., p. 160). While the secondary data 
analysis method allows researchers to save time and money, this method also creates some 
disadvantages (ibid., p. 161). The most common disadvantage is that the research study from 
which the data was obtained is most likely carried out within the framework of different 
research questions (ibid.). In addition, there is a possibility that the primary researcher did not 
conduct a comprehensive research on the subject (ibid.). Also, the data obtained from the 
primary source might not have been correctly encoded in the original source (ibid.). Lastly, it 
is often not possible to examine or judge the accuracy of data obtained from the primary source, 
the researcher utilizing the secondary analysis method often has to settle for the accuracy of the 
data (ibid.). For all these reasons, in this study, the data were carefully examined and quoted 
from several different sources in order to strengthen the accuracy of qualitative and quantitative 
data obtained from primary sources. In particular, the quantitative data in the sources, which 
are not largely related to the subject of this research but are included in the bibliography due to 
the quantitative data, were purged from the authors’ interpretations as much as possible and 
simply quoted. 
In this thesis study, besides the above-mentioned limitations, the most significant limitation 
was the fact that there were almost no issues corresponding to the research topic or 
corresponding to each other in terms of the context. The current study examining the political 
economy of the issue by addressing the Kurdish poverty within the scope of the nation-state 
policies, nationalism and totalitarian policies in Turkey was formed based on several qualitative 
and quantitative sources. However, since the content of the sources was not parallel with the 
questions pursued by this thesis study, it was necessary to integrate them into the context of this 
study especially without damaging the structure of quantitative secondary data. While this 
situation resulted in a disadvantage in terms of time and mental effort, it also caused the time 
allocated to the literature review to be longer than usual while seeking answers to the questions 
of the study to place the answers on a solid ground. Another limitation regarding the collection 
of the findings is related to the limitation of data collection to be conducted in the ESA due to 
the totalitarian policies carried out in the area of academic freedom, as in many areas of life that 
still continue today (see Chapter 3). Especially, strict and systematic discrimination and 
totalitarian policies on the Kurdish geography initiated since 2015 have posed an obstacle to 
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the interviews planned to be carried out with development agencies and companies in the 
region(Baser, Akgönül and Öztürk, 2017; Özkirimli, 2017). Since an academic and objective 
investigation into the Kurdish issue does not correspond to the current policies of the Turkish 
state, the state has increased its pressure on the intellectuals working on the Kurdish question 
calling attention to the issue day by day(Klein, 2010; Scalbert-Yücel & Le Ray, 2011; Orhan, 
2020). Therefore, the data planned to be obtained from the first-hand sources could not be 
collected from the region. 
Apart from the disadvantages about the findings of the study, another significant disadvantage 
was related to fitting the study into a theoretical foundation. The fact that Northern Kurdistan 
has been positioned as a geographical region of Turkey for about one hundred years, and the 
Turkish state’s colonialist policies on the Kurdish region for its economic interests and 
assimilation policies aiming to Turkify the people of the region has led to the diversification of 
the methodological approach of this thesis study. This multi-layered structure of the Kurdish 
issue has also led to the diversification of the theoretical paradigm utilized in this study that 
aims to understand and interpret the issue. That is, since a single theory cannot provide a 
meaningful representation of the findings to seek answers to the questions in this study, it was 
attempted to utilize the most suitable paradigms explaining the economic, political and 
sociocultural causes of the Kurdish Issue by establishing a link between the theories of several 
social science theorists. Ultimately, the relevant paradigms of many theorists, especially the 
nationalism theories of Eric Hobsbawm(2012), Benedict Anderson(2006) and Ernst 
Gellner(2006 [1983]), were utilized in order to interpret the logical foundations of Turkish 
nationalism, which is one of the main causes of the Kurdish Question. Different nationalism 
theories were utilized because Turkish nationalism does not only ensure the protection of ethnic 
and socio-cultural privileges to its members but also offers many economic, political and 
similar privileges/benefits. In addition, theoretical approaches of Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri(2001), Louis Althusser(2006) and Bob Jessop were utilized to interpret the domination 
policies carried out by the Turkish state on the Kurdish region ESA. While Michael 
Wallerstein's Center-Periphery theory was utilized to clarify the economic policies of the 
Turkish state in the region, Samir Amin's theoretical approach on pre-capitalist modernity in 
Asian and Eastern societies was utilized to interpret political, economic, military, and 
administrative relations between the Ottoman empire and Kurdistan before it was divided into 
four regions. Finally, internal colonialism theory was utilized to analyze the colonial structure 
of Northern Kurdistan/ESA in a meaningful way. Since we cannot mention a single theory of 
internal colonialism, the theoretical approaches specifically shaped by different theorists based 
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on their field were also utilized in the current study. Thus, it was attempted to utilize the most 
suitable models of internal colonialism for the unique structure of the Kurdish Question. Such 
diversity on the theoretical foundation was another major disadvantage encountered in this 
study. 
           The basic theoretical sources that have been effective in determining the relevant sources 
of this study, which is shaped within the framework of the secondary data analysis 
methodology, have been shaped through the road map directed by the paradigms summarized 





























4. 1st.Chapter: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
4. 1. Nation-Nation State: 
            The notion of the nation has been one of the most controversial concepts in the social 
sciences. The notion has been used by several scientists to explain social relationships and it 
has been defined as a concept both shaping the state and shaped by the state. It is an important 
matter of discussion that whether nation is a concept explaining ethnic and social relations or a 
concept generated by the elites (B. Anderson, 2006; P. Anderson, 2013; Eric, 1994; Gellner & 
Breuilly, 1983; Hobsbawm, 2012, p. 22 ;Hobsbawm, 2015). Apart from such discussions in the 
literature, we see that the conceptual meaning is addressed in two different processes, namely 
the pre-modern period and the modern period when handling the concept of nation. 
          Traditionally, the concept of nation was explained based on the terms “origin and 
descent” until the beginning of the 21st century (Hobsbawm, 2012, pp. 14-17). For the 
traditional period, the concept of nation is defined as a phenomenon identifying the common 
bond between individuals arising from the origin and descent existing among different 
individuals independent of the state, territory and a governing power or the elite class (ibid.). 
Hobsbawm (2012) states that the traditional meaning of nation was associated with origin and 
descent and he explains it by quoting  L. Curne de Sainte Pelaye:  “je fus retourné au pays de 
ma nation en la conté de Haynnau (I was returned to the land of my birth/origin in the country 
of Hainault)”(de Sainte-Palaye, 1875, 8 vols, "Nation" in ibid., p. 15). In the traditional 
understanding of nation, origin and descent shaped in a certain territory were only formed 
randomly and it was a political unit, and never a very large one (ibid.). According to Heinrich 
Zedler, the nation can never bear a territorial meaning because the members of different nations 
can live together in the same province, and even in a small state (Zedler, 1733. in ibid., p. 17). 
In the traditional concept of nation, therefore, we see that there is a relationality based on 
Durkheim’s mechanical social solidarity (Durkheim, 2010). 
Additionally, Benedict Anderson(2006) is one of the important theoreticians in the literature 
about the concepts of nation and nationalism. Benedict Anderson’s famous formula called 
“imagined communities” reflects the essence of civic nationalism (ibid.). According to him, the 
nation and nationalism are certain kinds of political products (ibid.). That is to say, a nation can 
easily be defined as a political project. It is not based on a certain group of values; it is the 
outcome of our perceptions and imaginations: “We can summarize the conclusions to be drawn 
from the argument thus far by saying that the convergence of  capitalism and print technology 
on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined 
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community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation.” (B. Anderson, 
2006, p. 46). 
According to Anderson’s conceptualization, the nation is imagined as a limited and sovereign 
community (ibid.). It is imagined as “limited” because it has a finite population and it has 
boundaries, beyond which other nations lie (ibid.). It is imagined as “sovereign” because the 
concept of nation was created in the age of Enlightenment and Revolution, in which the 
hierarchical dynastic realm, which was recognized as the will of God, was destroyed (ibid.). 
Finally, it is imagined as a “community” because the nation is always conceived as a “deep and 
horizontal comradeship” regardless of the unjust practices taking place in each nation (ibid., 
pp. 6-9). Anderson’s conceptualization of the nation is more about the perception/structure of 
the nation formed with modernization. In his definition, he went beyond the conceptualization 
of the nation based on origin and descent peculiar to mechanic solidarity and conceptualized 
the nation as a limited and sovereign phenomenon or an imagined community united around 
common interests in a certain territory. At this point, Ernest Gellner’spoint of view is similar 
to Anderson’s. Gellner regards nationalism as a sociological result of the transition from 
agrarian to industrial society in the 19th century (Gellner & Breuilly, 2006 [1983]). According 
to Gellner’s approach, nationalism is essential to form a modern society(ibid.). According to 
him, two conditions take nationalism to a natural form of political commitment: general 
literacy, which is recognized as a valid form, and special education mechanism, which uses a 
certain setting of expression (ibid. p. 22). Like Gellner, Eriksen(1991) also associates 
industrialization with nationalism: “The modern state, as well as nationalist ideology, is 
historically and logically linked with the spread of literacy, the quantification of time and the 
growth of industrial capital”(Eriksen, 1991, p. 267). So, how did the contextual change in the 
concept of the nation take place during the transition from traditional society to modern 
industrial society? 
The emergence of the concept of nation coincides with the period of monarchic kingdoms that 
were dominant governing structures before feudalism, which was an economic and cultural 
network based on territory, assigned its all kinds of governing power to another social and 
economic system called capitalism (P. Anderson, 2013). The state apparatus was defined as a 
property of monarchy based on the understanding of absolutist state peculiar to feudalism(ibid). 
This state structure was considered as a political form necessary to govern social relations of 
feudalism and relations of production (ibid., pp. 15-42).  During this period, it was necessary 
to put the masses into a common frame except from the serfs, landlords and the nobility, and to 
explain it thoroughly so that they could be governed more easily(ibid.). To explain without 
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going into much detail, the main theme of this hegemony was the theological belief that the 
rulers of religion and state were the representatives of God (ibid; Friedland, 2001). Therefore, 
people were expected to obey the king and the governors completely and this obedience was 
exercised almost without problems until the emergence of trade and the bourgeois 
monopolizing the trade (Anderson, 2013). However, the processes of primitive accumulation 
capital imposed new conditions on the feudal power structures (ibid). In this period, the 
absolutist regime began to make compromises (ibid.). As the economic relations started to 
change, divine characters of the king and the nobles gave their place to the national identity, 
which became a social discourse of the alliance formed by the bourgeois with the proletariat, 
poor people and the serfs, sought to share power (Hardt & Negri, 2001, pp. 221-280). It would 
later be understood that the concept of the modern nation would realize a regime, which is not 
so different from the concept of absolutist nation, and the capitalist relations of 
production(ibid.). It would also continue to oppress social classes that it allied with. An 
important ideological apparatus invented by this concept would be nationalism (see Althusser, 
2006). In addition to the capacity to use the remnants of feudal theological domination in favour 
of the system (churches and religion), nationalism’s constructing its financial pillars would be 
one of the most important features of capitalism (Hardt & Negri, 2001).  In short, the modern 
nation was the definition of a cultural unity based on biological continuity of blood ties, spatial 
continuity of territory and linguistic unity, and nationalism was utilized as a glue ( Hobsbawm, 
2012, pp. 17-80). The class figures dominating the accumulation processes were lying behind 
the concept of nation (ibid.). That is, the bourgeois built its own nation. In such circumstances, 
we can mention two new communities standing side by side. (a) The power of the disciplinarian 
bourgeois recreating the definition of sovereignty by destroying feudal sovereignty but 
attempting to exploit its allies (the remnants of feudalism may also be included in this group); 
(b) as defined by Hardt and Negri “a new productive set of free subjectivities and a disciplinary 
power” (Hardt & Negri, 2001, p. 97).   
Capitalism determined a basis, in which social relations would be established, and identified its 
rules, and created an ideological apparatus that could maintain the executive balance between 
the social groups. With capitalism’s appearance in history, the financial pillars of the nation-
state, which I attempted to explain above, started to be built. In fact, what lay behind the 
sovereignty of political power was the victory of one over another while what created modern 
sovereignty and the nation-state was force (hegemonic sense) and violence (Althusser, 2006). 
In this sense, the nation made an appearance in history as a method adopted by the hegemonic 
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power of the bourgeois simply to solve the problem of sovereignty (Althusser, 2006; 
Poulantzas, 2000, pp. 28-34).  
The main component of the social theses of the revolutionary discourse of historical 
transformations such as the French Revolution was that it put the nation on a pedestal as the 
multitude, which defied the feudal oppression (Hobsbawm, 2012). Unlike its meaning in the 
feudal system, there was the notion of “people and nation” in the concept of nation, which was 
also in the minds of Jacobins and other revolutionary groups (ibid.). After the bourgeois 
captured the sovereignty, the revolutionist ideals’ concept of nation began to be used as an 
ideological state apparatus of the modern domination ( Hobsbawm, 2012, p. 18). The people 
were represented as the original basis of the nation but modern notions of people and the nation 
were essentially actualized as the products of the nation-state. The nation was the community 
of citizens, which was the reflection of state sovereignty (ibid.). The phenomenon of the nation 
in the modern period was built around citizenship and collective participation as a tool for the 
justification of the activities of the state organization, which was founded in a certain territory 
with defined borders (ibid.). John Stuart Mill explains the structure of the nation in the modern 
state structure: “Desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be 
government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively” (Mill, 1910, pp. 359-366 
cited in Hobsbawm, 2012, p. 19). In the most general sense, the theological oppression 
mechanism utilized to keep the society together (the view that the king was the representative 
of God and should be obeyed) was replaced by the glue of nationalism manipulated by the 
capitalists. The bourgeois sovereignty hid the equivalent of this sovereignty mechanism in 
capitalism inside the notion of the nation created by revolutionist ideals (ibid.).  There were 
nation-states within the closed borders in the new social regime built in this sense and the 
relations between these nation-states were kept to a minimum (ibid.).  
After the creation of the control society based on the nation-state, modern sovereignty emerged 
with the desire not only to become a force based on individual identity and existence of the 
society but also to govern and tame them at the same time (ibid.). The nation-state nationalism 
was formed to overcome the paradox created by this situation (ibid.). It was thought that the 
way to overcome the crisis, which would emerge because the producers and those running the 
economy would be side by side in the modern society, was to give the impression that “what 
creates the sovereignty is the nation itself” (P. Anderson, 2013). Thus, the nation and nationalist 
discourse were transformed into the condition of the possibility of all human action and social 
life (ibid). Whenever an incident, which would “endanger the national integrity”, happened, an 
external/foreign power began to be mentioned. This situation normalized the nationalism’s 
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functioning as a protective shield in every level of the state and social life (ibid). Subsequently, 
the idea that everything is allowed for the survival of the state within the awareness of 
citizenship was popularized (ibid). 
Within this scope, Hobsbawm (2012) explains the establishment of the state in the modern 
period with the equation Nation = State = People. He states that especially ‘sovereign people’ 
in this equation link nation to a certain territory, since the structure of the state is defined by the 
territory (ibid.). Hobsbawm emphasizes that the most important element in this equation is the 
state from the perspective of the sovereign powers and governments (ibid.). Eventually, the 
phenomenon of the nation here is the community of people, who live in a certain territory 
‘founded’ by the nation-state as a means, and who are attempted to be homogenized (ibid.). 
This idea represented the basic content of the years in which  ‘nation’ building policies were 
the pioneers in newly founded states attempting to reorganize themselves as nation-states in the 
19th and 20th centuries, when radical changes regarding governance took place around the 
world (ibid., pp. 23-28). 
         The modernist commentators of nationalism see concepts such as nationality and 
nationalism as the concepts that emerged as a result of modernization and industrialization 
(Ozkirimli, 2010, p. 85). They argue that nationalism is a concept that emerged with modernism 
(ibid). Several liberal theoreticians including economic philosophers and theoreticians such as 
Adam Smith, John Roe, J. Stuart Mill and Walter Bagehot addressed the concept of the nation 
based on a certain territorial structure (Hobsbawm, 2012, pp. 24-26). According to several 
liberal philosophers in the 19th century, it was not possible to speak of a transnational capitalist 
economy from the 18th century, in which traditional form of nations existed, to the years after 
the Second World War (ibid, pp. 23-28). According to the popular view among liberal writers 
of the 19th century, the nation-state forms its economic system with this concern of nationality, 
just like the nation-building process in the modern period (ibid., p. 25). In this period, the state 
pursues policies based on nationality while it forms its economic capital (Hobsbawm, 2012; 
Özer, 2014). Oligarchic structures and class inequalities are supported by the states, in which 
top-down institutionalism is owned by the sovereign power in every field (P. Anderson, 2013). 
Capital is also accumulated around the central identity in such countries, which include many 
different ethnicities and pursue a homogeneous nation-building policy (Hobsbawm, 2012; P. 
Anderson, 2013). In the nation-state model based on nationality, the relationship and treaty 
between the state and capital were based on the protection of capital and maintaining the 
continuity of the capital increase in return for the protection of nationality (Hobsbawm, 2012, 
p. 29).  
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          Eric Hobsbawm discusses the concepts of nation and nationalism from a theoretical 
perspective while Barış Ünlü (2018) uniquely addresses the nation, nationalism and its 
economic pillars in his book about the reason of state, on which the Turkish nation-state was 
founded, as a theoretical and practical example. Within these contexts, the concept of 
nationalism has created a consciousness, which can bring groups with conflicting interests 
together without any conditions, within the closed borders of the nation-state in the event of a 
foreign danger (Hobsbawm, 2012; Ünlü, 2018). The establishment of an absolute racial 
difference formed the fundamental basis of a homogeneous concept of national identity 
(Anderson, 2013.). The actual sleight and ingenuity in the foundation of the people is the 
eradication of internal differences of the whole population by a hegemonic group, race or class 
(ibid.). One of its conscious foundations is nationalism (ibid.). That is, national sovereignty is 
the product of identity formation (ibid.). One of the functions of this formation is to guard the 
relations of capitalist production and consumption (ibid.). The governance network, which is 
determined by a certain parliament and the mode of rule to shape economic relations within the 
state borders, functions as its tool (ibid.). Then, the establishment of a nation-state, which 
homogenizes the existing social heterogeneity and creates its citizens by originating unity and 
putting it into the cultural and economic hierarchy, is the main character of bourgeois 
sovereignty (ibid.). Inevitably, all the oppressive components of totalitarian modern 
sovereignty will emerge with the national liberation and the establishment of nation-states 
(ibid.). Capitalist economic relations and the domination mechanisms of the state lie at the 
bottom of this structure (ibid.). At this point, we need to understand that the concepts of the 
nation-state, nation and nationalism are not natural political processes, but a set of concepts 
created by the capitalist economic system (P. Anderson, 2013). 
The concepts of nation and nation-state in the pragmatic relationship, which was defined by 
Hobsbawm(2012) as “the era of triumphant bourgeois liberalism” to define the relationship 
between the bourgeois and nation-state, were created to construct both the continuity of national 
identity and the capital. This structure of nation and national state would ultimately lead to the 
formation of a monolingual and united liberal world state (ibid).  Hobsbawm figures out: 
“Because the development of nations was unquestionably a phase in human evolution or 
progression or progress from the small group to the larger, from family to tribe to region, to 
nation and, in the last instance, to the unified world of the future” (ibid., p. 38). 
According to Hobsbawm, from the perspective of liberal ideology, the nation (that is, a viable 
great nation) reflected the phase of evolution that appeared in the middle of the 19th century 
(ibid, p. 39). Undoubtedly, when we think about the structure that allowed the emergence of 
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such a great nation, we should remember the dialectic of “big fish eat little fish”. In other words, 
nations having more dominant and large population suppress and assimilate nations with less 
population. Thus, a homogeneous and monolingual state will emerge as a result of a conflictual 
process, in which conflicts, repression and violence take place (ibid.). 
In the liberal understanding of the nation, other meanings were also attributed to the nation 
(ibid.). In the late 19th and the 20th century, in which the first samples of liberalism appeared, 
the concept of nation was being shaped by liberal aphorisms since it was a new concept (ibid.). 
Liberal freedom and equality served for the path of fraternity (ibid.). In addition, it is necessary 
to draw attention to two situations contradicting with liberal understanding. Firstly, social 
relations that are unique to traditional society, in which mechanical social solidarity such as 
fraternity is present, completely contradict with modern liberal understanding. However, the 
basic understanding in liberal thought should also be addressed here: Liberalism is based on 
pragmatic understanding, that is, anything that exists in society can be utilized as long as it is 
for the benefit of the individual. Secondly, any kind of relationality based on fraternity secretly 
points to totalitarianism because it is an older-younger brother relationship and the older brother 
usually has more voice than the younger brother. That is, older brother puts pressure on the 
younger brother. As a result, it is seen that this liberal understanding of the nation serves for 
the instrumental reason of nation-state in forming a homogeneous national identity.  
The structure of liberal thought naturally addresses the concept of “nation” from a 
developmental perspective, like all the other social spheres(ibid.). It is seen that liberal thought 
approaches the nation from a positivist, developmental perspective, as in Marx and 
Engels(ibid.). This liberal structure in multinational states that are based on freedom and 
equality could have naturally allowed different ethnic minorities to preserve their cultural 
characteristics and ethnic languages. However, since they were founded, many nation-states 
have been carrying out policies through a structure on which the central identity was built, and 
they have been reinforcing this structure and strengthening the central identity by adopting 
liberal economic policies and they have caused other minorities to weaken gradually against 
the central identity (Ünlü, 2018).  
Bob Jessop(1990) explains the sovereignty strategies of capitalist nation-states through the 
concepts of hegemony and domination in the third chapter of his book called “State Theory: 
Putting the Capitalist State in its Place” (ibid, pp. 191-272). According to Jessop, there are 
various methods used by Modern sovereignty to transform and tame the revolutionary potential 
in the phase of a nation-state (ibid.). For example, the real social identity is reduced to 
order/system identity while the reality of existence is reduced to a theological essence (ibid.). 
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The concept of modernity is emptied and the ethical foundation of social relations changes its 
direction towards hegemony (ibid.). The system is naturalized in a general mediation 
mechanism and people become subjected to the system (ibid.). The revolutionary potential is 
brought under control and the domination of the state over each segment is increased (ibid.). If 
we pay attention, we can find the nuclei of the concept of nationalism in all of them. In that 
sense, while nationalism was utilized in a progressive manner against the feudal system, it was 
used in a reactionary and repressive manner in the age of capitalist nation-states. Considering 
that economic relations affect all the societies also in cultural context, we see that the great 
nation-states and revolutionary characters in the foundation ideals of national liberation 
struggles in the 20th century were transformed into fascist governments in a very short period 
of time with the political mentality of Bonapartism and we can state that nationalism is an 
important corner of the triangle consisting of capitalism and the nation-state. Of course, the 
phenomena such as the bureaucratic state mechanism, the state’s means of repression and 
violence, organizations of deep state, the efforts to create new obedient individuals during this 
period also prove that nationalism was utilized as a kind of hammer-force. Society, which 
evolved from feudal subjects into the nation-state citizens made an appearance as an effective 
political figure.  The existence of the nation and the notion of nationalism is a theological power 
that needs to be preserved and a legacy from the old times. 
        As a result, it is seen that capitalism, nation-state and nationalism are the structures acting 
as institutions supporting each other, which are founded by the sovereign powers. While the 
capitalist bourgeois class consists of individuals with a central ethnic identity, the structure of 
the nation-state enables the enrichment of individuals having the central identity, and it ensures 
the safety and continuous development of the capital. The continuity of the nation-state, which 
protects the capital in this way, is guaranteed by the ideology of nationalism. Therefore, the 
capitalist bourgeois class constantly tries to keep the nationalist ideology alive in its territory. 
A structure or a state, in which nationalism and capitalism support each other, inevitably results 
in the formation of central/core and peripheral identities both culturally and economically. 
While the central/core identity is the ethnic identity, on which the nation-state was founded, the 
peripheral identity is the minority identity outside the central/core identity, which consists of a 
different ethnic language and culture and whose capital accumulation is not supported by the 
state (on the contrary, attempted to decapitalize). However, in this context, the periphery 
represents a different geography located in the same state, which is less developed compared to 
the core and which exists as a part of the core as being dependent on it. As seen, in this thesis, 
the internal core-periphery dichotomy or separation in a nation state with different ethnic groups 
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 is examined instead of adopting a macro perspective of the core and periphery countries in the 
relevant literature.  
 
4. 2. Core-Periphery Theory 
            Structuralist theories, which have an important position in international relations 
studies, hold the view that both political and economic factors are influential in analyzing the 
international system in terms of facts and events. The fundamental perspective of these theories 
is their adoption of a bipolar approach in the analyses (Core-Periphery, Global North-Global 
South). In this bipolar approach, the issue is addressed from the perspective of one side 
(Periphery, Global South) when dealing with the phenomena. The notions of core and periphery 
are identified within the ‘dependency’ theory. The “core” has the high ability to influence the 
international system and the “periphery” is under the influence and control of this core. 
          The notion of core-periphery was first identified by the American sociologist Edward 
Shils (1975) in his article titled “Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology”.  What Shils 
attempted to explain by the concept of the core was a ‘genetic code’ enabling the integration of 
society (ibid). Within the framework of this definition, he points out that there are two 
sides/dimensions of the core: cultural dimension and theoretical dimension (ibid, p. 1). In Shils’ 
terminology, the core both reflects the values and beliefs shaping the society and the institutions 
built on these values and beliefs (ibid). Essentially, the core with its cultural dimension is the 
‘centre of the order of symbols, of values and beliefs, which govern the society’ (ibid.). 
Shils states that every society has a core.  According to Shils (1975) for every imagined place 
or civilization there is a center/core from where every piece of idea, amongst them religious, 
political, cultural and administrative thoughts are reflected to the less influencial peripheries . 
Knowingly or unknowingly, ideas that originate from the center, from where the elite are 
stationed, dominate all the other junior discourses that are utilized the outer parts of a  
geographic or society that are located in the periphery (Shils,1975). Political, cultural, religious 
or any other ideas of the same weight has their sources from the center, and governs the 
mainstream perspectives that dominate the whole entity (the center and the periphery), putting 
efforts to modify them becomes tough as well (ibid). 
According to Shils, each of the subsystems/organizations such as economy, status system, 
political organizations, the university system, religious organizations owns several elites (ibid). 
Each of these elites makes decisions to maintain the existence of the organization, to monitor 
members’ behaviors and to achieve their objectives (ibid.). Shils defines the elites’ decisions as 
the central value system and as the central organizations of the society (ibid.). Shils describes 
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the central value system as the organizations shaping a considerable part of the population of 
the society through the influence of their authority (ibid.). According to Shils, the power of the 
ruling class derives from its duty in certain key positions in the central institutional 
system(ibid). Different segments of the elite are never equal. On the other hand, whether they 
are equal, unitary or segmental, there is usually a fairly large amount of consensus among the 
elites of the central institutional system (ibid.). 
         As a result, in Shils’ conceptualization, the elites, as the members of the core, control the 
periphery by making the periphery dependent on the core through various kinds of pragmatic 
relationships they establish with the periphery. This relationship of control and dependency is 
maintained through comprador structures or groups in the periphery (ibid.). 
          
4. 2. a. The Approach of Immanuel Wallerstein 
          The perspective of Immanuel Wallerstein towards the core-periphery theory is a macro-
structuralist paradigm. Wallerstein(2004) suggests that the world capitalist system is the 
fundamental element shaping the core-periphery concepts in the World-Systems model. In this 
approach, which addresses the phenomenon of capitalism and underdevelopment, the surplus 
value transmitted from periphery countries to the core within the scope of the reproduction of 
capitalism and the maintenance of the level of underdevelopment in peripheral countries, is 
examined(ibid.).  
Wallerstein developed this model by arguing that there is a “single world” connected by a 
complex network of economic exchange relationships. When developing his single world 
capitalist system argument, Wallerstein was influenced by Fernand Braudel, who suggested 
that the Mediterranean formed a “World-economy” in the 16th century((Wallerstein, 2004, pp. 
15-16).  He divided world countries into three zones: core, periphery, and semi-periphery(ibid.). 
According to this model, countries in the core are the industrialized countries exporting 
manufactured products and importing raw materials, and specializing in technology, capital-
intensive commodity and services. On the contrary, the periphery countries are the poor 
countries importing manufactured goods and they are passively integrated to the core countries. 
The semi-peripheral countries act as a buffer between the core and the periphery. He states that 
these countries, which both exploit and are exploited, contribute to the perfect progression of 
the capitalist world economy(Wallerstein, 2004). 
          According to Wallerstein’s analysis, this world economy is not the only world economy 
ever; however, it is the only capitalist world economy that has survived by thriving and gaining 
strength(ibid.). The world-economy, in which we are in, is the capitalist world economy(ibid.). 
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The economic system surviving for a long period of time is characterized by the capitalist mode 
of production (ibid., p.17). Karl Polanyi’s three features, which differentiate the capitalist mode 
of production from previous production processes, explain how this new economic order 
maintains its existence by gaining strength(ibid.). Polanyi names these production organizations 
as follows: “reciprocal (a sort of direct give and take), redistributive (in which goods went from 
the bottom of the social ladder to the top to be then returned in part to the bottom), and market 
(in which exchange occurred in monetary forms in a public arena)” (Polanyi, 1994. citen in 
Wallerstein, 2004, p.17). Wallerstein based his analysis on Polanyi’s arguments. However, he 
changed the names of these concepts by switching mini-systems with reciprocity, world-
empires with the redistribution, and world-economies with market exchanges (ibid.). At this 
point, it is clearly seen that Polanyi’s modes of redistributive and market organization are the 
processes that correspond to the top-down relationship between the core and periphery. In the 
redistribution process, there is a process of exploitation, in which raw materials of the periphery 
is processed in the core and marketed to the periphery in favor of the capitalist class (ibid.). In 
the market organization, there is a process of monetary mobility from the periphery to the core, 
in which capitalists make a profit at maximum (ibid.). 
The division of labor is another important concept, in which Wallerstein explains the process 
of economic organization between core and periphery (ibid.). According to him, a capitalist 
world-economy is characterized by an axial division of labor between core-like production 
processes and peripheral production processes (ibid.). Those participating in the core-like 
production processes between two different divisions of labor are more privileged compared to 
the periphery (ibid.). Some regions or states can be brought together because of these unequal 
and processes. This situation led to inequality or dichotomy between the core and periphery. 
However, Wallerstein puts excessive emphasis on a situation: According to him, core-like and 
peripheral processes do not emerge because of the states but the mode of production itself 
(ibid.). Wallerstein explicitly states that the mode of capitalist production or the 
capitalists/bourgeois are now above the oligarchic political elites and they determine the world 
order. Division of labor ensures the unity of the core and periphery states and it leads to the 
formation of a dependency relationship between these different structures (ibid., p. 22). 
However, the situation here is not the dependency of the core to the periphery but the 
dependency of the periphery to the core. 
When we look at Wallerstein’s conceptualization, we see that the core-periphery processes do 
not correspond to two different situations but they are the concepts explaining relational 
processes interacting with each other. Wallerstein explained what made the production 
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processes central and peripheral through the monopolization of the commodity. According to 
him, monopolized processes were also profitable compared to products circulating in the free 
market. This situation made the states involving in core-like processes wealthier. Eventually, a 
linear development could be achieved by maintaining a surplus-value increase based on the 
number of owned monopoly products. 17-18). Wallerstein’s ideas regarding the superiority of 
monopolization over free trade are again based on Braudel’s (Braudel, 1992 in Wallerstein, 
2004, pp. 18) theory. Braudel deconstructed the paradigm describing free market economy as 
the defining feature of capitalism both by classical economists and Marxism, and he put the 
concept of monopoly against it. He stated that capitalism was the zone of monopolies and, in 
this respect, it was “anti-market” (Ibid, 2004, p. 18). The second most important contribution 
of Braudel to the world-system analysis is the concept of “longue duree” (long time). Braudel 
advocated for the plurality of social times and put emphasis on a structural time with this 
concept. The world-systems analysts describe the notion of “longue duree” as the partial 
historical time itself (ibid, 2004, pp. 19-20). This understanding, which addresses the structural 
and partial continuity of time, is a distinctive feature describing the capitalist world-system in 
the zone of monopolies. 
The world-systems theory imminently sought to find answers to the criticisms received from 
several disciplines regarding its above-mentioned features.  Marxist criticism based on Robert 
Brenner’s arguments identified the world-systems theory as  Circulationist (a paradigm that 
does not address all factors that affect the occurrence of a situation) and it claimed that it 
neglected the productionist base of surplus-value and the struggle between the bourgeois and 
proletariat as the explanatory variable of social change (ibid., pp. 20-21). Again, Marxist 
theoreticians accused world-systems analysis of failing to treat non-wage-labor as anachronistic 
and on course to extinction (ibid.). In response to such criticism, the world-systems analysts 
persistently emphasized that wage-labor is only one of the many forms of labor control within 
a capitalist system, and it is not the most profitable one at all from the point of view of capital 
(ibid.). These analysts argued that the class struggle and all other forms of social struggle could 
be only understood and evaluated within the world-system taken as a whole (ibid.).  
Wallerstein explained the ways the World-Systems Analysis is different from Nomothetic, 
state-autonomists, Orthodox Marxist and cultural-particularistic criticisms as follows  
For nomothetic positivism, the actor is the individual, homo rationalis. For orthodox 
Marxism, the actor is the industrial proletariat. For the state-autonomists, it is political 
man. For cultural particularists, each of us (different from all the others) is an actor 
engaged in autonomous discourse with everyone else. For world-systems analysis, these 
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actors, just like the long list of structures that one can enumerate, are the products of a 
process. They are not primordial atomic elements, but part of a systemic mix out of 
which they emerged and upon which they act. They act freely, but their freedom is 
constrained by their biographies and the social prisons of which they are a part 
(Wallerstein, 2004, p. 21-22).  
Analyzing their prisons liberates them to the maximum degree that they can be liberated. 
Undoubtedly, Wallerstein identified the role of actors in the system(s) specific to the 
relationship between his world-systems analysis and the dependency theory in terms of the 
dependency to other actors. In other words, this analysis states that actors can never be fully 
free but they can be free as much as they discover the system, which encloses and surrounds 
them (ibid.). 
         One of the most fundamental issues that Wallerstein entered into discussions with other 
world-systems analysts such as Samir Amin and Andre Gunder Frank arises from his concept 
of the Capitalist World-economy. According to Wallerstein, all the economic systems managed 
to survive for a short period of time before capitalism (ibid., p. 23). However, the modern 
capitalist world-system is different from all the other world-economy systems since it ensures 
an endless accumulation of capital (ibid., p. 24). According to him, we can understand that we 
are in a capitalist order by looking at the endless accumulation of capital. The endless 
accumulation of capital is described as an accumulation order, in which firms or people 
accumulate capital in order to accumulate more capital and they do it in an endless way (ibid). 
However, it is an obligation to follow structural mechanisms in order to accumulate capital 
endlessly. It is possible to accumulate capital endlessly as long as people conform to structural 
mechanisms, while nonconforming ones are taken out of the system (ibid). For example, all 
kinds of firms or individuals within the national borders of the modern nation-states organizing 
a homogeneous structure built with a consciousness of a single nation have the power of 
maneuverability to the extent that they serve the national interests determined by the state. The 
capitals of firms or individuals, which conform to the structural order, are secured through 
monopolization and thus, endless accumulation of capital is ensured(ibid.).  
Wallerstein argues that monopoly more is preferred by the capitalists since they can maximize 
the profit gained from the products compared to free trade within the modern capitalist world-
system (ibid. p. 26). In addition, he states that perfect monopolies are extremely difficult to 
create but quasi-monopolies are not (ibid.). In the modern capitalist world-economy, policies 
such as state restrictions on imports and exports, state subsidies and tax benefits, buying 
products with excessive prices, using force to prevent weaker states from creating counter-
 
 29 
protectionist measures, and implementing state interventions to restrict the movement of 
smaller producers ensure the formation of quasi-monopolies(ibid.). Notice that all of those 
practices are carried out by giving reference to the organic bond between the state and the 
capitalist class. Therefore, the continuity of the state means the continuity of capital. Eventually, 
a system emerges, in which the firms or actors in the core become distinctly powerful compared 
to the firms and actors in the periphery and they control the periphery by repressing it(ibid, pp. 
27-39). 
           According to Wallerstein, the axial division of labor of a capitalist world-economy 
divides production into core-like products and peripheral products (ibid, p. 28). Wallerstein 
addresses the concepts of core-periphery in relation to profitability rates in the production 
process(ibid.). Since Wallerstein directly associates profitability with monopolization, he 
identifies core-like production processes as the processes controlled by quasi-monopolies. 
Therefore, peripheral processes are considered as competitive processes(ibid.). When the 
exchange occurs in these two processes, peripheral competitive processes are in a weak position 
while quasi-monopolized products are in a strong position. As a result, there is a constant flow 
of surplus-value from the producers in the periphery to the producers in the core. Wallerstein 
defines this situation as “unequal exchange”(ibid., p. 28). Wallerstein states that exploitation is 
another form of surplus-value/flow of products from the periphery to the core as a process, in 
which the core derives high profit from peripheral resources in the short term(ibid.). However, 
he states that a system based on exploitation consumes itself and peripheral resources are not 
used efficiently in such an order of exploitation since its outcomes and gains are medium-term 
(ibid., p. 29). 
Wallerstein argues that some states have both core-like and peripheral characteristics. He 
conceptualized countries, which are in the process of a capitalist change, as semi-peripheral 
countries (ibid.). However, since the structures with such production and change processes are 
not a part of our topic, there is no need to explain the issue in depth(ibid.). 
The states, which substantially and constantly benefit from the peripheral processes, carry out 
policies to protect quasi-monopolies of the core-like processes (ibid., pp. 29-30). This situation 
both ensures the consolidation of the central government in power and the strengthening of the 
state by serving the ideology, upon which the state based (ibid.). 
Wallerstein emphasizes that sovereign states can determine the value, profit rate, tax rate and 
the movement of products at the border crossings of the core and periphery and this situation is 
always beneficial to the core-like production processes in those countries (ibid., p. 46). He 
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defines three fundamental kinds of transactions across boundaries: the movement of goods, of 
capital, and of persons (ibid.).  
We are not just talking about border relations or trade between two different core and periphery 
countries. The same issue is valid for the inner periphery zones within abstract boundaries in 
nation-states, where have different ethnis groups/society, where the interests of central ethnic 
identity are preserved (ibid, p. 51-52). At this point, Wallerstein calls attention to the concept 
of “people” (ibid. pp. 51-52). Although it seems that the concept of people is used as an 
egalitarian conceptual reference in the nation-states, where have many different ethnic groups 
but there is a single ethnic group located in the core, it is mainly used as a product of 
homogenizing political interest (ibid.). The concept of people generally has a conceptual 
meaning, in which inclusion and exclusion policies are present(ibid.). While the included 
represent those who belong to the central ethnic identity or accept the assimilationist 
domination of that identity (but still not completely equal with those belonging to identity), 
serve the continuity of the interests of the states, while the excluded represent those with a 
different ethnic identity from the central ethnicity (ibid.). The excluded are sought to be 
included while those who are already included are organized to maintain the narrowly defined 
eligibility for citizens’ rights. Since the people in the periphery are excluded from the 
parliament, they try to be organized in order to demand for their rights on alternative platforms. 
This process ultimately leads to rebellion and revolts, and these rebellious activities sometimes 
end up with revolution (Wallerstein, 2004, pp. 51-52). The included groups promote policies 
against the inclusion of the excluded because they do not want to share their privilege acquired 
from their central identities (Ünlü, 2018).. Since the inclusion of the excluded leads to the 
division of capital among more people, the people owning the central capital prevent this 
division of surplus-value by claiming that they act for the interests of the nation-state 
mechanism (ibid). 
Another important point mentioned by Wallerstein specific to the internal dynamics of the core-
periphery dichotomy is that local and regional comprador structures carry out activities in their 
own interests by taking advantage of the authority gap during the periods in which the state is 
weak and becomes weaker (ibid., pp. 53-54). Local landowners, tribals, mafia-like gangs and 
similar interest groups become local or regional totalitarian groups and they transform into the 
pressure groups on regional people (ibid.). Such authoritarian structures carry out activities to 
make high profit by organizing a capitalist movement on non-monopolized products (ibid.). 
Such capital accumulation leads to an increase in local and regional economic inequalities and 
increases social stratification (ibid.).  
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The state develops policies to eliminate the authority gap and strengthen the state by 
concentrating on nationalist/chauvinist policies (Wallerstein, 2004, pp. 54-55). According to 
Wallerstein, the states utilize three basic modes of creating nationalism:  the state school 
system, service in the armed forces, and public ceremonies (ibid.). The state aims to establish 
a homogeneous nation by building a national identity and uniting people from all the different 
ethnicities around this central ethnic identity within its territory and it utilizes all of its 
apparatuses for its ideological ambitions (ibid.). 
Policies during such periods, in which hegemony reaches the highest levels, are the processes 
most beneficial to the capital interest groups (ibid. p. 58). In these periods, laws are enacted for 
the advantage of these interest groups and the institutional functionality is carried out for the 
advantage of these groups. Hegemony ensures the functionality of several non-functional 
institutions in a state mechanism in a short period of time; monopolistic ones thrive in this 
stability (ibid.). Hegemony is also accepted by ordinary people since it claims to guarantee a 
more prosperous future for all(ibid.). However, no state can be governed indefinitely with strict 
totalitarianism. Wallerstein emphasizes that hegemony eventually weakens and disappears. 
However, a coup takes place in the new process (ibid.). At this stage, hegemonic power actually 
rules the state through military practices. These military practices prove that the state has 
weakened and this process is the most apparent indication of the collapse of the state (ibid.). 
The government powers referring to imperial power abolish the legitimacy, which is built on 
hegemonic power first economically, then politically and eventually the imperial power is 
widely perceived as a sign not of strength but of weakness (ibid.). The pressure of the core on 
periphery increases in the states, where such extreme totalitarian practices are in effect in the 
event that the concept of legitimacy is achieved by militant nationalism (ibid.). Ultimately, this 
situation leads to the emergence of several social movements including internal conflicts(ibid.). 
We mentioned that Wallerstein emphasized three basic modes of creating nationalism 
(Wallerstein, 2004, p. 66). These are: primary schools, the army, and national 
celebrations(ibid.). Especially, the primary schools were so important in terms of liberalism 
because they were supported by both the radicals and the conservatives (ibid.). Most 
importantly, they played a key role as institutions teaching the national language. In addition, 
they transformed workers and peasants into potential citizens so that they could perform their 
national duties (ibid.). This should be seen as a derivation of the mutual interest relationship 




Another vessel that feeds the nationalism is related to hostility against internal and external 
powers (ibid, p.  66). The nation-state structure calls for national unity especially by spreading 
the discourse that the differences are a policy of foreign states during the process of a 
homogeneous identity formation (Wallerstein, p. 66; Ünlü, 2018). 
Finally, Wallerstein distinguishes the issues of the liberty of the majority and the liberty of the 
minority. He states that we can talk about real liberty as long as the collective political decision 
processes do not suppress the minority but they reflect in fact the ideas of the majority and 
enable the active participation of the majority in decision-making process. The majority should 
be able to access information if we are to talk about the liberty of the majority (ibid, p. 88). 
The liberty of the minority is related to activities in realms, in which the majority does not 
impose its all values and judgements and the minority groups can pursue their preferences (ibid. 
pp. 88-89). According to Wallerstein, the minority must be equal socially and economically to 
be able to mention equality in areas, where the majority decisive in terms of representation 
(ibid. p. 89). To speak of real liberty, individuals from all segments must realize their own 
liberty and encourage the liberty of the minorities (ibid.). 
         There are several criticisms against Wallerstein’s world-systems theory, which argues that 
there were multiple world systems before 1492 but there is only one continuous modern world 
system after 1492.  Andre Gunder Frank and Berry K. Gills (1993) present a single world 
system analysis in response to Wallerstein’s conceptualization, they extend accumulation of 
capital over 5000 years and state that this has been continuous in the whole process of the world 
system (Gunder Frank & Gills, 1993).  
According to these theoreticians, the unequal exchange of surplus value between the core and 
periphery is not only specific to the modern world-systems; this unequal exchange is a system, 
which existed for ages, before 1492(ibid.). They claim that hegemony and competition 
relations, which are the indicators of power to ensure the continuity of capital, date back to 
before 1492 (ibid.). These theoreticians argue that before 1492, there were also contraction and 
expansion processes, in which relations of production between the core-periphery become 
distinct (ibid.). Frank and Gills address capital accumulation as a system that existed for 
thousands of years and they provide examples about trade through agriculture, livestock, 
military, temples and luxuries peculiar to the traditional period (ibid, pp. 7-8). 
According to Frank and Gills, Wallerstein’s argument that the periphery will be strengthened 
during contraction periods in the core by taking advantage is false because there are multiple 
hegemonic powers dominating the periphery (ibid, p. 8). Although there is a relief in the 
policies and mobility of the firms in the periphery during contraction periods in the core, the 
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periphery may not reach its desired expansion due to hegemonic relations and means of 
repression organized by the central structure beforehand (ibid.).  
In addition, these two analysts’ conceptualization of people is fluid (ibid, p. 23). They argue 
that one cannot sharply define society based on ethnic and economic dependence and every 
individual in society is pragmatic, thus, one cannot talk about a single society (ibid, pp. 23-24).  
Frank and Gills claim that there is a single world system and continuous capital accumulation 
goes back to the times of aristocratic agricultural societies and therefore, hegemony has been 
constantly present in unequal societies/states.  
         Another criticism against Wallerstein’s World-systems analysis was made by Samir Amin 
(1993). Amin argues that the modern world analysis is completely Eurocentric and it offers an 
interpretation of all world systems from the center of Europe and this does not reflect reality 
(Amin, 1993, pp. 247-278). Like Wallerstein, Amin also acknowledges that there was a 
fundamental change in the world system after 1492 and the world system moved from east to 
west (or from South to North). However, Amin claims that the eastern countries were in the 
core, contrary to present, and there was a conflict between the east and west. While Amin makes 
a sharp distinction between the pre-capitalist period before 1492 and capitalist period after 
1492, he also argues that there is a sharp polarization between the core and periphery (ibid, p. 
247).  
Amin’s biggest contribution to the world system analysis is his sharp distinction between the 
capitalist mode of production and the mode of production specific to eastern and some Asian 
countries, in which traditional mode of production was dominant. Amin states that surplus value 
in eastern and some Asian countries is directly tapped from peasant activity through some 
transparent devices associated with the organization of the power hierarchy (ibid,  p. 248). He 
identifies societies with surplus value flow as “tributary societies” (ibid.). Amin emphasizes the 
necessity of legitimacy enabling such a flow of surplus value. He highlights the necessity of 
having a state religion to ensure legitimacy relationship which guarantees that peasants “pay 
tribute” to the state (ibid, p. 249). Thanks to the presence of an official state religion, it was 
ensured that the people created a flow of surplus value in line with religious beliefs. 
Amin mentions the “law of capitalist value” to explain the difference between the capitalist 
society and “regional-tributary” society (ibid.). Amin states that the law of value transformed 
into goods requires an integrated market for the social labor products, capital and labor(ibid.). 
The law of value moves in a similar tendency in capital and profits of goods (in the form of 
prices or profits of small producers) in the prices of same goods within areas of activity. This 
is a situation conforming to the empirical reality in relations of capitalist production (ibid.). 
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However, this situation changes based on central and peripheral conditions within the capitalist 
system. Amin explain this situation as follows:  
…the world capitalist system, the worldwide law of value operates on the basis of a 
truncated market that integrates trade in goods and the movement of capital but excludes 
the labor force. The world- wide law of value tends to make the cost of commodities 
uniform but not the rewards for labor. The discrepancies in world pay rates are 
considerably broader than in productivities. It follows from this thesis that the polarizing 
effect of the worldwide law of value has nothing in common in terms of its quality, 
quantity, and planetary scope with the limited tendencies to polarization within the 
former (regional) tributary systems(ibid., p. 49). 
The commodity mobility and labor processes determined based on the law of capitalist value 
explain the differentiation between the rates of development in the core and periphery 
zones(ibid.). Amin explicitly states that the core-like processes, which are decisive in capitalist 
relations of production, determine the peripheral processes and this process is organized in a 
way that the core maintains its sovereignty (ibid.). 
Amin’s conceptualization of “tributary societies” is of great importance in terms of providing 
an interpretation of the research field. Organizations such as tribalism, land ownership, 
sectarianism, communitarianism peculiar to traditional societies is of great importance to 
understand the solidarity among Kurdish people in Turkey’s Kurdistan region and their 
relationship of legitimacy establishment (in Durkheimian sense). 
         Although Wallerstein’s World-Systems analysis received much criticism, it is still one of 
the most important and primary sources in understanding the difference between the core-
periphery countries/zones and capitalist relations of exploitation. His arguments about the 
central units formed in the nation-building process and policies pursued by nation-states over 
different ethnicities in the internal periphery zones have become important sources for the 
questions that this study seeks to answer. Also, Wallerstein’s arguments about authoritarianism, 
the rise of hegemony and the accompanying political and economic crisis have strengthened 
the theoretical basis of this study. 
         Since the core-periphery theories facilitate the understanding of military, political and 
economic policies pursued in different regions of a country, they have become one of the main 
sources for Internal Colonialism theoreticians. Many theoretician of internal colonialism 
theory, applied to the core-periphery theories to understand ongoing internal conflicts between 
different regions within a country. In this dissertation, which examines the effect of internal 
conflicts taking place in Turkey’s Kurdistan region on the development of the country, Internal 
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Colonialism approach constitutes the theoretical basis of this study since it puts an emphasis on 
internal colonialism and conflicts through the concepts of the core-periphery. 
 
4. 3. Conceptualization of Internal Colonialism 
            The notion of “internal colonialism” historically emerged from the notion of 
colonialism, in which an external power dominates another country, “with the disappearance 
of the direct domination of foreigners over natives, the notion of domination and exploitation 
of natives by natives emerges” (Casanova, 1965, p. 27). Multinational states once were 
dominated by a powerful state entered into the process of re-establishment as nation-states by 
liberating themselves (ibid). Internal colonialism is defined as the processes, in which the states 
engage in activities to exploit local and regional resources of different ethnicities that are 
outside of the central identity formed by the states during the process of nation-state formation 
within state borders (ibid).  According to Casanova, a new kind of colonialism emerged with 
the liberation of formerly colonized countries due to their multinational structure (ibid.). The 
Nation-state model was regarded as a key to stability and development since nationalism and 
liberalism movements threatened internal security and the survival of the state (ibid.). 
Therefore, there appears a need for technicians and professionals, for contractors and capital in 
the countries, which are founded as a nation-state or become a nation-state due to their current 
positions, with the disappearance of the imperialist period (ibid.). Internal colonialism activities 
carried out in internal regions of different ethnicities have become one of the main sources of 
capital accumulation processes (ibid.). According to Casanova’s definition, “internal 
colonialism corresponds to a structure of social relations based on domination and exploitation 
among culturally heterogeneous, distinct groups.” (ibid.).  
          Most of the theorists carrying out research based on internal colonialism approach 
changed the content of this theory in line with the data in their research field and applied it to 
their own study (Hind, 1984, pp. 543-555; Love, 1989, pp. 905-907). Some researchers used 
the internal colonialism theory for the political and economic management of Latin America 
countries in the second half of the 19th century while others utilized it to explain executive 
originality of the USSR after 1920 (Hind, 1984). However, several analysts heavily criticized 
these studies by stating that such absolute statements about these periods cannot be made (ibid., 
p. 552).  
Presenting an early model of internal colonialism, Lenin described the migration from the 
central regions of Tsarist Russia, which was the field of capital accumulation for a long period 
and economically developed small industrialists and craftsmen, to the steppes, which were 
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indicators of colonization of peripheral regions (Vladimir, 1956, pp. 269-270. cited in Hind, 
1984, p. 544). In his analysis, Lenin considers the industrial development in central Russia and 
commercial agricultural development in the periphery as interdependent processes. According 
to this analysis, the steppes were described as the colonies of Tsarist Russia (ibid., p. 544). 
According to Robert Hind analyzing examples of internal colonialism, there was a “peculiar 
socialism without the peasant” in Soviet Russia (ibid.). At that time, Russia was under the 
control of the “urban-centered power elite” and the whole peasantry was subjected to 
discrimination legally and factually (ibid.). According to Hind, Russian villages were governed 
by the policies of internal colonialism during the Stalin era (Gouldner, 1977, pp. 13-14. cited 
in Hind, 1984, pp. 543-544). By quoting Anders (1979), Hind argues that the political and 
economic policies of the American federal government in the 1930s was a model of internal 
colonialism as an imperialist power of foreigners over Native Americans (Anders, 1979. cited 
in Hind, 1984, p. 546). 
When different interpretations and definitions of the internal colonialism are put aside, it is seen 
that the common feature of all the definitions refers to the superior-subordinate relationship 
between the core and peripheral production processes regarding unequal distribution. When the 
national ethnic identity is recognized as a premise in the states, which involve citizens of 
different ethnicities, a policy of rent and exploitation might occur based on economic and 
political inequalities among different ethnicities outside the national identity (ibid.). In 
countries, where such an economic and political division is observed, groups living in the 
regions outside of the central identity live in poorer and weaker conditions than the rest of the 
country (ibid.). This is mainly due to the unequal exchange of regional economic resources and 
products of capital and their exploitation from periphery to the core (Casanova, 1965). 
Therefore, Love defines the notion of internal colonialism as follows, “internal colonialism is 
a process of unequal exchange, occurring within a given state, characteristic of industrial or 
industrializing economies, capitalist or socialist.”(Love, 1989, p. 905).  
       In his article Race, Articulation and Societies Structured in Dominance published, Stuart 
Hall (1996) clearly points out the situation about Racist policies and regimes dominated by a 
central ethnic identity. Hall's article examining the causes of social stratification is a critique of 
Marxism that failed to analyze the situation unique to countries, in which capitalist mode of 
production was established after being conquered by capitalist countries(Hall, 1996). This 
situation, which can be called Settler Colonialism, corresponds to a regime or ideology based 
on racism, in which the colonialist reshapes the political, institutional, economic and even social 
relations for its own interests in the colonized country. Settler Colonialism is a distinct type of 
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colonialism that functions through the replacement of indigenous characteristics with an 
invasive settler society that migrates to a particular geography and develops a distinctive 
identity and sovereignty in the territory (Veracini, 2010). In settler colonialism, the dominant 
group starts living in the territories of the dominated group and subjects this group to genocide 
and/or assimilation (Horvath, 1972).  Today, the settler colonial states established in the United 
States, Canada, South Africa, Palestine, and lastly the four parts of Kurdistan (Kurdistan 
territories shared between Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran) are the most obvious examples of settler 
colonialism.  
Stuart Hall’s article allows us to see the structure of these exploitation relations in more detail 
since it addresses the exploitation relations in countries where such colonial relations are 
established in terms of sociological and economic paradigms. In line with this approach, Hall 
also allows us to focus on South African sociologist John Rex's studies on South Africa and 
Latin America in his article. In the economic approach, the problem is examined under several 
crude headings for convenience and internal economic structures are addressed to analyze 
certain social relations when analyzing the countries with capitalist exploitation relations based 
on racial domination (Hall, 1996, p. 308). In this way, all the factors that cause exploitation are 
attempted to be analyzed (ibid.). In the sociological approach, on the other hand, a great variety 
of approaches are placed under a single rubric with a paradigm that examines the socio-cultural, 
political and ethnological causes of more complex relations, and the structures with exploitation 
relations are analyzed (ibid.).  
Hall is clear that racial relations are directly linked with economic processes. According to Hall, 
economies historically based on conquest and plunder, colonization and mercantilist 
domination, and currently, the relations between underdeveloped and developed countries 
based on "unequal exchanges" are directly related to economic processes (ibid.). However, Hall 
argues that the economic approach does not provide an adequate explanation of these racial 
features. He points out that the sociological approach draws attention to the specificity of social 
formations which include distinctive racial and ethnic characteristics. Capitalist exploitation-
based relations of production in South Africa represent a clear example of these social and 
economic structures (ibid.). Capitalist relations of production in South Africa has a distinctive 
feature that differs from classical capitalist relations in developed countries since labor force is 
structured into black and white strata, which leads to fracturing in the working class (Hall, 1996, 
309). This race-based stratification between the labor force causes the stratification of class. In 
that sense, race in South Africa functions as an articulator of social, political and ideological 
structures and it shapes the capitalist structure as 'free (white labor)' and 'forced (black labor)' 
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labor (ibid). Wolpe states that this racial division specific to social formation of South Africa 
can be explained under the 'logic' of capitalist economic relations (Wolpe, 1976 cited in Hall, 
1996). In contrast to Wolpe, Rex adopts a critical and plural analysis that might be called a 
sociological approach. Rex criticizes M. G. Smith’s argument that different ethnic segments of 
Caribbean society were 'singularly' distinct, the political power was held together through only 
monopoly by opting for one of these ethnic identities. He also argues that such race-based 
sovereignty ultimately lead men of different ethnicities to be in the same social institutions, 
namely, slave plantations (ibid.). However, the working class become stratified as a result of 
the privilege granted to a race by the political power among those with different ethnicities 
(ibid.). In his studies, Rex completely distances himself from Marx's paradigm that is based on 
the analysis of classical 'free labor’ by focusing on capitalist relations of production colonized 
after conquest and formed under the shadow of racial conflicts (Rex, 1973, p. 262 cited in Hall, 
1996, p. 310). The distinctive feature of Rex’s analysis is that capitalist relations of production 
formed by colonialists pursue a ‘forced’ policy towards the indigenous (black) working class: 
the “capacity of the employers to command the use of coercive violence during and after 
colonial conquest", and the fact that the 'central labor institution' is not classical free labor but 
'migrant labor in its unfree form’ (ibid.). In his studies, Rex states that capitalist relations of 
production in African society can be interpreted within their racial specificity, not by a classical 
Marxist analysis (ibid.). In this society, in which organic social relations take place, wages and 
relations of production have characteristics peculiar to African society (ibid.). Rex argues that 
these non-normative relations were put under legal protection by the State, dominated by the 
white settler capitalist class (ibid.). It is because such illegal social formations lead to the 
placement of indigenous (black) labor to a subordinate status through a compromise between 
the white settler capitalist class and the white working class so that it serves the interests of both 
classes (ibid). At this point, a race-based fracturing occurs in the working class and the class 
becomes stratified. Hall states that Rex’s synthesis between the economic approach and 
sociological approach is secured on the Weberian idea (ibid., pp. 312-313). Rex acknowledges 
that there will be class struggles of a capitalist type where there is capitalism (ibid.). On the 
other hand, social formations of a colonialism type show different forms that follow a different 
path and conform to a different logic (ibid.).  
         Rex’s synthesis was criticized by Wolpe, who said that the commodification of labor 
ultimately arose from an economic imperative and capitalist production was based on labor 
exploitation, regardless of regional characteristics (Wolpe; 1975, p. 203 cited in Hall, 1996, p. 
315). According to Wolpe, “all labour-power is in some way and in some degree unfree, the 
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type, gradation or continuum of degrees of unfreedom "merely" affect the intensity of 
exploitation but not its mode” (Wolpe, 1975, p. 203 cited in Hall, 1996, p. 315). Wolpe's another 
important criticism is that Rex failed to provide a sufficient theorization at the production level 
and did not have a paradigm addressing a political and ideological definition that the sovereign 
central racial groupings could easily homogenize other classes as a result of their domination-
based relations with these classes (ibid). In his last criticism to Rex, Wolpe states that classes 
that are oriented towards certain organizations due to political and ideological orientations 
cannot be positioned at the economic level. “A social class, or fraction or stratum of a class, 
may take up a class position that does not correspond to its interests, which are defined by the 
class determination that fixes the horizon of the class struggle.” (Carchedi, 1977 cited in Hall, 
1996, p. 315). Eventually, Wolpe also acknowledges Rex’s distinctive analysis on property 
relations and states: Rex “was right to insist upon the need for a more comprehensive and more 
refined conceptualization of class than was encompassed by the bare reference to property 
relations” (Wolpe, 1975, p. 262 cited in Hall, 1996, p. 316).  
Those who analyzed underdevelopment "singularly" differently from Rex were not limited to 
Wolpe. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) 'school', led by 
Gunder Frank, who was mentioned in the previous chapters, insisted that development and 
underdevelopment had to be addressed within the single framework of a world economic 
system. 'Underdeveloped' countries were the dependent sectors of such a world economy: ‘the 
theory of underdevelopment turns out to be essentially a theory of dependence’ (Furtado, 1971 
cited in Hall, 1996, p. 318). Frank stated that Latin America had been transitioned into a 
capitalist economy as of the 16th century and he completely rejected Rex's theory, which 
considered it as a capitalist from the beginning. According to Frank, underdevelopment in Latin 
America stemmed from centralization policies continuing for a very long time (ibid). According 
to this theory, the social, political and ideological effects of racism in Latin America emerged 
with the establishment of different forms of production (ibid., pp.322-323). This theory failed 
to explain how racism emerged as a ruling ideology and why it was "necessary” by directly 
linking the emergence of racism to the capitalist structure in these regions (ibid.). 
Therefore, theoretical accuracy of Rex’s plural synthesis has stood out among all analyses once 
again. Like Rex, Meillassoux also stated that such feudal structures were grafted to production 
in order to provide raw material and product for capitalist markets in his studies about 'self-
sustaining' agricultural social formations (ibid. p. 324). With this analysis, those who were 
forced to be wage laborers in a new and semi-colonial situation in societies such as South Africa 
were placed in a different position in the traditional structure compared to classical capitalist 
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labor relations. Like Meillassoux, Rey also deals with organic societies where ‘lineage’ is 
determinant in his fieldwork in Africa (Rey, 1971,1973, 1975 cited in Hall, 1996, p. 324; Rey 
and Dupre, 1973 cited in Hall, 1996, p. 324). The distinctive feature of Rey’s work was that it 
drew attention to certain articulations that articulates lineage societies into the capitalist 
system(ibid.). The most remarkable one among these articulations was an emphasis on a full 
colonial structure, in which structures rooted in capitalism are gradually transitioned to a 
capitalist structure through full domination-oriented policies on pre-capitalist structures that are 
dependent on land (ibid.). In his studies, Rey also calls attention to the violence and situation 
what Marx called the 'fact of conquest'(Foster-Carter, 1978 cited in Hall, 1996, p. 324) in the 
implantation process of precapitalistic structures of lineage societies to capitalist structures in 
the colonization period(ibid.). Rey states that indigenous societies are generally excluded in 
written form and rehabilitated to serve the colonial capitalist mentality during this articulation 
process (ibid.). 
At the end of his article, Hall draws attention to Italian theoretician Antonio Gramsci’s work 
on hegemony. Defining hegemony as a total social authority, which is based on 'coercion' and 
'consent' formed by a specific class alliance over the whole society at certain specific 
conjunctures, Hall states that this totalitarian structure is formed at economic, civil, intellectual, 
political and ideological level within the civil society through the condensed relations of the 
state (ibid, p.337). Hegemony allows the ruling class alliance to secure and elaborate the 
privileges of this class in line with the long-term aspirations of the superstructure of the society 
(ibid.). Hegemonic power, which is organized to serve the interests of the superstructure, plays 
an educative and formative role by establishing indirect and direct relations between economic, 
political and ideological institutions to raise the society to what he calls a "the new level of 
civilization” (ibid). Gramsci defines this situation as 'educative and formative role of the State’ 
(ibid). The relations between economic and political ideological structures that grant privilege 
to the superstructure and make this situation permanent are not based on a priori but 
correspondence and historically concrete relations (ibid). The hegemonic structure formed by 
the dominant class has the power to homogenize the members of the ruling class as well as 
members of the dominated class (ibid.). It shows us the effectiveness of ideologies in shaping 
class structures. In this respect, Hall puts an emphasis on this very important point: 
… then, from the concrete historical 'work' which racism accomplishes under specific 
historical conditions—as a set of economic, political and ideological practices, of a 
distinctive kind, concretely articulated with other practices in a social formation. These 
practices ascribe the positioning of different social groups in relation to one another 
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with respect to the elementary structures of society; they fix and ascribe those 
positionings in on-going social practices; they legitimate the positions so ascribed. In 
short, they are practices which secure the hegemony of a dominant group over a series 
of subordinate ones, in such a way as to dominate the whole social formation in a form 
favourable to the long-term development of the economic productive base (Hall, 1996, 
p. 338). 
       In social structures that involve race-based social relations, ideologies ultimately 
incorporate black labor into class relations that serve the interests of the ruling class by 
penetrating to black labor and affecting the social and political structure and black labor. Thus, 
race is also the form in which class is 'lived', class relations are formed and maintained, the 
class is included and it is 'fought through'.  
Hall's article, with its all these aspects, allows us to interpret internal colonialism and settler 
colonialism occurring in societies after the conquest more explanatorily within recent 
intellectual accumulation. 
         Cedric Robinson is another contemporary theoretician, who draws attention to Marx's and 
Marxist paradigm's indifference to racial issues when analyzing the capitalist relations of 
production. In his seminal book titled Black Marxism, Robinson (2000) criticizes Marx as 
follows:  
Marx consigned race, gender, culture, and history to the dustbin. Fully aware of the 
constant place women and children held in the workforce, Marx still deemed them so 
unimportant as a proportion of wage labor that he tossed them, with slave labor and 
peasants, into the imagined abyss signified by precapitalist, noncapitalist, and primitive 
accumulation (Robinson, 2000, p. xxix). 
Robinson explicitly states that Marx failed to position a part of society within capitalist relations 
of exploitation according to racial or gender issues. In his book, Robinson clearly criticizes 
Marxist class analysis while addressing the conditions and political struggles of black people 
in Africa and the diaspora. According to him, the Marxist paradigm, which made a 
comprehensive critique of capitalism, could not break away from the theoretical foundations of 
the "White" Western European Civilization built in line with the cultural and philosophical 
heritage of the feudal period during the birth and development of capitalism (ibid.). In the 
formation process, Western European states carefully separated themselves from the cultures 
of Egyptian and African civilizations of the Mediterranean and built nation states undertaking 
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the mission of constructing a distinct, racially pure modernity. Accordingly, terms such as "the 
English Working Class", "the English proletariat" masked the social and historical realities that 
accompanied the birth of capitalism and the British Empire that included races, tribes, regional 
differences and relevant discrepancies (Robinson, 2000, p. 42). Within this framework, 
racialization and the invention of "whiteness" that led to the stratification of the proletariat 
began within Europe, long before Europe's encounter with Africa and New World labor (ibid.). 
Social divisions and habits of life dating back to the pre-capitalist period continued their 
existence in capitalist production and in the working class in various groups with specific 
sensibilities (ibid.). The English working class never consisted of a single ethnic structure since 
it also involved Scottish, Welsh, Celtic and Irish workers (ibid.). Ethnic and national 
differences, racial divide among the working class continued as well as the negations arising 
from capitalist modes of production, relations of production and relevant ideologies (ibid.). The 
reaction of the English working class to the wave of poverty that occurred with the industrial 
revolution was not only economic (ibid.). The earliest forms of English nationalism that 
emerged with the development of Anglo-Saxon chauvinism and certain forms of racism began 
to shape the consciousness of the English working-class. Ethnocentrism and racism against 
Scottish Workers began to grow following the dissolution of precapitalistic social relations 
(ibid.). Irish nationalism had an impact on the development of the English working class 
nationalism (ibid.). The formation and maintenance of such divisions in the working class was 
an important part of capitalism's success in the 19th century.  For the ruling capitalist classes, 
it was easier to manage a working class with unorganized race discrimination (ibid.). In his 
studies on the English and Irish working class, Robinson saw that the Scottish working class 
was formed by popular traditions of British colonialism, whereas the "English" working class 
of England was formed by Anglo-Saxon Chauvinism (ibid.). The division among the working 
class within the framework of racist ideologies allowed the British Bourgeoisie to rationalize 
low wages and bad attitude towards the Scots (ibid.). While the Black population, another group 
subjected to racism in Europe and America, migrated to be the input of primitive accumulation 
of capital, they also brought the cultural world of Africa, which would help them to build 
themselves socially wherever they went;  
Marx had not realized fully that the cargoes or laborers also contained African cultures, 
critical mixes and admixtures of language and thought, of cosmology and metaphysics, 
of habits, beliefs, and morality. These were the actual terms of their humanity.  These 
cargoes, then, did not consist of intellectual isolates or deculturated Blacks-men, 
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women, and children separated from their previous universe. African labor brought the 
past with it, a past that had produced it and settled on it the first elements of 
consciousness and comprehension (Robinson, 2000, pp.121-122). 
The social consciousness brought by slaves later became the cornerstones of their struggle 
against slavery and racism. In his analysis of the political construction of "blackness", which is 
one of the components of the working class, Robinson emphasizes how the working class 
constructed its own differences rather than conceptualizing a universal proletariat (ibid). 
Consequently, Robinson argues that construction of "whiteness" and "blackness" as labor force 
mostly from Africa did not allow a homogeneous conceptualization of class in the formation 
processes of the nation state and social classes. In addition, Robinson's approach does not 
examine migrant labor force as a mere cheap workforce in places where migrants live and work 
or an "incompatibility" that needs to be integrated, it differs from other studies in this field since 
it addresses migrants as subjects with a capacity to build themselves. Migrant labor force 
constructs itself against the nation state and the ruling working class by bringing its own 
historical experiences and culture to the migrated places, which does not allow 
conceptualization a homogeneous working class. Ethnicization processes do not only emerge 
within the framework of the reproduction and control of cheap labor force, they are also related 
to the construction process of migrant working class with its specific historical experiences and 
culture.  
Hall and Robinson's theories on capitalist relations of production that were developed with a 
focus on racial structures allow an accurate and plural analysis of internal issues in countries 
whose citizens are from different ethnicities. 
         At this point the theorists of internal colonialism focus on structural forms of the unequal 
exchange and unequal labor between internal core and periphery. As the economic inequalities 
increase with regard to region, production factors and income flow from one or more 
geographical areas to another, based primarily on price mechanisms, and secondarily on fiscal 
transfers (Love, 1989, p. 905). In addition, the state plays a decisive role in setting price ratios 
while regional differences occur in foreign trade. Love (1989) puts an emphasis on the 
inequality in regional development based on the market in this new colonialism which emerged 
during the period of state formation as follows:  
At the minimum, the process involves a structural relationship between leading and 
lagging regions (or city and hinterland) of a territorial state, based on monopolized or 
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oligopolized markets, in which incremental growth is progressively “inequalizing” 
between populations of these constituent geographic elements, rather than “equalizing.” 
(ibid, p. 905). 
Internal colonialism models are also based on a critique of capitalism, although the Marxist 
criticism of capitalism is the most familiar theoretical approach (Love, p. 906). Russian 
populists, such as Nikolai Danielson and Sergei Kravchinsky, saw internal colonialism as an 
integral part of development in the 19th century, when first forms the notion emerged(Nicolas-
On, 1902; Stepniak, 1888 cited in Love, 1989, p. 906). However, internal colonialism was a 
popular concept frequently used by the Marxists. For example, Antonio Gramsci ( 2005, p. 41 
cited in Love, 1989, p. 906) employed this concept to describe relations between inhabitants of 
Italy’s industrial North and the agrarian Mezzogiorno - nordici and sudici while Bukharin 
compared the imperialist nations’ relations with agrarian underdeveloped countries(Bukharin, 
1973, p. 21 cited in Love, 1989, p. 906). In the same period, Evgeny Preobrazhensky interpreted 
the concept of internal colonialism quite differently from Gramsci and Bukharin 
(Preobrazhensky, 1965 in ibid, 1989, p. 906). Preobrazhensky viewed internal colonialism as a 
policy to be pursued to accumulate capital at the expense of agriculture in the Soviet 
industrialization debate of 1924-28 (Erlich, 1960, pp. 49, 50, 55, 121. cited in Love, 1989, p. 
906). Preobrazhensky thought of the system of the state as a “developmentalist” internal 
colonialism (ibid.).  
In the late 1970s, the Marxist usage of internal colonialism became a reference for the models 
of internal colonialism based on modes of production analysis associated with the structuralist 
school of Marxism in France in internal colonialism, in Third World Countries in Latin America 
and the countries with similar political and economic characteristics, (ibid, p. 906). For 
example, Latin American scientists carried out studies based on Pierre-Philippe Rey’s thesis on 
the articulation of pre-capitalist modes of production to explain colonial economies with a 
capitalist paradigm (ibid.). The focus of Brazilian researchers on internal capitalism was related 
to the dynamics of the metropolitan areas and the frontier regions, which was on a continual 
movement. The state had a decisive role in the structure linking capitalist production processes 
of the frontier involving coercion, while the population of the frontier exploited for these 
relations was colonized by almost being imported to central regions (Foweraker, 1980; Otávio 
Guilherme Velho, 1976; Otávio G Velho, 1979 cited  in Love, 1989, p, 906). 
Finally, in the 1950s, Hans Singer and Celso Furtado, theoreticians of the Latin American 
structuralist school of economics, such as Hans Singer and Celso Furtedo, developed a model, 
which might be called internal colonialism, and applied it to the Brazilian case (ibid.). In this 
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new colonialism replacing the traditional colonialism, the natives found themselves as a part of 
the role, which was assigned by the recolonized people (Hind, 1984, pp. 548-549). In this new 
system, the natives lost their lands, they were forced to work for the foreigners and they were 
included in new monetary economies against their will (Stavenhagen, 1965 cited in Hind, 1984, 
pp. 548-549). In this colonialism model, there is a new exploitation model, in which colonial 
society gradually increases its domination over native society (ibid.). Researchers Hans Singer 
and Celso Furtado explained that the state prevented the dynamics of the peripheral production 
processes and retarded their development as a result of this unequal exchange between these 
regions ( Singer, 1964. cited in Love, 1989, p. 12). In Singer’s studies, the Argentine economist 
Raúl Prebisch also mentioned Singer’s analysis on the unequal division between regions 
(Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950. in ibid, 1989, p. 912). According to Prebisch, unequal exchange 
derived from different modes of production between the industrial countries at the international 
level and the agricultural periphery in the world market, combined with different institutional 
arrangements in capital and labor markets (ibid.). According to these analysts, technological 
progress in production resulted in a rise in incomes in developed countries by increasing the 
rate of development, while the progress in the production of food and raw materials led to a fall 
in prices in underdeveloped countries and weakened economic power of these peripheral 
regions (ibid.). In other words, while the unequal situation between the core and periphery 
regarding currency is attempted to be fixed by state policies, in the production processes, the 
unequal exchange of factors between regions gradually increased in technological progress 
taking place in the industrial field (ibid.). 
According to Prebisich, the principal mechanism by which unequal exchange occurred between 
the regions was the operation of the business cycle (ibid.). During the development process, the 
prices of primary commodities rise more sharply than those of industrial goods, while they fall 
more steeply during the recession process (ibid.; Wallerstein, 2004). During the development 
process, the working class of the core absorbs economic gains, but its wages do not fall 
proportionately; while unemployment rises, labor contracts keep wages high and therefore keep 
industrial prices from falling (Love, 1989, p. 12).  Since workers are not well organized in areas 
such as agriculture in the periphery, the periphery absorbs the system’s resources during a 
recession more than the core. In addition, the periphery is more affected by the economic 
recession during monopolization activities in the core (ibid.). 
Since workers are not well organized in the periphery (at least in agriculture), the periphery 
absorbs more of the system’s income contraction during a recession than does the center (Grilli 
& Yang, 1988, p. 29; UNECLA, 1951, p. 59. cited in Love, 1989, p. 912).  
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Prebisich’s analysis pointed out negative features of peripheral economies: structural 
unemployment, due to the inability of traditional modes of production to grow and therefore 
failing to prevent migration of rural population; the disequilibrium emerging due to the higher 
rate the import of modern agricultural commodities than the export of traditional agricultural 
commodities, and gradual deterioration of trade(François Perroux, 1948, pp. 297, 300; Francois 
Perroux, 1950, pp. 198, 203; 1970, in ibid, 1989, p. 912).  
The analysis of Prebisich and Singer was criticised by many analysts due to the problems in 
their data and the issues of quality of the data related to the field (Spraos, 1980, p. 126. cited in 
Love, 1989, pp. 912-913).  
Economist Mihail Manoilescu was the first theoretician to address the model of internal 
colonialism quantitatively. He based his analysis on his theory of international trade and he 
carried out analyses within the national borders of Rumania regarding the agricultural areas(M 
Manoilescu, 1929 cited in Love, 1989, p. 908). In his case study, he handled the economic 
process based on exploitation in three ways, two of them commercial, and third fiscal (ibid.). 
Manoilescu’s first unit of analysis was international trade. Having the data on the exported 
commodities, he identified that a larger part of Rumania’s exports of goods and services was 
based on agriculture (ibid.). Although Manoilescu had difficulty in measuring the destination 
of imports, he was able to discern imports between those destined for the cities and those for 
the countryside ( Manoilescu, 1940, pp. 20, 21 cited in Love, 1989, p. 908). In 1913, Rumania’s 
villages exported goods worth 530 million gold French francs, and received 120 million in 
return while the cities and mining sector (mostly oil) exported 11 million and received 551 
million in return (ibid.). Thus, he noticed that the cities gained 410 million francs while the 
villages made the same amount of net loss ( Manoilescu, 1940, p. 19 cited in Love, 1989, p. 
908). As a result, the urban areas represented the class obtaining the major gains while the rural 
areas represented the losers in this trade. Manoilescu mentions this situation as follows: “The 
economic triangle formed by the village, the city and the export market play the special role of 
transforming the commodity surplus produced by the village into consumer goods, to the 
advantage of the city” (ibid.). 
        Apart from unequal change among regions, the one who in the first place handled the 
concept of internal colonialism on the basis of ethnic identity is Mexican sociologist Pablo 
Gonzalez Casanova(Casanova, 1965). Casanova defines the concept of internal colonialism as 
a conflicting process based on domination and exploitation between culturally and ethnically 
heterogeneous groups (ibid, p. 33). Again, Casanova(1965) points out a different aspect of 
internal colonialism by handling the internal exploitation relationship as a process based on 
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conflicting power relations. He underlines in his analysis that conflict is inevitable in 
heterogeneous societies where there are ethnic and cultural dualism(ibid.). Therefore, pluralism 
occupies an important place in his analysis (ibid., pp. 906-907).  
One of the contemporary interpretations on use of the concept of internal colonialism from the 
stand point of ethnicity is formalized by Harold Wolpe (1975). In his theory, Wolpe 
characterizes internal colonialism through two main factors (Wolpe, 1975, p. 2): As the most 
distinct feature, the first one is that colony relationships emerge among different countries, 
major populations, nations, local regions or people from different ethnic groups and cultures. 
Secondly, the relationship of colonization is a system based on domination, oppression and 
exploitation (ibid.). To him, an internal colony creates a society based on differences of 
ethnicity, language and/or culture (ibid, p. 108). In his analysis, he deals with the conflicting 
process between the core and periphery who have different ethnic and cultural identities in an 
apparently heterogeneous society (ibid.). Another analyst who formulated an approach close to 
those of Casanova and Wolpe is Robert Blauner (1969). 
In the article titled “Internal colonialism and ghetto revolt”, he explains the theory of internal 
colonialism by claiming that the relationships between the White and Black in the US is 
essentially colonialism (Blauner, 1969). To him, the theory of internal colonialism is 
problematic and not clear; however, it gives a hope for including the concepts of caste and 
nationalism, ethnic origin, cultural and economic exploitation in a conceptual schema (Blauner, 
1989, p. 394). According to Baluner, a colonized poor society has no economic organization 
and power (ibid., p. 394-398).  
However, Baluner’s model of internal colonialism has been criticized to be unclear on 
economic exploitation and political hegemony which are the most prominent features of this 
concept(Trimberger, 1979, p. 132. cited in Hind, 1984, p. 553). 
One of the most up-to-date works on internal colonialism has been carried out by Joe Turner 
(2018). In his work he explains the internal colonialism through the relationship between 
ethnicity and violence in a country governed by liberal policies.  In the analysis of Turner, he 
defends that there is a colonial process through ongoing liberal exploitation and colonization 
policies in metropolitan areas of the Global North (Turner, 2018). Approaching the subject 
through an ethnicity-based viewpoint as his contemporary predecessors, he merges his analysis 
with neocolonial and neo-metropolitan approaches. According to him black people, refugees 
and other identities out of European cultures have been colonized through neoliberal 
urbanization policies both ethnically and materially (ibid.). In this context Turner helps us to 
see the traits of this colonial system by claiming that internal colonization in neoliberal period 
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determines contemporary regimes in the history of long-term governments based on ethnicities 
who spread through the neocolonies and metropoles and deem them as imperial property 
(Turner, 2018, p. 3). He continues as follows: “Internal colonisation provides a historical 
schema and an analytical tool which contests the treatment of colonialism as a ‘remnant’ and 
instead focusses on colonisation as active and ongoing across both (neo)colonies and 
(neo)metropoles in the governance of racialised populations” (Turner, 2018, p. 3). 
       According to Robert Hind (1984, p. 553), the main reason for analysts of internal 
colonization is based on the critique of the deliberative epistemological denial of the facts 
known by everyone. The analysts of internal colonialism distinguished that is a scientific 
contradiction and distortion in scientific explanation of existing economic and political 
processes in some multinational capitalist heterogeneous societies (ibid.). According to these 
analysts, multinational states established among capitalist nation-state institutionalism indwell 
these countries through establishing an internal exploitation system via hegemonic 
governments to exploit the resources in these countries; in the same time, these countries creates 
hegemonic oppression over the minorities within their borders and exploit them (ibid.). This 
also causes an unequal transition period among the regions in the core and periphery. These 
analysts revealed the epistemological denial of this exploitation system and brought it to the 
scientific literature (ibid.). More over, Hind (1984) in his efforts defining the gist of internal 
colonization theories came up with more of a comparative approach. In internal colonization 
apparatus , both the colonized and the colonizer live within a shared territory , in to which the 
one (the colonized but a citizen) is considered as a second citizen , for reasons which are absurd 
(Hind, 1984, p. 552). The colonization features that we see within the corridors of traditional 
colonization (invading overtly the territory of others by alien people) are different (ibid.). 
According to Hind, internal colonialism should be understood as a model rather than a theory 
(ibid.). Sometimes a society should be understood as a group using the hegemony that they 
have in favor of themselves, in other times, as a characteristic structure of unbalanced 
socioeconomic and political operations, and some other times, it should be understood as a 
process by which the two situations are intertwined (ibid.).  
         There is no fixed way of methodologically application of the internal colonization 
approach because there become many models based on the economic, political, social, cultural, 
linguistic and belief-related structure of the field (ibid., pp, 552-553). Because the concept of 
internal colonialism is convenient in terms of flexibility and applicability, it loses its 
meticulousness during its theoretical application to research fields (ibid., p. 553). 
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         Another works on internal colonialism established on political and economic hegemony 
of the urban core areas over regions in periphery as a result of unequal change between the core 
and the periphery, is the work titled “Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National 
Development” published by Michael Hechter in 1975(Hechter, 1975, 1999). In his work, 
Hechter applied the theory of internal colonialism to explain the existence of Celtic community 
and the discrimination they had been subjected to, who have a distinct language, culture and 
social links within Britain. The feature of Hechter’s model of internal colonization is that the 
ethnic solidarity among an objectively defined group of individuals in communities in Britain 
which is a typical developed society is essentially a product of a hierarchical cultural division 
of labor which supports emergence of reactive group. 
 The important point in Hechter approach, which is underlying concept, is the internal 
colonialism and the economic relations among different regions through this concept. 
According to his definition: 
Internal colonialism refers to a process of unequal exchange between the territories of a 
given state that occurs either as a result of the free play of market forces or of economic 
policies of the central state that have intended or unintended distributional consequences 
for regions. Since the 1960s, however, the term has been largely reserved for regions 
that are simultaneously economically disadvantaged and culturally distinctive from the 
core regions of the host state(Hechter, 1999, p. xiv. cited in Ozkirimli, 2000, p. 78). 
Hechter analyzes the economic relations through the relationships emerging between the core 
and periphery within the borders of the country. He emphasized that, the formation of internal 
colonialism primarily begins with the emergence of difference in the society through the 
emergence of relatively developed and underdeveloped groups during modernization process 
in a country(ibid.). In this process by which a group arbitrarily surpasses the other, the 
prevailing group tries to create a monopoly by ensuring their privileges through implementing 
policies to institutionalize stratification system (ibid., p. 9). While the central group tries to 
distribute the prestigious roles in society among their members, the access of the individuals in 
the underdeveloped group is tired to be prevented. This stratification system that Hechter called 
as cultural division of labor contributes to the development of different ethnic identities 
(Hechter, 1975, p. 9). Individuals belonging to these two groups start to associatively classify 
themselves and others according to the roles to be played (ibid.). These are supported by the 
existence of tangible or cultural signs which appeared in the characteristics of both groups in 
this categorization(ibid.). Since caderization (exclusion of the core) are not in favor of the 
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institution, culturization does not take place (ibid.). Finally, a political and economic internal 
colonization system is completed (ibid.).  
In his internal colonialism model, while the core has a wealthy industrial organization, the 
development in the periphery is dependent and plays a complementary role to complete the 
development process in the core. (ibid, p.10). Industrialization in the periphery can only be 
established as being extremely specialized under the conditions based on exports(ibid.). That is 
to say, a developed industrialization in the periphery has to work in favor of the core in order 
be come into existence (ibid.). Therefore, the economy in the periphery is more sensitive to the 
fluctuations in prices in proportion to the core (ibid.). The decisions regarding the investments 
to be made in the periphery and fees are collected in the core (ibid.). As a result of the economic 
dependency emerged because of all these mentioned, the regions in the periphery lag behind 
the core regions in development (ibid.). According to Hechter’s model of internal colonialism, 
the economic inequalities between the core and periphery will continue to increase(ibid.). There 
will be peripheral cultural reaction against the cultural hegemony of the core(ibid.). Finally, 
political separations reveal significant cultural differences among the groups in the core and 
periphery to a large extent. (ibid.). 
        What differs Hechter’s model of internal colonization from other models of colonization 
is that he argues there is a cultural division of labor which is based on production processes in 
the core and periphery (ibid, 1975, pp. 30-31; Hechter, 1978). To him, there emerges during 
the first colonization processes a cultural division of labor which is a form of stratification built 
on class structures of practical cultural differences (Hechter, 1975, pp. 30-31). While high-level 
professional roles are organized in urban areas, rural local cultural roles are gathered together 
under the stratification system (ibid.). Because the role of the colony is designed to be 
instrumental, the development in this region is such as to complete the role of the metropolitan 
areas (ibid.). The colony’s economy is organized by the core to be specialized in production of 
raw material for exportation generally with a limited range of main products (ibid.). Rather than 
being the centers for organizing development as in urban areas, the cities in neighboring regions 
play the role of a station connecting colony hinterlands and metropolitan harbors, which are 
established for exportation of the products (ibid.). Moreover, transportation systems are not 
built to connect various areas in the colony, but to facilitate the transportation of the goods from 
hinterland to coastal regions (ibid., p. 31). Cultural division of labor contributes to the 
development of different ethnic identities by providing the individuals of the regions both in 
the core and periphery for identifying themselves with their own groups (Ozkirimli, 2000, p. 
80). Since Hechter’s model of internal colonization is the same as Wallerstein’s world-systems 
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theory in terms of underlining the division of labor among the core and periphery regions, it is 
seen that Hechter is influenced with Wallerstein’s theory.  
Another feature of Hechter’s conceptualization of cultural division of labor is his claim that it 
is the main reason of the tension among the regions in the core and periphery because it feeds 
the ethnic identities in periphery regions and eventually has an influence to produce peripheral 
nationalism (Hechter, 1978). To him, the main reason why the cultural division of labor 
emerged is that the development in the periphery is lower than the development in the core 
(Love, 1989, p. 907).  
Whereas the increasing competition among actors escalates tensions between different groups, 
the communities in the periphery embark on a quest for independence to get rid of the system 
of exploitation as a result of the unequal continuation of the relationship between core and 
periphery (ibid.).  
        Hechter’s model of internal colonization has problems similar to those several previous 
models. While his model is consistent especially within its own local-cultural dynamics, it 
couldn’t put forward a fixed method in terms of general methodological practicality (Palloni, 
1979. in Hind, 1984, p. 551). Despite his theory refers to such negative aspects of the 
colonialism as economic exploitation, domination, nationalist conflict, it has been criticized 
because it doesn’t mention at such aspects of colonization as humanitarianism, civilization and 
Christianization (Hind, 1984, p. 552). Moreover, there are criticisms that Hechter adopted a 
controversial artificial analogy regarding the Celtic society and his analogy is ambiguous and 
misleading (ibid). In response, with his adding to the 1999-edition of the same book, he said 
that it is needed to mention at some tangible data regarding the economic and political structure 
of England in order to prove the cultural division of labor (Hechter, 1999, p. xv).  
       An in-depth comparative analysis of the concerning literature was carried out on the 
theoretical foundation which this project is based on aiming to practically and theoretically 
make sense of the effects of the development of the Kurdish Question being one of the most 
critical social, political and economic problems of Turkey after 1920 in the development of the 
country.  First of all, the relation of capital formation and domination in multi-ethnic countries 
with the process of nationalization and nation state was handled in-depth through Hobsbawm’s 
paradigm. Secondly, as a basis to the theory of the core and periphery by looking at 
Wallerstein’s conceptual arguments, the way the core makes the periphery dependent on itself 
through the domination and all of the dynamics of this tense process were analyzed with a 
comparative paradigm. Consequently, the literature regarding the models of internal 
colonialism on which this project is based was comparatively reviewed.  
 
 52 
The three theoretical approaches mentioned above within the scope of this thesis project was 

































5. 2nd. Chapter: Turkish Modernisation: From Homogeneous Nation Policies to 
Centralized/Etatist Economic Policy 
5. 1. Construction of Turkish Nationalism and Its Historical Journey 
5. 1. a. The Emergence of Turkish Nationalism in the Late Ottoman Empire 
            The continuity of a nation is largely made possible by individuals who consider 
themselves a part of the nation. In that sense, Ernest Renan argues that membership of a nation 
resembles a daily referendum because the nation needs a perpetual “affirmation” (Renan, 1990 
cited in Özkırımlı,2017, p. 30). Modern state and ruling class become involved at this point. 
Pierre Bourdieu argues that the modern state fully emerged as a result of the monopolization of 
various forms of capital: Physical capital or apparatus of violence (army, the police), economic 
apparatus (taxation, redistribution, incentive, financial instruments, standardization of money 
and units of measurement), cultural/knowledge capital (educational institutions, statistical tools 
for classifying and measuring the population) and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1994 cited in 
Ünlü, 2018, pp. 186-187).  Monopolization and centralization of these different forms of capital 
was possible through policies that were approved/supported by its citizens during a period, in 
which the modern state structure was formed. Therefore, modern nation-states applied to 
nationalist ideology to receive support for their centralist policies of capital (ibid.). This 
nationalist ideology, which was the official ideology of the Republic of Turkey founded based 
on the idea of a modern nation state in 1920, was regarded as the sole component that would 
ensure the continuity of the state (Ahmad, 1993; Üngör, 2012). The first job of the founder 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and other founders taking joint action with him was to build a 
nationalist society in the Republic of Turkey immediately, which took place of the Ottoman 
Empire that collapsed as a result of nationalist uprisings by different minorities within its 
borders (Ahmad, 1993; Üngör, 2012, pp. 25-33). İsmet İnönü (1884-1973), one of the first 
Prime Ministers of the state, summarized these policies in a speech he gave in 1925: “Our duty 
is to Turkify people in the Turkish homeland no matter what happens. We will cut out those 
elements that oppose Turkishness and Turkism. What we are seeking in those who are to serve 
the country is above all that they are Turkish and Turkist” (Üstel, 1997, p. 173). The state 
promises a system, in which a citizen will participate in the capital class of the new state and 
become a privileged individual in return for a citizen profile serving the survival of the state 
based on nationalist principles determined by the state (Ünlü, 2018).  
        The events and policies that took place in the last period of the Ottoman Empire have a 
significant role in the process leading to the establishment of the Turkish State. The Ottoman 
Empire started a series of reform movements such as agriculture, industry, military service, 
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architecture, finance, regulation of laws and institutions and land reform in order to prevent its 
collapse at the end of the 1800s, which was the decline period of the Ottoman Empire (Üngör, 
2012, pp. 25-27). However, these reforms could not prevent the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire. In 1865, the Young Turks movement emerged as an organized group of liberal 
opposition that was in search of constitutional reforms against the Ottoman Sultan, whose 
regime was worsening day by day (ibid.).  
The Young Turks movement gathered around the idea of “Ottoman Patriotic Citizenship” and 
tried to save the empire when it was first founded. Then, they realized that this idea would not 
organize the Ottoman people and they attempted to organize the people around a new program 
called “Muslim nationalist movements” (ibid.). However, they saw that this idea also did not 
gather people and they pursued a nationalist policy based on a systematic “nationalist Turkish 
sovereignty” between the years of 1913-1950 (ibid.) It is seen that there is a radicalization 
towards the increase of violent policies during the ideological evolution of the Young Turks 
movement. The Young Turks, which was an opposition organization, established the 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) by coming together with the intellectuals in the 
country and the opposition intellectuals exiled to Western Europe (ibid.). These intellectuals 
were influenced by positivism and social Darwinism (Bozarslan, 2007; Buenos,2012). Social 
Darwinism regards the committees, communities, nations and societies as the enemies of each 
other (Bozarslan, 2007; Buenos,2012; Bozarslan, 2015, pp.177-190; Zürcher, 2017, pp. 83-84). 
Social Darwinism derives from the fact that species cannot “coexist” and it considers social life 
as a biological existential life (Bozarslan, 2007; Buenos,2012; Bozarslan, 2015, pp.177-
190). Turkishness is a biological structure in terms of the Committee of Union and Progress 
and this structure needs to be strengthened (Bozarslan, 2007; Buenos,2012; Ahmad, 2014; 
Bozarslan, 2015, pp.177-190). The strengthening of this structure would also be possible by 
annihilating other structures (ethnic and religious minorities) in the region The doctors in the 
CUP played a significant role in the formation of these policies(Bozarslan, 
2007;Buenos,2012;Ahmad, 2014; Bozarslan, 2015, pp.177-190) For instance, Dr. Bahattin 
Şakir and Dr. Rühusi Dikmen were “Social Darwinists” in the Special Organization, which was 
a secret organization affiliated to Enver Pasha within the CUP(Bozarslan, 
2007;Buenos,2012;Ahmad, 2014; Bozarslan, 2015, pp.177-190). That is to say, they were 
ideologically ready to kill the minorities who did not accept the Turkish identity (Bozarslan, 
2007;Buenos,2012;Ahmad, 2014; Bozarslan, 2015, pp.177-190). Population growth, eugenics 
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and physical training constituted the pillars of the nationalist biopolitics of the CUP (Bora, 
2017, p.227). 
         The history of the Young Turks (id est, the CUP) movement can be viewed as a complex 
process of identity formation that occurred in two significant phases. The transformation of the 
movement from the first phase into the second was a shift from Ottoman nationalism to Muslim 
nationalism and it resulted in the exclusion of non-Muslims (Ungor, 2012, p. 28; Bozarslan, 
2015, pp. 193-253). The shift from the second phase of Muslimism to the third phase of Turkish 
nationalism produced a process of disidentification with non-Turks (Ungor, 2012, p. 29; 
Ahmad, 2014, pp.1-100; Bozarslan, 2015, pp. 193-253). These two shifts were crucially 
important in the formation process of the Turkish nation. 
Hundreds of thousands of Muslims from different origins migrated to the Ottoman territories 
as a result of the emancipation of the Balkan and Caucasian states from the Ottoman Empire in 
the 19th century as well as the bloody events taking place throughout this century, and all these 
migration movements brought the concept of Turkification to the agenda (Üngör, 2012). Ethnic 
discrimination against non-Turks was another important event strengthening the rise of Turkish 
nationalism, which emerged due to the fact that Armenian and Greek deputies, who were the 
minorities living in the Ottoman Empire ruled by the constitutional monarchy at that time, 
parted ways with the CUP in the first parliament (ibid.) The central committee of the CUP 
foresaw a much more active involvement on the issues of identity policies as of this period 
(ibid.).  
Sociologist Mehmet Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura were the official ideologues of this period. 
Gökalp proposed the rejection of Islamism and Ottomanism ideologies in favor of a single 
synthesis of an official Muslim Turkish Nationalism (Heyd, 1950). This understanding of 
nationalism, which was based on the sovereignty of a single central identity, not only eliminated 
civic interpretations of nationalism, but also ensured a collective disidentification with non-
Turkish Muslims such as Albanians, Arabs, Kurds and Iranians living in the Ottoman Empire 
(Üngör, 2012 p. 30). There were many requirements of the nation in Ziya Gökalp’s book titled 
The Principles of Turkism, which is an important reference work about Turkish Nationalism: 
Common language, religion, morality, aesthetics and common ideals (Gökalp, 1952 cited in 
Bora, 2017, p. 214). During the period of National Struggle, he notably reduced the ethno-
religious intensity of the nation’s bond, he confined it to being trained by Turkish culture and 
serving the Turkish ideal in his writings (ibid.). Another important ideologue of Turkish 
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Nationalism was Yusuf Akçura, the founder of the Turkish Hearths, an institution where violent 
and radical nationalist policies and actions were organized (ibid, p. 215). In 1904, In his very 
important article titled “Three Styles of Politics” (Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset), Akçura mentioned the 
impossibility of a nation consisting of the Ottoman minorities and argued that this would lead 
to the failure of Ottomanism ideology(Akçura 1976; Üngör, 2012, p. 32). Then, he targeted 
Islamism and stated that a nationalism arising from Muslim minorities would also be 
problematic(Akçura 1976; Üngör, 2012, p. 32). Akçura pointed out that "the nation is the 
mainstream in our contemporary history" by stating that the most valid solution was the 
ideology of Turkish nationalism(Akçura, 2008).  However, Akçura’s ideas united with 
Gökalp’s ideas in the field during the ripening period and he defended that a Sunni Muslim 
nationalism is the most suitable ideology for survival of the state (ibid). In his other article in 
the Yeni Hayat (New Life) journal published to spread the policies of the CUP, he stated: “The 
‘Übermensch’ envisaged by German philosopher Nietzsche are Turks. Turks are the new people 
of the every century. Therefore, the new life will be born from Turkism, the mother of all youth 
(Ülken, 1992, p. 310 cited in Akçam, 1995, p. 26).  
All these developments strengthened the CUP, and significant leaders of the party, Dr. 
Bahaeddin Şakir and Dr. Mehmed Nazım wrote to a party branch that the CUP could never be 
entrusted to “any enemy of the Turks, Armenian or not” during the First World War”(Üngör, 
2012, p. 33). Two years later, Dr. Nazım explicitly stated in a letter to Zionist leaders as the 
following: “The Committee of Progress and Union wants centralization and a Turkish 
monopoly of power. It wants no nationalities in Turkey. It does not want Turkey to become a 
new Austria-Hungary. It wants a unitary Turkish nation, with Turkish schools, a Turkish 
administration, and a Turkish legal system” (Hanioglu, 2001, p.260 cited in Üngör, 2011, p. 
33). 
       Intra-state and non-state pressures as well as conflicting developments regarding the 
concepts of freedom, equality, constitution, and justice transformed the party into the advocate 
of ethnic nationalism and provided a basis for violent practices (ibid.). Two phases became 
prominent as a result of the decline of the Ottoman state due to the Western imperialism and 
separatism regarding disidentification among the Ottoman political elite:  a shift from Ottoman 
patriotism to Muslim nationalism, and a shift from Muslim nationalism to Turkish nationalism 
(ibid.). This radical shift between the ideologies caused the CUP, which pursued ethnic 
nationalism due to the concerns about the survival of the state, to perform destructive massacres 
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in the country (ibid.). During this process, which coincided with the last period of the Ottoman 
Empire, the CUP pursued policies towards the Turkish Republic that it aimed to establish and 
not towards the Ottoman State (Ünlü, 2017, pp: 101-132). They first pursued assimilation 
policies and “taming policies” towards other ethnic groups, notably Armenians who demanded 
freedom during this period. However, they started their ethnic cleaning practices in 1914 when 
the Armenians’ demand for freedom continued and they carried out Armenian Genocide, in 
which one and a half million Armenians were slaughtered in 1915-1920 (Ünlü, 2017, pp 137-
148; Bora, 2017, pp 212-213). The CUP administration, who carried out the Armenian 
Genocide, has now overlooked the Ottoman Empire and set the foundation logic of the New 
Turkish State, which will be built on the central Turkish identity (Bozarslan, 2007, 2015; Ünlü, 
2017). In other words, the logic that founded the Republic of Turkey in 1920 is a genocidal 
logic. 
5. 1. b. Establishment of Modern Turkish Nation-State and Structuralization of 
Turkish-Nationalism       
            Founders, notably Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü, of the centralist unitary 
Turkish nation-state that took place of the Ottoman State in 1920, resorted to establish a strong 
state by enforcing laws one after another in order to annihilate the traces of the past quickly 
(Ünlü, 2017, pp. 186-207; Ahmad, 1993, pp. 52-72). Speeches were given in the first parliament 
of the young Republic established around these totalitarian ethnic policies, claiming that we 
took the risk of being labeled as “murderers” to save our country:  
As you know the deportations were an event that triggered a worldwide outcry and 
caused us to be regarded as murderers. Before embarking upon it we knew that the 
Christian world would not indulge us and would direct its full wrath and deep-seated 
enmity against us on account of it. Why have we then opted for appending to ourselves 
the label of murderer? Why have we involved ourselves in such a grave and difficult 
conflict? We acted thusly simply to ensure the future of our country that we consider to 
be dearer and more sacred to us than our own lives (from the speech of Hasan Fehmi on 
17 October 1920 in the parliament, Turkish Grand National Assembly Minutes of the 
Secret Sessions, Volume I, s. 177, Ankara, 1985. cited in Akçam, 1995, p.25). 
In his speech in a conference in 1925, Yusuf Akçura, who was appointed by Atatürk as the 
state’s official ideologue, provided a framework of the nation-state program of the newly 
founded Republic of Turkey by mentioning the principles about “requirements of a 
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contemporary state” (Bora, 2017, p. 215). The first principle is to ensure homogeneity(ibid.). It 
is crucial to insist on the unity of power as a necessity of national sovereignty; the state cannot 
allow any establishment preventing independence (ibid.).  By referring to Anglicanism and 
Bismark’s Kulturkampf, Akçura emphasized the need for the nation-state to control and 
nationalize religion (ibid.). In fact, the feudal and spiritual people were the “reactionary 
elements" that must be tackled by the contemporary state (ibid.).  
During his conversation with young people in Konya, in 1923, Mustafa Kemal expressed the 
common concern of his generation by stating, “We are a nation which was late and negligent 
in applying the idea of nationality” (Bora, 2017, p. 195). In the Civilized Knowledge for the 
Citizen published in 1931, Mustafa Kemal noted that the Turkish nation was superior and 
unique in terms of homogeneity or essential durability: “It seems that all of the characteristics 
of the Turkish nation (unity in political entity, unity in language, unity in homeland, unity in 
race and origin, historical affinity, moral affinity) do not exist in other nations"(ibid., pp. 2017). 
These words expressing official recognition and inspiring self-confidence are in fact a statement 
of aspiration.  
This founding mindset, which was situated around the idea of a nation in which all the citizens 
were Turkish, initially reshaped educational institutions as in order to Turkify the society(Ünlü, 
2017, pp. 192). The policies of monopolization and centralization in the cultural domain in 
general and in the educational field in particular were enacted by the 3 March 1924 dated Law 
on Unification of Education in order to ensure the unity of nation in terms of “thoughts and 
feelings”(ibid.). Therefore, madrassas, which were the symbol of actual autonomy and plurality 
in the educational field, were closed down (ibid.). The directorate of religious affairs, which 
was established following the abolition of the caliphate in the same year, favored only Muslims 
among religions, and Sunnis among sects, and only guaranteed the visibility of Sunni Muslims 
in public sphere as well as Turkifying Muslims by providing education in mosques (ibid.). Thus, 
the mosques were centralized to provide intellectual and emotional education based on the 
principle of Muslim Turkishness, just like the schools (ibid). Durkheim describes common 
education of certain thoughts and feelings aiming at “fixing in the consciousness” and “having 
deep influence in the mind” as the following: “Society can survive only if there exists among 
its members a sufficient degree of homogeneity: Education perpetuates and reinforces this 
homogeneity by fixing in the mind of the child, from the beginning, the essential similarities 
that social life demands.”(Durkheim, 1956, p. 45 cited in Ünlü, 2017, p. 193). The founders of 
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the Turkish State created a Turkish entity and a habitus of Turkishness in individuals based on 
the structure of education: Turkish individuals who have common forms of thinking, emotion, 
perception and vision(ibid.). The words that might be the best evidence for these centralist 
educational policies of the state were uttered by Esat Sagay, the Minister of Education, in 1931: 
“The Turkish school is obliged to transform every Turkish child (living in Turkey) into a 
thoroughly useful Turkish citizen who has fully grasped the psychology and ideology of the 
Republic, for the Turkish nation and the Republic of Turkey”(ibid. 193-194). The fact that the 
Turkish state only recognized Turkish language and a single culture as legitimate and 
guaranteed their survival also meant that other languages (Kurdish, Armenian, Laz, Arabic, 
Greek, etc.) and cultures except this language and culture were seen as illegitimate(ibid., p. 
198). At this point, market values of other language and cultures were set to zero although use 
values of languages were still functional among individuals from different language and 
cultural backgrounds in their social networks; because it was not possible to get education or 
to find a job with that language (ibid.). The illegitimate people of an illegitimate culture are left 
out of the labor market since they are also left out of the legitimate culture and language market 
(Bourdieu, 1991 cited in Ünlü, 2017, p. 198). 
Ethno-cultural ethnic engineering policies aimed at forming a pure Turkish homeland that 
continued until the 1930s also affected the migration policies (İçduygu&Aksel, 2013). The 
1934 Resettlement Law is the most obvious evidence of ethnic engineering policies on 
Turkification of migrants. The 1934 Resettlement Law, which was enacted in parallel with the 
project of building a state through nation-state consciousness, in which there is a homogeneous 
and single nation with a single language, is as follows: “In order to protect, strengthen and 
homogenize our national constitution, now it is time to follow and enforce a settlement policy 
to constitute the Turkish population over the masses who are rather demanded in relation to our 
national culture and contemporary civilization in terms of quality and quantity efficiently 
through the means of the state.”(Danış&Parla, 2009, p. 132). 
There were two main reasons that the Turkish state transformed its migration and resettlement 
measures into policies aimed at forming a homogeneous population: The first one was the treaty 
concerning the exchange of population, which aimed purging non-Muslims who were not 
Turkish, and was based on the Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923 between Turkey and Greece, 
France, United Kingdom(İçduygu&Aksel, 2013). About one million 200 thousand Greeks were 
forced to migrate to Greece and 400 thousand Muslims were forced to migrate from Greece to 
Turkey in line with this treaty (İçduygu&Aksel, 2013). The second one was the assimilationist 
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resettlement policy based on forced migration of Kurdish people, who were the second largest 
ethnic group in Turkey after Turks, to regions in which the majority population was Turkish 
(Bora, 2017, p. 2018). During that period, an ethnic hierarchy determined the migration priority 
regarding migration movements from abroad: Turks, Turkic communities (Tatars, etc.) and 
Balkan Muslims were allowed to migrate. Caucasian Muslims were allowed under supervision. 
Kurds, Arabs, Albanians, Jews, Christians were unwanted migrants (ibid. pp.218-219). To sum 
up, the 1934 Resettlement Law was not only about external migration, it was also a product of 
assimilation policy towards Kurds within the country (ibid.). 
Apart from a short-term multi-party experience, the Turkish State was governed by an 
authoritarian regime ruled by the Republican People's Party (CHP), chaired by Atatürk, as a 
single party in the parliament for about thirty years as of the first years of the state (Cagaptay, 
2012). The CHP led by Atatürk continued its authoritarian policies following the first multi-
party period with the Progressive Republican Party (TPCF:17 November 1924-July 1925) and 
the Free Republican Party (SCF:12 August 1930-17 November 1930) (ibid.).  The emergence 
of Turkish History Thesis, which marked the rise of Turkish nationalism with a “narrative of 
glorious heroism” was the beginning of the authoritarian policies that were pursued in the 1930s 
(Cagaptay, 2012; Beşikçi, 1977). According to this thesis, the Turks were regarded as the 
essential component of Mesopotamia and Anatolia with a history of full of heroism from 
Mongol and Genghis Khan Empire in Central Asia to Sumerians and Hittites in Anatolia 
(Cagaptay, 2012; Beşikçi, 1977). Therefore, Turkish nationalism became the official ideology 
of the state, which suggested the idea that it was an honor and privilege to be a Turk and Turks 
ruled over many states throughout the history to the citizens living in Turkey during the 1930s 
(Cagaptay, 2012; Akçam, 2012; Beşikçi, 1977). 
The desired citizen profile in the citizenship policy of the state’s founders, who pursued a 
homogeneous population policy, was a citizen who was a nationalist-Turkish and pure-Turkish 
(Bora, 2017, p. (219). İsmet İnönü’s following statements in 1932 explains the citizen profile 
formed at that time: “We do not ask for anything abnormal to be a Turkish nationalist and a 
Turkish citizen in this country. It is sufficient to love and accept being Turkish to have all the 
rights granted for being a member of the Turkish nation” (ibid., p.237). In 2004, Füsun Üstel 
developed the definition “state-centered, militant citizenship indebted to duties” in her book 
explaining the state’s desired citizen profile in Turkey (Üstel, 2004). 
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         As a result of the policies aimed at forming a community of citizens based on a Sunni 
Muslim-Turkishness, the biggest Kurdish massacre/genocide of the century was carried out 
against the Alevi Kurd population located in the East and Southeast part of Turkey (Northern 
Kurdistan, ESA) between the years of 1937-1938(Kieser, 2011; Bruinessen, 1994). As a result 
of this massacre, about ten thousand Alevi Kurds living in Dersim were killed while hundreds 
of thousands Kurds were forced to migrate from the region and those trying to escape from the 
massacre migrated to various regions of Turkey and the world(Kieser, 2011; Bulut, 2005; 
Bruinessen, 1994). Following this massacre, which will be examined in a heading addressing 
the Turkey’s Kurdish Question in more detail, the Turkish state completed its policies aimed at 
forming a homogeneous nation; thus, placed nationalism, which is still the official state 
ideology, at the foundation of the state (Yeğen,2007, 2002). In her work titled Muslim 
Nationalism and the New Turks, Jenny White (2013) provided an in-depth examination of the 
project of creating a nationalist Turkish nation pursued by the founders the Republic of Turkey 
since the first years of the republic, and analyzed Turkey’s model of nationalism attached to 
Islam and stated that the basic elements of nationalism were blood, purity, militarism, being a 
Muslim and Turkish. White indicated that the Kemalist national identity, the founder ideology 
of the Republic of Turkey, has evolved into a heterodox understanding of nationalism based on 
the privilege of Muslim identity and culture (ibid.). 
Turkish nationalism, which emerged with the fall of the Ottoman Empire and was constructed 
through authoritarian legal regulations during the first twenty years of the Turkish Republic, 
has become the official ideology of the Turkish nation-state both in administrative and cultural 
policies during this historical formation process (Bora, 2017; Ünlü, 2017; Üngör, 2012;  
Akçam, 2002; Yeğen, 2002). The fact that the idea of ‘national culture’ (Turkish culture), which 
synthesizes Islamic values and values of Central Asia Turks, became the state policy when it 
was officially recognized by the Constitution, Atatürk Supreme Council for Culture, Language 
and History between the years of 1982 and 1986 clearly reveals the continuity of this nationalist 
ideology, which is still dominant in the Turkish state today (Copeux, 2002, p.47). As a result 
of these ethno-religious policies of the state, educational and cultural institutions have become 
places, in which a nationalism attached to values of Islam have been taught and expressed 
without an effort to hide it (ibid.). In his article titled Hızla Türkleşiyoruz in 1995, Taner Akçam 
emphasized that the current regime of the Turkish state has been still governed by the 
understanding of Kemalist Turkish nationalism, which is the founding ideology of the state 
(Akçam, 1995). In his work titled Studien über die Deutschen, German Sociologist Elias states 
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that the notion of “past” has a negative connotation since it is generally used to describe 
something happened and finished and therefore, it underestimates the impact and meaning of 
our history on today (Elias, 1989, p. 165 cited in Akçam, 1995, p. 20) According to Akçam, the 
history taking place in the past has had a big influence on today and even our behaviors that 
determine today date back to hundreds of years ago (ibid.). Elias states: “It has been amazingly 
seen that certain patterns of thinking, hearing, and behavior can reemerge after many 
generations in the same society by adapting new circumstances in a remarkable way... In fact, 
social events generally show their effects 100 years later” (ibid.). Therefore, we have to look at 
the current Turkish identity and Turkishness from a broad period of time and build a solid 
bridge between yesterday and today (ibid.). Akçam argues that we also should know how this 
process took place in history to be able to understand the current process of “ethnicization” and 
he states that Turkey is still governed by nationalism based on Turkish ethnicity that started to 
be formed in the 1920s(ibid.).  
In his eye-opening article titled Türkiye'de Gayriresmi ve Popüler Milliyetçilik (Unofficial and 
Popular Nationalism in Turkey), Umut Özkırımlı (2002) helps us to understand ongoing 
dominance of nationalism in Turkey. According to Özkırımlı, nation-building process is not 
peculiar to the modern nation-states that are being newly established, on the contrary, nation-
building is a process that never ends (ibid., p.711). Nation-building vaguely gives its place to 
the process of reproduction by evolving (ibid.). Mechanisms (educational unity, symbols and 
rituals) that are formed during the nation-building process continue to exist along with the 
involvement of new institutions during the reproduction process (ibid.). For example, visual 
and written media start to play a crucial role in the reproduction of the nation with the increase 
in literacy rates and opportunities of communication (ibid.). Privatization and “gaining 
autonomy” following the release of economy from the state monopoly as the separation 
between public and private sector had begun, and this started to produce its own understanding 
of nationalism resulting in the spread of nationalism into popular culture and daily life (ibid.). 
From music to sports, beauty contests to cinema, literature to advertisements, it has become 
possible to see “nationalist fetish objects” (flags, uniforms, logos, maps) in every domain 
(McClintock, 1996 cited in Özkırımlı, 2002). In parallel to this theoretical basis, nationalism 
became particularly evident in daily life in Turkey and turned into a useful tool in the popular 
press in the beginning of the 1990s (ibid.).  Especially, the increasing deaths of soldiers due to 
conflicts between the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê/Kurdish Worker’s Party(PKK) and Turkey, 
which started in the mid-1980s and increased in the 1990s, the nationalism wave around the 
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world, and the election of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which embraced a racist and 
nationalist program, as the second party in the elections held on 18 April 1999 also increased 
the popularity of nationalism in Turkish press and media organs (ibid., p. 712). According to 
Özkırımlı, the unofficial nationalist discourse having a wide coverage in private media 
organizations was in parallel with the official Turkish nationalism in that period (Özkırımlı, 
2002, p. 714-715; Yumul&Özkırımlı,2000). Today, reproduction of Turkish Nationalism is not 
only limited to media, the most powerful supporter of nationalism is still the state with its 
educational and cultural policies (Ünlü, 2017, Chap. 4,5; Özkırımlı, 2002, pp. 715-717). 
Educational system is still largely under state control; curriculum and books to be read are still 
determined by the central authority, higher education institutions are kept under control through 
strict policies, and reading, education and training that oppose official policies of the state are 
prevented with these centralist policies (Ünlü, 2017, Chap. 4,5; Özkırımlı, 2002, pp. 715-717). 
The state also encourages the celebration of national holidays “enthusiastically”, Turkish 
nationalism is reproduced by the state by ensuring the spread of national symbols into everyday 
life (singing the national anthem in official meetings and even in sporting events, obligation to 
have an Atatürk portrait in government agencies, naming the streets, parks, city line ferries, etc. 
after ‘Great Turks’) (Ünlü, 2017, Chap. 4,5; Özkırımlı, 2002, pp. 715-717). In addition, this 
reproduction functions as a means of “discrimination” and it pushes aside the fact that the 
culture adopted by the official ideology does not show similarities with neighboring countries 
and it ensures that people focus more on the others (especially Kurds, and every segment 
opposing the general official ideology) in the country(ibid.). Thus, a sacredness is attributed to 
the official ideology by the majority of Turks as if it is a guard against the Kurds and other 
opponents of the official ideology. 
At this point, it is observed that Turkish nationalism formed in the first years of the republic 
has also been pursued as the official ideology by the Justice and Development Party led by 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, which has been in power in Turkey, since 2002 (Bora, 2017, pp.266-
267). In its early years, the Erdoğan government promised prosperity to Turkish society by 
stating that “true nationalism is to develop the country economically” and implemented a 
neoliberal developmentalist nationalism policy aimed at earning the sympathy of larger 
segments (Bora 2017, p.266-267; İnsel, 2013). On the one hand, this understanding of 
nationalism supported the official Turkish nationalism that was formed in the early years of the 
Republic. On the other hand, it was based on a narrative that actual development would only 
be possible through economic development while it did not associate Turkey’s development 
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with ethno-cultural unity (Bora 2017, p.266-267; İnsel, 2013). However, the Erdoğan 
government’s understanding of nationalism took the strictest form of the official Turkish 
nationalism because of the civil war with PKK, which started again as a result of Erdoğan’s 
changing Kurdish policy in 2015, and formal governmental institutions and ceremonies, 
especially the media, returned to the narratives emphasizing how big the Turkish nation was 
(Bora, 2017, p.266-267; Ünlü,2017).  
In his book Türklük Sözleşmesi (Turkishness contract), Barış Ünlü (2018) expressed opinions 
supporting Akçam’s and Özkırımlı’s theses on the currency of Turkish nationalism. According 
to Ünlü, those acting as a Turk by involving Turkish ethnicity and serving the continuity of the 
Turkish state have many privileges in line with the functioning of the state, this system has 
functioned in the same way since it was established in the late 1800s, and Turkish nationalism 
has survived until today for the continuity of Turkishness by adapting to circumstances of the 
period throughout its historical journey (ibid.).  
         As a result, the ideology of Turkish nationalism, which was organized and formed before 
the establishment of the modern Turkish nation state, has existed in different forms until today 
but it has been constantly reproduced, serving the ‘survival’ of the state. Based on the 
nationalism theories of Eric Hobsbawm and Ernest Gellner, the Turkish nation can be 
considered not as a social reality based on an ancient history, but as a political, modern, and 
collective centralist identity constructed by Turkish nationalism and the Turkish state. Within 
the framework of Benedict Anderson's concept of “imagined community”, Turkishness can be 
regarded as an imagined community, in which members of the nation see each other as fellows 
even though they do not know each other, who are willing to die for each other and for the 
nation, therefore, a reality due to its consequences. In other words, the Turkish nation may be 
an imaginary community created by the Turkish state; however, this invention and imagination 
is built on common and real interests, crimes, suffering and emotions that are under the 
protection of the state (Ünlü, 2017, p. 174). 
The Turkish state’s understanding of centralist nationalism has pursued an official state 
ideology between racism and a strict ideology of nationalism creating tension towards ethnic 
and religious minorities, and followed an economic policy based on the central identity. The 
main argument of the founders of the Republic for sovereignty is to establish an economic 




5. 2. The Process of Economic Centralization and The Establishment of Turkish 
National Economy 
5. 2. a. Policies Regarding the Centralization of Economy in the Late Ottoman 
Empire  
          In the formation process of Turkish nationalism, the first reflections in the economic field 
are based on the Second Constitutional Period(1908-1920), during which a liberal economic 
policy aimed at creating national merchants were pursued(Toprak 1995, p. 2; Toprak, 2000). In 
the Second Constitutional Period, the ‘economic’ state approach became evident rather than a 
‘administrative’ state,  and economic policies were adopted in a way that the state would not 
intervene in economic life on the ground of obtaining maximum revenue for the public treasury 
(Toprak 1995, p. 2; Toprak, 2000). The main function of the national state(late period of 
Ottoman Empire) was to strengthen the economic structure to provide an environment for the 
entrepreneurship, and to indirectly generate revenue for the state by increasing the tax paying 
power of the people (Toprak 1995, p. 2; Toprak, 2000).  
         With the election of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Ottoman 
Parliament(Meclis-i Mebusan) in 1908, radical changes were implemented in many institutions, 
especially in the economic institution, of the Ottoman Empire (Bozarslan, 2015, pp.177-190; 
Toprak, 2000). Since the majority of the trade was controlled by Armenians and Greeks in this 
period, the chamber of commerce was also under the control of these segments (Toprak, 1995, 
pp. 4-5; Toprak, 2000, pp. 245-250; Sussnitzki, 1966, pp. 120-121 cited in Aktar, 2000, p. 24). 
The Turks were the artisans of that time and controlled the chamber of artisans (Toprak, 1995, 
pp. 4-5; Toprak, 2000, pp. 245-250). In this period, the CUP made its first national economic 
move between these two groups by supporting the chamber of artisans dominated by the Turks 
(Toprak, 1995, pp. 4-5; Toprak, 2000, pp. 245-250). As an extreme example of the first term 
national economic policies, the CUP called on Muslims to stop shopping from non-Muslim 
merchants with the Declarations published following the Balkan War (1912-1913), and 
published lists including the names and addresses of Muslim shopkeepers (Toprak, 1995, p.5). 
In the meantime, nearly 500 new Muslim Turkish grocery stores were opened in Istanbul at the 
same time, and this movement was supported by trade associations which were pro-CUP (ibid.).  
In parallel with these, Yusuf Akçura, one of the official ideologues of the CUP, believed that 
economic liberation would be achieved with the creation of Turkish bourgeoisie and stated: 
Contemporary prosperous states came into existence on the shoulders of the 
bourgeoisie, of the businessmen and bankers. The national awakening in Turkey is the 
beginning of the genesis of the Turkish bourgeoisie. And if the natural growth of the 
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Turkish bourgeoisie continues without being damaged or interrupted, we can say that 
the sound establishment of the Turkish state has been guaranteed(ibid., p.41)    
          The CUP accelerated its national economic policies by taking advantage of the outbreak 
of the First World War in 1914 (Toprak, 1995, pp. 107-131; Ahmad, 2014; Toprak, 2000).  As 
the Western states were not able to intervene in the Ottoman Empire due to the war, the 
capitulations1 were abolished on 10 September 1914 (Toprak, 1995, pp. 107-131; Ahmad, 
2014; Toprak, 2000). Legal regulations were made to increase accumulation of Turkish capital 
to increase industrial and commercial activities and the value of land as well as to ensure 
financial development by encouraging Muslim Turkish entrepreneurs through state policies 
(Toprak, 1995, pp. 107-131; Ahmad, 2014; Toprak, 2000). The Law for the Encouragement of 
Industry was passed in June 1914. With this law, domestic production was prioritized and the 
state was obliged to purchase domestic products even if they were 10% more expensive than 
imported products (Toprak, 1995, pp. 107-131; Ahmad, 2014; Toprak, 2000). Foreign trade 
was directly carried out by the state through the Export Committee (Toprak, 1995, pp. 107-131; 
Toprak, 2000). During this period, the Chamber of Artisans which was dominated by the Turks 
was granted privileges and the use of Turkish language was made obligatory in commercial 
transactions in 1916. On the same date, the Regulation on Customs which imposed high taxes 
on imported products came into force (Toprak, 1995, pp. 107-131; Toprak, 2000). During this 
period, these economic constraints against non-Turks and non-Muslims were widely accepted 
by the Turkish population of the country(Ünlü, 2017, pp. 14-15). The main reason for this was 
that this national economic policy allowed Muslim Turks to live a privileged and secure life to 
move up or to have potential opportunities to move up higher positions in the social hierarchy 
(ibid.). 
The law on abandoned properties(emvâl-ı metrûke) is one of the most solid sources of the 
process, in which mutual privileges and advantages were substituted between the Turkish 
authorities and Muslim Turks. It was an euphemism to veil and legitimize goods of the 
Armenians and the Kurds confiscated by the CUP (Yadirgi, 2017, p. 160-161; Üngör&Polatel, 
                                                        
1 Those were the rights and privileges (economic, judicial, administrative, etc.) firstly granted to the French in 
the 16th Century, then to Russians, the British and non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. See for more 
information: Ahmad, F. 2000). Ottoman perceptions of the capitulations 1800–1914. Journal of Islamic 




2011, p.6).  While abandoned properties was a term used in the Ottoman Empire, it was started 
to be utilized as a feasible legitimization and normalization tool for the Turkification of 
Armenian goods by means of plunder as it was re-enacted in 1915 when the Armenian Genocide 
began, which occurred in the years of nation-state formation during the transition from the 
Ottoman to Turkey (Üngör&Polatel, 2011, pp.6, 43-48). In line with this regulation, movable 
and immovable properties of hundreds of thousands of Armenians were confiscated by 
Muslims, business sectors (mining, agriculture, trade, artisanship, etc.) of the Armenian 
businessmen were seized by the Muslim Turks, and debts of Muslims owed to the Armenians 
were wiped off (Üngör&Polatel, 2011, pp.6, 43-59; Onaran, 2010, pp. 56-62). The Commission 
for the Prevention of Hoarding (Men-i İhtikar Heyeti) was established to suppress the war 
speculators during the first World War and to replace the “convict components who comprised 
the bourgeois class” with Muslim-Turks who were the foundational components of the state as 
pointed out by the National Economy Program, and it was specifically used to suppress non-
Muslim ethnic minorities (Toprak, 1995, p.57). According to the Turkish Homeland (Türk 
Yurdu) journal, the disseminating organ  of the Turkism ideology at that time, 1915 (the year 
that the Armenian Genocide started) was the turning point for the transfer of the Ottoman 
economy from “non-national hands to national hands”, that is to say, the starting point for the 
move on national economy(ibid., p. 28).  The governor of Aleppo expressed his satisfaction 
after the plunder by the Muslim Turks during the Armenian Genocide as follows:  
It is with pleasure that I report we have, in accordance with the government’s wishes, 
succeeded in completely transforming the conditions here and in the District (Sanjak) 
of Maraş. My province has been cleansed of Christian (Armenian) elements. The 
merchants and business owners, who two years ago were 80 percent Christian, are now 
95 percent Muslim and 5 percent Christian (Akçam, 2002, pp. 175-176 cited in Ünlü, 
2017, p.138).  
In conclusion, as summarized by Yusuf Akçura, the Union and Progress became the party and 
representative of the Muslim/Turkish bourgeoisie during the years of war (Georgeon, 1980, pp. 
175-176 cited in Ünlü, 2017, p.138). The centralization policies of economic identity continued 
with the secret articles of the government program, which was written by Talat Pasha, who was 
appointed as the grand vizier on 4 February 1917 (Bardakçı, 2009, pp. 172-173 cited in Ünlü, 
pp. 138-139). In accordance with these secret articles, it is stated that the Turks which are the 
foundation of the Muslim state must be strengthened both economically and socially (ibid.).  
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5. 2. b. Ethno-Centralist Economic Policies as of the Establishment of the 
Turkish Nation-State and Construction of Turkish Economy 
          Those ethno-political economic practices in the late Ottoman period, in which the 
Turkish nationalism was first formed, were taken over as of the establishment of the Republic 
of Turkey. The following words of M. K. Atatürk, who is accepted as the founder of the 
Republic of Turkey, allow us to understand how this approach continued: “The Armenians do 
not have any rights in this beautiful country. Your country is yours, it belongs to Turks. This 
country was Turkish in history; therefore it is Turkish and it shall live on as Turkish to eternity 
(...) Armenians and so forth (alluding to the Kurds and other minorities) have no rights 
whatsoever here.” (Bardakçı, 2014, p.7 cited in Ünlü, 2017, p.167).  
The protective discourse, which gradually became evident in the first years of the republic, also 
designated the boundaries of nationality (Insel, 2002, p.769). Development, namely economic 
growth, would be achieved through the strengthening of economic components that act in 
coordination with the state, have strong organic bonds with the state, therefore, should be 
“national” (ibid.). During this period, the national enterprise was national because it had the 
feature of Muslim-Turkish, that is, its existence was completely subjected to the national state 
(ibid.). The fact that a part of this private enterprise class consisted of civil-soldier bureaucrats 
allowed the state to monitor the development dynamics more closely during the “affairism” 
wave in the 1920s (ibid.). The political dream of the Republic, which considered development 
as a requirement for the survival of the state above all, made an effort to include “official 
enterprises in national bourgeoisie” to closely determine the process (ibid.). 
          Ziya Gökalp, the official ideologue of the Turkish state, hoped that economic-social 
development in the nationalization process would strengthen the collective-organic structure 
(Bora, 2017, p. 214). Gökalp's perspective on economy was an allied national economy that 
would serve to strengthen the country and Turkishness in line with his political ideology (Insel, 
2002, pp. 765-766). Gökalp’s understanding largely derives from anti-liberal German 
developmentalist ideology of the period (ibid.). This argument, which was also the fundamental 
development policy of the Turkish state, was influenced by the "national economy" doctrine of 
Friedrich List, which was based on the problem of "delayed development" and German 
nationalism (List,1999 cited in Insel, 2002, pp.764-765). The necessity of a “Closed Nation-
State”, namely a national economic and political structure closed to the outside world, in a 
“delayed country”, which is supported by this economic paradigm, influenced the formation of 
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the idea of Turkish economic development (ibid.). In this organic understanding of nation, the 
economic structure was handled in a holistic manner with the political and cultural structure 
(ibid.). Gökalp emphasized the necessity of intellectual homogeneity for the national economy 
based on these intellectual foundations. Gökalp argued that "national solidarity" would not 
develop since there was no "common conscience/bond (religion, kinship, etc.)” between 
Muslim Turks and non-Turkish minorities (ibid.). Therefore, national economy could only be 
actualized with an organic division of labor. That is why the Muslim Turkish component had 
to undertake every activity in material life by not being limited to military and civil service 
(ibid.). According to Gökalp, the economic structure of the Ottoman state was largely based on 
civil servants, artisan-type local commercial structures and taxation peculiar to feudalism 
(ibid.). In addition, the absence of a bourgeoisie class due to the lack of industrial development 
accelerated the collapse of the Ottoman state (ibid.) At this point, Samir Amis’s thesis, which 
asserts that pre-industrial Asian and Eastern countries were the center of world economy and 
these economies were based on extortion and they collapsed because they could not adapt to 
new relations of production in the post-industrial period, is a guide for us to understand the 
ideas of Gökalp. 
Yusuf Akçura, another official ideologue of the state, also agreed that the greatest obstacle lying 
ahead of economic growth was the lack of a “Turkish bourgeoisie” (Insel, 2002, pp. 765-766). 
Akçura clearly emphasized the national dimension of the economic development and the 
ethnic-religious scope of this dimension:  
The only remedy was to rescue the Turkish nation from the current situation at all costs 
(including to kill and die by fighting) by means of population and economic forces so 
that it could carry the burden of perseverance (such as maintaining the survival of the 
Turkish state). Ensuring the economic growth of the Turk during the Great War(WWI), 
establishing a middle class and a bourgeoisie, and for this, creating industries in the 
country held by the Turks and the state, pursuing a certain and serious policy against 
the superior and competitor communities can be explained by this objective (Toprak, 
1995, p. 17). 
         Throughout the 1920s, the state focused on policies towards Turkification of the 
economy, nationalization of foreign state-owned companies and reduction of the impact of non-
Muslim elements on economic activity(ibid.) During this period, economic development 
approach of the Republic administrators was not only limited to economic independence, but 
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also based on an economic approach that would include the economic autonomy of the state 
(Insel, 2002, p.769). Therefore, the biggest step was taken for the economic centralization 
throughout the history of republic and İzmir Economic Congress, led by Mustafa Kemal, was 
held in February 1923 (Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 166-168; Ünlü, 2017, pp.188-190). The founders of 
new Turkey and Muslim Turkish bourgeoisie(national) attended İzmir Economic Congress 
(Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 166-168; Ünlü, 2017, pp.188-190). The most important partnership between 
two groups was the desire to maintain relations with “foreign capital”, namely international 
capitalism, through Muslim-Turkish bourgeoisie instead of non-Muslim bourgeoisie, which 
was to be eliminated (Ünlü, 2017, p.188). This congress was regarded as a national sovereignty 
struggle for the Turkification of the capital. In the opening speech of the congress, Mustafa 
Kemal stated: “The following principle is required for total independence: National sovereignty 
should be consolidated by economic independence” (ibid.).  The congress published the 
Economic Pact determining the economic boundaries as a continuation of the National Pact, 
which was the state policy indicating the territorial borders (ibid.) In brief, the following 
statements were made in the document:  “A Turk is always friendly to nations that are not 
hostile to his religion, nation, territory, life and institutions; he is not against foreign capital. 
However, he does not establish relationship with organizations that do not conform to the law 
and his own language in his country.” (Ökçün, 1981, pp. 387-389 cited in Ünlü, 2017, p.189). 
This statement indicated that companies not using Turkish in their transactions and not 
consisting of Turkish employees would be liquidated or excluded (ibid.). As a continuation of 
these policies, it was decided to establish national banks to speed up the centralization of capital. 
The main reason for this was that the banking system taken over from the Ottoman Empire had 
a foreign-dependent structure and this did not comply with the centralist ideology of the new 
Turkish state (Kocabaşoğlu, 2001 cited in Ünlü, 20017, pp. 189-190). Eventually, Türkiye İş 
Bankası(Business Bank of Turkey), whose “capital was completely national and employees 
were completely Turkish", was founded in accordance with this policy in 1924 in order to 
support the national capital enterprises (ibid.). Thus, centralist capital was supported by means 
of corporate official state banking. 
This centralist economy approach was called etatism as a concept recognized by Atatürk as the 
key principle for prosperity (İnsel, 2002; Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 176-179). This economic approach 
that is a synthesis of nationalism and developmentalism became the agenda  under the pretext 
of countring of the Sheikh Said Resistance(which took place as the Sheikh Said Resistance in 
Turkish official historiography), which was a Kurdish resistance that broke out in 1925, and 
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internal liberals liquidated in 1929 and finally etatism became the state's economic policy (İnsel, 
2002; Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 176-179).   
Kadro (Cadre) Journal is considered as the most influential political movement, in which the 
voluntarist development ideology of the period was systematically mentioned within the 
framework of an authoritarian nationalist-etatism principle(İnsel, 2002; Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 176-
179).  Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, one of the prominent writers of the Kadro Journal, expressed 
the meaning of the etatist development ideology in terms of the development policy of the 
period as follows:  
That national liberation movement is etatist in national politics can only be 
comprehended in this way. The economic objective of the national independence can 
only be achieved by a national business plan that knows what to do beforehand and 
ensures to operate the national energy, national capital and all the national affairs as 
soon as possible in the most efficient and smooth way(Aydemir, 1934, p. 7).  
In the single-party (CHP) period between years of 1920-1950, hostile policies were adopted 
against the non-national population while policies encouraging immigration to Turkey were 
adopted for the Turks living abroad (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Greece and other Balkan countries). Within this framework, people of Turkish origin living in 
Greece and other Balkan countries were forced to migrate to Turkey in masses in line with the 
Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923 and Population Exchange Agreement between Greece (and 
also with United Kingdom and France)  and Turkey (Danış & Parla, 2009; İçduygu & Aksel, 
2013). The 1934 Resettlement Law, which was mentioned in the previous chapter, legitimized 
this population policy (İçduygu & Aksel, 2013). Both legal regulations were enacted in order 
to strengthen the population in terms of quality and quantity to Turkify the state by creating a 
working class consisting of the Turks in the Turkish state, which began to industrialize, and to 
strengthen policies by promising citizenship to Turks living in other countries in the short term 
(İçduygu&Aksel, 2013; Danış&Parla, 2009). The Armenian Genocide that took place in the 
late the Ottoman Empire and the population exchange agreements signed by Turkey and Greece 
in the early years of the Republic led the sectors under the control of Armenians and Greeks 
who were active in artisanship, farming, trade and many other fields to be taken over by Muslim 
Turks (Üngör, 2012; Aktar, 2000). The goods of Armenians and Greeks largely changed hands 
by means of plunder (Aktar, 2000, pp. 34-47). In this period, the Armenian and Greek goods 
were seized by Muslim Turks in Anatolia by means of plunder and this process was legitimized 
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by being removed from the definition of crime with laws enacted by the state (ibid.). Mahmut 
Esat Bozkurt, who was the Minister of Justice between 1924 and 1930, explains how the 
Armenian and Greek goods changed hands and were Turkified as follows: 
Who were working in the ferries, railroads, commercial and financial organizations of 
our country and who owned them until yesterday? The non-Turks, didn’t they? Who 
owns them today? The Turks. All of them are the products of the Republican People’s 
Party. Weren’t the vineyards, orchards, even mountains, plains, goods, property, the 
economy of the country entirely in the hands of non-Turks? Today, all of them has been 
taken over by the Turks, which is the result of the policy of the Republican People's 
Party. We see that thousands of Turks, who were working for foreigners until yesterday, 
own vineyards, orchards and property today. (…)In my opinion, and let friends and 
enemies know it, the masters of this country are the Turks. Those who are not pure 
Turks have only one right in the Turkish homeland, and that is the right to be a servant. 
The right to be a slave (Uyar, 2000, pp. 2007-2008 cited in Ünlü, 2017, pp.184-185).  
This polarizing official state ideology, which justifies the existence of a single identity and 
acknowledges that only this single identity can have claims, clearly reveals both capital and 
identity policy of the republic. However, population exchange adversely affected the economy 
of the young Turkish State in many respects. The Greeks, who were forcibly displaced and 
migrated to Greece, were experts in their business lines in the regions they lived, but the Turks, 
who took their places, were not experienced in the service sector and trade (Aktar, 2000, pp. 
34-47). This situation posed an obstacle to the sustainability in the agriculture, service and trade 
sectors in the resettlement areas, especially in İzmir, and these regions transformed into 
unproductive regions in a short period (ibid.). This irreconcilable situation between those 
arriving and those departing was summarized in the records of parliament in that period as 
follows:  
I must confess that the lifestyles and economic conditions of people arriving the region 
are not similar to those of the departing. Those departing are mostly artisans or 
merchants while those arriving are mostly peasants. Gentlemen, the majority of those 
arriving are peasants; the majority of those departing are urban dwellers. I leave it to 
your judgement to decide if it is possible to succeed in settlement under such 
irreconcilable conditions (TBMM-Zabıt Caridesi - Minutes of the Grand National 
Assembly, Volume 10, p. 43 cited in Aktar, 2000, p. 47).  
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The resettlement policies of the founders of the Republic, which focused on the creation of a 
national identity and national capital, led the state's relations of economic production to 
deteriorate and eventually weaken (ibid., pp 49-59).  
The Turkification policies in the economic field were manifesting themselves in all areas, 
including jobs requiring physical strength. In 1926, the manager of a British railway company 
explained the state’s Turkification policy on the working area as follows: “The Turks demand 
that the personnel of the railway should be entirely Turkish…” (ibid., p.58). In this period, 
Turkification policies in the public sphere were spread to all areas and there was a lot of pressure 
on firms, shopkeepers, companies and sometimes even self-employed people such as doctors 
and lawyers to dismiss their non-Muslim employees and hire Muslim Turks instead (ibid.). All 
these Turkification policies were legitimized by the state with the 2007 numbered Law on 
Professions and Services Reserved for Turkish Citizens in Turkey enacted in 1932(ibid, p.60). 
9000 Greeks, who became unemployed in Istanbul as a result of all these Turkification policies, 
had to migrate(ibid.) These Turkification policies became the official policy of the state with 
the Law on Civil Servants enacted in 1926 (Ünlü, 2017, p.190). In the fourth article of the law, 
it was stipulated that one must “be a Turk” to be a civil servant( Aktar, 2000, p. 121). While a 
clear discrimination policy was pursued towards all the minorities living in Turkey, it was also 
stipulated that one must be a Turk to have a job both in the private sector and in the public 
sector, must serve the Turks and serve the survival of the state in line with these laws (Aktar, 
2000, pp.118-121; Ünlü, 2017, pp.188-191).  
In the 1930s and 1940s, the Turkish state considered itself as the only actor in consolidating the 
regime and order; determining general objectives, utilizing its opportunities for action 
coordinately so as to achieve these objectives. Therefore, like other social organizations, labor 
unions were excluded (Akkaya, 2002). Workers were used as a tool in the formation of the 
Turkish nation as a central identity in order to ensure the survival of the Turkish state until the 
1950s (ibid.). During these years, workers and their unions were seen as an actor, especially in 
the spread of nationalism to the social structure (ibid.). Therefore, they first tried to nationalize 
workers and then to nationalize society through workers (ibid.). Mustafa Kemal, the founder of 
the new Turkish State, who perceived the society as a holistic structure and attempted to create 
a Turkish nation in this manner and stated: “We consider the people of the Turkish Republic 
not as composed of separate classes but as a community divided into various occupations with 
regard to the division of labor for individual and social life” and “the nationalist Turkish 
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laborers and workers are the valuable members of Turkish society with their existence and 
labor” (Son Posta, 22.4.1931 cited in Akkaya, 2002, p.130). The state used labels such as 
“nationalist Turkish workers” in order to consolidate these policies towards the working-class 
citizens of the time(ibid.). Those who built the official ideology of Turkish nationalism regarded 
class movements and class conflict as organisms that would endanger the survival the state and 
weaken the state. Recep Peker, the secretary-general of the CHP which was in power during 
the single-party period explained this situation in a speech:  
The interests of a country cannot be ensured through the emergence of classes by 
claiming that some qualifications are similar and common. If we look at the examples 
all over the world, the emergence of classes leads to a merciless, ambitious and bigoted 
class struggle and thereby to a constant conflict among citizens. Such conflict gradually 
destroys national unity and nationalist ideas that are the greatest forces for the survival 
of the state and its protection from dangers (Peker, 1931, … cited in Akkaya, 2002, 
p.132).  
Therefore, it was necessary “to reject the emergence of classes” and “to defend the idea of 
forming a national community”(ibid.). In these years, it was necessary to be a nationalist Turk 
to get a job or to be included in this nation with one’s own consent. Thus, the working class 
was being made nationalist and nationalism was being socialized. In the same years, mass labor 
migration(mostly Kurds) from rural areas to cities took place due to the industrialization in the 
cities of Turkey, and the cities became ethnically heterogeneous (Akkaya, 2002; İçduygu & 
Aksel, 2013). This social heterogenization in the cities is the main reason for the necessity of 
making the working class nationalist in public and private institutions of the republic (Akkaya, 
2002; İçduygu & Aksel, 2013). In this period, Avni Doğan, the provincial head of the CHP, 
explained their labor policies in İzmir which was subjected to the most intense internal 
migration due to the industrialization as follows: “Turkish workers and tradesmen are by no 
means related to political movements taking place in other countries.Turkish workers and 
tradesmen are nationalist and etatist/statist, and they are peculiar to our politicization... The 
Turkish worker will always follow the path of Atatürk's regime thanks to the strength he take 
from the sources of Turkish history.” (CHP, 1935, p.8 cited in Akkaya, 2002, p. 133). These 
statements are an expression of the desired conditions, not the existing ones (ibid.).   
In this totalitarian period, in which it was attempted to keep every member of the society under 
control with a nationalist working class, the state immediately became involved as a power 
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holding the monopoly of force and violence during the times when the working class would 
become conscious and organized, and it dispersed such movements as it did in 1938 (ibid.).  
The 3008 numbered “Labor Law” was enacted in June 1936 based on the Italian labor law of 
Mussolini period so as to bring all these labor and worker policies to a point that would impose 
sanctions before the state policy (ibid.). Recep Peker stated that the enactment of this law was 
delayed in order to “find the most suitable one for our political and national life” (ibid.). The 
labor policy, which was adopted after the 1930s, was pursued to ensure national unity and to 
create a coherent and unprivileged labor policy (Centel, 1982, p.141). In 1947, steps were taken 
to create national workers that would perpetuate centralist policies towards workers and trade 
unions, and accordingly, “the Law of Worker and Employer Unions and Union Associations” 
was enacted (The Ministry of Labor, 1947, p.2 cited in Akkaya, 2002, p.137).  
The Democrat Party(DP), which came to power at the 1950 after the single-party period, 
considered the trade unions and the right to strike as a democratic right, however, they were in 
line with the official Turkist ideology and said that they would not compromise national 
benefits and interests in their policies towards workers(Cumhuriyet Newspaper, 31.8. 1950 
cited in Akkaya, 2002, p.138). Unionization under the state’s control and working class policies 
continued until the late 1960s. In 1967, an independent labor union, The Confederation of 
Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DİSK) was established for the first time (ibid., p.140). 
Since the year it was established, DİSK defended the rights of workers in many areas, especially 
the right to strike, however, the state placed DİSK under pressure to neutralize its actions both 
by laws and its monopoly of power and established the Confederation of Turkish Trade 
Unions (Türk-İş) and supported this union to weaken DİSK (ibid.). For all these reasons, the 
activities of DİSK remained at the level of discourse. Still the DİSK and Turk-İş are two blocs 
in confrontation with the powers they get from the people and the state, respectively 
(Kurt,2010). 
        Throughout the second half of the 20th century, development policies of the Turkish state 
were pursued in a way to serve the state's survival. The idea of national development continued 
throughout the history of the republic, the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party), which was in 
power before the 1973 elections, included the promise of “purging commerce of anti-national 
elements” in its election bulletin on the eve of election (Insel, 2002, p.772). Similarly, Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, who is still in power today made eugenicist and racist promises such as “a 
Muslim-Turkish Turkey with a population of one hundred million” before 2002, when it came 
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to power(ibid.). In 1947, the Democrat Party (DP), led by Adnan Menderes, came to power as 
a new party in place of the CHP, for the first time since the foundation of the Republic. The 
DP's economic approach manifests itself as a developmentalist policy from the center to rural 
areas, including the people from a centralized elite class in production (Sunar, 1985). During 
this period, in which agriculture enterprises were encouraged, etatism was no longer an elitist 
project since it was transformed into a populist ideology towards the desires, aspirations and 
support of the masses, arising from the political participation of the people (ibid.) The DP 
tradition argues that something that is “national” may be culturally and economically different 
from the patterns imposed by the local and bureaucratic center (ibid., p.2083). Patronage 
relations were used to promote these segments and development became a significant promoter 
of nationalism in that sense (ibid.). In conclusion, during the DP period, it was also considered 
that the elements that would be active in economic development were national Turkish elements 
(Insel, 2002). Like the DP, other right-wing parties also pursued a nationalist economic policy 
focused on economic development, in which there were intense patronage relations based on 
populist-nationalist populism (ibid). For example, Süleyman Demirel, who was the leader of 
the Justice Party (AP) which participated in the coalitions and the governments of the Turkish 
politics since the beginning of the 1960s pursued a national economic policy that increased 
industrialization and supported enterprises serving to Turkishness through patronage relations 
(ibid.). On the other hand, the MHP leader Alparslan Türkeş who had an authoritarian 
nationalist approach argued that Turkey’s development should be realized by an economic 
move that was "one hundred percent native and one hundred percent national” and bourgeoisie 
class should be supported by the state(ibid). This strict nationalist approach, which was entirely 
the same with founders of the republic, was mainly based on a racist ethno-policy (ibid).  
The evolution of Turkish nationalism in terms of economic development has taken place in the 
form of "Western Turkish Nationalism" since the mid-1980s (Bora, 1995, pp. 77-93). This 
mentality which existed during the 1990s and continued to increase during the 2000s allowed 
the formation of a welfare chauvinism in the thought system of the Turkish nation and policies 
were pursued to create the "Turkey is developing" idea (ibid.). In this period, a “banal” 
economic nationalism policy was pursued to construct an image that Turkey has become 
Westernized based on the physical assets such as the number of electronic items and mobile 
phones used in Turkey (ibid.). Turkish nationalism has been tried to be kept alive by addressing 
the feelings of the masses through these policies. 
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        The economic policy of the AKP government led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, which came 
to power in 2002 and is still in power today, is a nationalist policy following the national 
vision(milli görüşçü) in which Islamic identity is dominant. The AKP focused on production 
policies based on the construction industry which would provide a rapid growth in the economy 
during the years it came to power(Adaman et al., 2014). The AKP has turned all over the 
country into a giant construction site in a short time with huge constructions of the Housing 
Development Administration(TOKİ) affiliated to the Prime Ministry, which is the state's 
official construction company and it has also focused on economic growth strategies based on 
construction by building several micro-dams and power plants in rural and mountainous areas 
of the country(ibid.). The objective of the AKP's policies was to create an image that it is a 
force that provides political and economic stability both inside and outside the country by 
overcoming the effects of the crisis which broke out in the banking and financial sector in 1999, 
and to strengthen the partisan businessmen who support the party, and thereby to gain strength 
thanks to the power gained by a privileged community behind the party(Beriş, 2008; Yenigun, 
2014; Yadirgi, , 2017, pp. 228-233; Fernandes, & Carvalhais, 2018). The Islamist Turkish 
nationalist businessmen, who are supported within an Islamist Turkish nationalist approach 
advocated by the Erdoğan government, correspond with the ideology formed by the founders 
of the republic (Beriş, 2008; Yenigun, 2014; Yadirgi, , 2017, pp. 228-233; Fernandes, & 
Carvalhais, 2018). For the “national welfare” approach, all the development activities carried 
out in this period were to serve the state's survival for the welfare of the state. 
       The Turkish mind, which recognizes the sovereignty and legitimacy of a central ethnic 
identity at all levels of the state socially and administratively, notably in social, cultural and 
economic areas, has experienced problems regarding different ethnic and religious minorities, 
especially the Kurds in the country, since its establishment. The Kurdish Question of Turkey, 







6. 3th. Chepter: The Republic of Turkey’s Policy on the Kurds and Northern Kurdistan  
6. 1. From Autonomy to Colonization: The Status of Kurdistan in the Ottoman 
State 
            When nearly all of the academic studies on the origin of Kurdish people are examined, 
it is seen that the Kurds originally organize in sub-national organizations called aşiret (tribe) 
(Izady, 1992; Bruinessen, 1992; McDowel,2000; Ozoglu, 2004;). The Kurdish ethnic group 
(tribe) is a socio-political and organic unit based on a common ancestor and kinship, real or 
putative, with a unique internal structure that has territorial integrity and therefore economic 
networks (Bruinessen, 1992, p. 51; Ozoglu, 2004, pp. 41-42). Although the ethnic (tribal) 
structure has lost its former importance with the modernization process, it still maintains its 
effectiveness for the Kurdish society (Ozoglu, 2000). Şerefnâme is the earliest source written 
on the Kurds and Kurdistan history, authored by Şerefhan Bitlisi in 1596 (Bitlisi, 1975 cited in 
Ozoglu, 2004, pp. 27-31). The Kurdish emirates are mentioned in Şerefnâme. According to 
Bitlisi, Kurdish tribes can be divided into four groups based on tradition, language, and social 
condition: Kurmanc, Lur (Lor), Kelhur and Goran (Bitlisi, 1975 cited in Ozoglu, 2004, p. 30). 
The Kurdish emirates were political communities involving multiple tribes and non-tribal 
communities(Ozoglu, 2004, pp.27-25; Bruinessen, 1992, pp.51-59). Bitlisi identified the 
boundaries of Kurdistan that is recognized as the Kurdish homeland dominated by the Kurdish 
emirates in detail: “The boundaries of the Kurdish land begin at the sea of Hürmüz [the Persian 
Gulf] and stretch on an even line to the end of Malatya and Maras. The area north of this line 
includes Fars, Irak-ı Acem [the Khuzistan region of southwest Iran], Azerbaijan, and Little and 
Great Armenia. To the south, there are Irak-i Arab, Mosul, and Diyarbakır”(Bitlisi,1975, p. 20 
cited in Ozoglu, 2004, p.28). 
         Today, it is accepted that the Kurdish territories became a part of the Ottoman Empire in 
the 16th century, they were subjected to the Turkish and Mongolian domination as of the 11th 
century, and they lived under the rule of two Turkmen tribes named Aqquyunlu and 
Qaraquyunlu in the 14th and 15th centuries(McDowall, 2000, pp.25-31; Ozoglu, 2004, pp.47-
51). It is generally accepted that certain Sunni Kurdish groups (tribes) allied with the Ottoman 
State against the Safavids and came under the Ottoman rule, which was one of the most 
powerful imperial powers of the period, as autonomous administrations by remaining 
independent in their internal affairs while becoming affiliated to the Ottoman State in their 
external affairs in order not to come under the domination of Shia Safavid State following the 
fall of Aqquyunlu and Qaraquyunlu states(McDowall, 2000, pp.25-31; Ozoglu, 2004, pp.47-
51). The Kurds established a series of emirates in the region until the 19th century. Each of 
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these emirates was governed by a family, which was granted hereditary title by a government 
(McDowall, 2000, pp.25-31; Ozoglu, 2004, pp.47-51). The government(the Ottoman Empire) 
was able to select the family member it wanted as emir(McDowall, 2000, pp.25-31; Ozoglu, 
2004, pp.47-51). 
The Ottoman state utilized the regional Kurdish elite as a mediator instead of establishing direct 
relations with the tribes and peasants until the late 19th century(Bruinnessen, 1986, p. 15). In 
addition, military governors were appointed from the center to the territories of Kurdistan, 
which had a very strategic and economic value(ibid.) The ruling families of the Kurdish 
emirates that existed long before they became a part of the Ottoman state gained more power 
after taking part in the Ottoman state and recognized as a regional authority by the center. 
However, the state recognized these emirates in exchange for some military and small-scale 
taxes(ibid.). The emirates consisted of Kurdish ethnic groups (tribes) or units of Kurdish ethnic 
groups  (ibid.). The only form of government, with whom the peasants called raiyyet and 
Kurdish ethnic groups (tribes) established direct relations, were emirates, dynasty and their 
entities(ibid.). 
       The rise of Western European countries in the 19th century along with colonial activities 
carried out in the underdeveloped countries for the purpose of more accumulation, advancement 
and wealth immediately attracted the attention of the Ottoman state and resulted in changes in 
its all the economic and political policies(Ozoglu, 2004, pp. 59-63). Meanwhile, receiving 
tax/booty through military occupation and conquest came to an end during the dissolution 
period of the Ottoman Empire(ibid.). Therefore, the Ottoman state, which could not acquire 
new territories, resorted to the only option left and turned to the policies enabling the rise of 
Western Europe by implementing modernization and centralization policies ethnically, 
politically and economically, thereby trying to catch up with the rise in Europe(ibid.). In this 
period, the state’s relations with the Arab and Balkan states under its rule, especially with 
Kurdistan, were similar to those between the European countries and their colonies(ibid.). The 
empire’s modern colonial activities in this period emerged as a survival strategy(Deringil, 
2003). Colonial policies were regarded as modern policies by the state power, and thus, such 
policies were adopted and implemented by evaluating the periphery of the empire from a 
modern colonial perspective(ibid.). In this period, similar to the European colonial ideology, 
the state elites proposed the establishment of government houses, military organizations, civil 
courts, the spread of education and the construction of roads in order to “civilize” the periphery 
of the empire(ibid.). The Anatolian peninsula and the east of Thrace, where Turkish identity 
was dominant, were identified as the “central region”. While ethnic homogenization policies 
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were implemented in those areas, the Kurdish and Arab regions were positioned as the 
periphery of the state by being turned into regions where colonial activities were carried 
out(Deringil, 2003; Ozoglu, 2004).  
           The Kurdish emirates and tribes quickly reacted to the European-based modern colonial 
and centralist policies implemented by the Ottoman state, and many Kurdish revolts emerged 
during the 19th century(Ozoglu, 2004). Among those revolts, the revolt of Bedirhan Beg(Mîr 
Bedîrxan), the leader of Botan Emirate, comes into prominence(Ozoglu, 2004, p.60). This 
revolt broke out in response to the attempt of attaching the Botan Emirate, which was centered 
around Cizre under the rule of Bedirhan Beg, to Diyarbakır and central government(ibid.). 
Although the revolt rapidly intensified, it was suppressed by the Ottoman state and the Botan 
Emirate was abolished (ibid).. In the 19th century, the self-governing entities of the Kurds were 
completely eliminated as a result of the bloody suppression of the Kurdish revolts(ibid.). 
         In response to the centralization policies in social, cultural, economic and political areas 
of the state that continued throughout the 19th century,the tribalist structure of the Kurds 
protecting the interests of a particular people resisted modernity and prevented the formation 
of an organization that would ensure a national unity among the Kurds by failing to adapt itself 
to the spirit of the age(Bruinessen, 1992; Ozoglu, 2004). This tribal structure, which is still one 
of the main factors of Kurdish question today, influenced the emergence of several Kurdish 
revolts throughout the history of the Republic of Turkey(Bruinessen, 1992; Ozoglu, 2004). The 
commitment of Kurdish people to the tribal structure was exploited by the founders of the 
Republic of Turkey by being used as a factor facilitating the establishment and development of 
the republic based on the sovereignty of ethnic Turkish identity(Bruinessen, 1992; Ozoglu, 
2004). 
          In the 19th century, the First World War was undoubtedly one of the important events in 
the history of Kurdistan. The Far East, Middle and Near East territories of the Ottoman Empire 
were divided by the victorious group led by Britain and France due to the great defeat of the 
Ottoman State (Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 118-120). During his trips in the region, British traveler and 
diplomat Mark Sykes (1879-1919) notified the British Embassy in İstanbul that the Ottoman 
territories should be divided between the British and the French before the war ended (ibid.). 
Eventually, the Ottoman territories were allocated between England, France and other alliances 
in line with the Sykes-Picot Agreement concluded under the leadership of British Mark Sykes 
and French M. George Picot on May 16, 1916(ibid.). This agreement also resulted in the 
allocation of Kurdistan territories(ibid.).  
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After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, colonial policies on Kurdistan territories intensified along 
with the establishment of the Ankara-based Republic of Turkey under the leadership Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk in 1920. As a result of the persistent policies of the Ankara Government, the 
Treaty of Lausanne was signed with Britain and France on 24 July 1923, which determined the 
current disintegrated borders of Kurdistan(Izady, 2015, pp. 61, 180; Yadirgi, 2017, pp.5-6). In 
line with this treaty, Kurdistan territories were divided into four parts: Northern Kurdistan was 
given to Turkey, Southern Kurdistan was given to Iraq, Eastern Kurdistan was given to Iran 
and Western Kurdistan was given to Syria(Izady, 2015, pp. 61, 180; Yadirgi, 2017, pp.5-6). 
These four states occupying the territories of Kurdistan pursued colonial policies to attach the 
Kurds into their central identity and economic structures within the framework of the nation 
state programs they sought to establish(Izady, 2015, pp. 61, 180; Yadirgi, 2017, pp.5-6). 
Northern Kurdistan was recognized as the East of Turkey by being divided into two regions as 
the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia(ESA) within the scope of the centralization policies of 
Kemalist regime(Yadirgi, 2017; Yarkın, 2019). 
 
6. 2. Ethnic Homogenization and Monopolistic State Policies of Turkish State 
towards the ESA between 1920-1950  
            Despite the ethnic and economic centralization policies that started in the late Ottoman 
period, Kurdistan maintained its autonomous structure until the end of the 19th century.  It was 
understood that the Ottoman would not survive after the First World War and the Kurds took 
part as the foundational components along with the Turks during the establishment of the 
Republic of Turkey(Üngör, 2012; Yeğen, 1999, 2015). In the Amasya Protocol signed in 1919, 
the Turks and Kurds were defined as the foundational components of the state on the basis of 
equal citizenship(Kutlay, 1991, p.138 cited in Yeğen, 2015, p. 116; Yadirgi, 2017, p. 162).  
The Turkish state, which took place of the Ottoman state, was based on a constitutional order 
based on ethnic pluralism during its establishment process(Yeğen, 1999, 2015). In fact, Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk pointed out in his speech in the Turkish Grand National Assembly: “[. . .] 
various Muslim elements living in the country [. . .] are genuine brothers who respect each 
other’s ethnic, local, and moral norms [laws]. [. . .] Kurds, Turks, Lazs, Circassians, all these 
Muslim elements living within national borders have shared interests.”(TBMM 1985, p. 73 
cited in Yeğen, 2007, p. 126).  
Although these statements seemed like an egalitarian text that granted the right of representation 
to many Muslim people in Turkey, especially the Kurds, by indicating that Islam was the 
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inclusive component of the young state, it is an anti-democratic text because of the exclusion 
of non-Muslims. 
           Indeed, these separatist ideological attitudes ultimately exposed the nationalist project 
of the state aiming to create a homogeneous nation, with the exclusion of the Kurds(Yeğen, 
2007, 2015a; Ünlü, 2018). In parallel to this, the founders of the Turkish state fiercely opposed 
to the Britain's project to establish a Kurdish state in Mosul in 1922 to consolidate the economic 
relations in Mosul(Yeğen, 2015a, p.116; Yadirgi, 2107, pp. 165-166). Apart from nationalist 
policies, this attitude of the Kemalists was also caused by the desire to keep Mosul under control 
because it was rich in oil resources(Yeğen, 2015a, p.116; Yadirgi, 2107, pp. 165-166). 
Atatürk’s following statements about his political attitude towards the Kurds in Mosul clearly 
reflects the spirit of the age: “Mosul is very important for us. First, it contains oil fields. Second, 
there is the problem of Kurdishness, which is no less important. The English want to form a 
Kurdish government there. If they do so, the idea might spread to Kurds on our side of the 
border.” (İnani, 1982, p.45 cited in Yeğen, 2015, p. 117). 
These statements explicitly reveal that several policies were adopted to prevent the Kurds from 
organizing and forming a state as well as exploiting their resources while weakening the Kurds 
economically. 
 
 6. 2. a. Reform Programs of the Kemalist Regime towards the ESA and 
Resistance of Kurds against the Reforms 
          The status of the Kurds in the Turkish state, which was still in the establishment process, 
had been a subject of debate until 1924. In the Lausanne Conference held in Switzerland in 
1924, the Turkish delegation tried to convince the other parties that the Kurds had rights as 
much as the Turks in the newly established state (Yeğen, 2015a, p. 117; Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 161-
165).  
The Kemalists, who did not hesitate to recognize the existence of the Kurds in those years, 
managed to establish military and political dominance over the Anatolian lands with their 
moderate policies and proclaimed the republic by abolishing the caliphate in 1923. The 
parliament proclaiming the republic established a new Constitution in 1924. With the 
declaration of this constitution, the founding cadre, who adopted a pluralistic discourse in the 
first stage, clearly declared the project of a homogeneous nation at a constitutional level (ibid.). 
The 1924 constitution which stated that "the state does not recognize any nation other than 
Turks" revealed the policy of the Republic of Turkey that was adopted towards the Kurds and 
non-Turkish communities(Üngör, 2012, pp.122-148; Yeğen, 2015a, pp.118-119). The 1924 
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Constitution aimed to attain unity by homogenizing all communities living in Anatolia in a 
single nation category(Üngör, 2012, pp.122-148; Yeğen, 2015a, p. 119). In parallel to this, 
Article 88 of the 1924 Constitution stated that “In Turkey, every person is considered a Turk 
regardless of race or religion, from the point of view of citizenship(Yeğen, 2015a, p. 119).  The 
Kurds, who represented themselves in the Kurdish language autonomously for centuries during 
the Ottoman period, were prevented to get into the parliament in line with Article 12 of the 
Constitution, which stated: “Those who cannot read and write the Turkish language are not 
eligible to be deputies”(ibid., pp. 119-120). Such constitutional regulations clearly showed that 
only the Turks had the right of representation in the parliament, while those who were not 
Turkish would have the right of representation only if they denied their memory, language, 
history, in short, their identity(ibid., p. 121). 
        The Kemalist regime's abolition of the sultanate, which granted equal citizenship to the 
Kurds and Turks on the basis of the ummah, not on the basis of the nation, caused great reactions 
among the Kurds(Üngör, 2012, pp. 148-149). For the Kurdish elite, this attack on Islam was 
perceived as a move that would end the collective identity of the Kurds, the fraternity between 
Muslim groups and the state(ibid.).  Therefore, a group of Kurdish elite held a congress to 
discuss the problems of the Kurds by forming a movement called Azadi (Freedom) in 1924 
(ibid.). In the congress, they decided to organize a large-scale campaign of resistance in all the 
Eastern provinces of Turkey(Northern Kurdistan) starting from May 1925 and they started their 
preparations for resistance(ibid.). Those organized around the Kurdish resistance against the 
policies of the Kemalists involved a broad spectrum of Kurdish elite: Tribe members, pious 
clergy, atheist intellectuals, Hamidiye military, village elders, as well as ordinary peasants and 
other tribesmen(ibid.). The Kurdish delegates, who remembered Mustafa Kemal’s promises to 
the Kurds, asked for moderate claims of Kurdish local autonomy to the government officials in 
Diyarbakır on 1 August. However, the government ignored their demands and the Kurds ran 
out of patience(ibid.).  
After several small-scale Kurdish revolts such as Colonal Xelig Cibrani, the main revolt erupted 
due to the clashes between Naqshbandi Sheikh Mehmed Said(1865-1925) and the Gendarmerie 
during a search in the Piran district, north of Diyarbakır, on 13 February 1925(Üngör, 2012, 
pp.123-128; Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 168-170). Sheikh Said’s resistance quickly spread over a wide 
area thanks the assistance of experienced Kurdish military officers who had served in the 
Ottoman army during the First World War, as well as powerful tribes(Üngör, 2012, pp.123-
128; Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 168-170). Sheikh Said explained his motives for declaration of war 
against the regime as follows: 
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For several years we have been able to read in the newspapers and official documents 
about the oppression, insults, hatred, and enmity that the Turk Republic [sic] accords to 
the Kurdish notables and dynasties. There is a lot of evidence available from authentic 
sources that they want to subject the Kurdish elite to the same treatment to which they 
subjected the Armenians and as a matter of fact, this subject was discussed and decided 
in parliament last year(Üngör, 2012, p.124).  
He firmly criticized the Kemalist regime which “occupied his country and reduced it to ruins 
and destroyed Kurdistan in a way that it had never encountered in its history” when he explained 
his motives for Sheikh Said Rebellion(ibid.). For Sheikh Said it was obvious that “The Turks 
are oppressive and vile towards the Kurds”. “They do not honour their promises. We must teach 
them a lesson so the entire world understands their hypocrisy, bloodshed and barbarism.”(ibid.). 
Therefore, it was clear that the conflict had pragmatic and ideological aspects. Sheikh Said 
movement spread many Kurdish provinces by turning into a large army with 5,000 infantry and 
cavalry in a short time(ibid.). This army conquered many Kurdish provinces, towns and villages 
occupied by the Turkish state(ibid.). In return, the Turkish state deployed 50,000 Turkish 
soldiers, who were the half of the Turkish army, to suppress the Sheikh Said movement(ibid.). 
On March 6, 1925, Sheikh Said’s cavalry of 5000 men laid siege to Diyarbakır, the biggest 
province of the ESA at that time. However, the siege was repelled because the Turkish army 
was advantageous in terms of the number of soldiers and ammunition such as machine guns 
and fighter aircraft(ibid.). Every corner of the city was covered with death bodies as a result of 
this siege(ibid.). The Sheikh Said resistance rapidly weakened after the siege of Diyarbakır and 
eventually many Kurdish soldiers surrendered to the regime forces. The resistance ended when 
Sheikh Said, who was in a difficult situation, was caught on April 15, 1925(ibid.).  
        At this point it should be noted that among Sheikh Said’s men were many Kurdish 
tribesmen, who were discontent with the oppressive and violent policies of the Kemalist regime 
towards the Kurds, and were convinced they could stop this regime only with violence (ibid.). 
In this period, the Kemalist regime did not take their demands seriously and responded with 
violence as well as adopting policies that delegitimized this movement by calling it a 
‘rebellion’(ibid.).  According to Kalywas, who was one expert of war, it “is usually sought out 
by insurgents in search of legitimacy, and denied by incumbents who label their opponents “bad 
guys”, bandits, criminals, subversives, or terrorists—and describe the war as banditry, 
terrorism, delinquent subversion, and other cognate terms.”(Kalywas, 2006, p.17 cited in 
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Üngör, 2012, p. 126). In the regime's rhetoric, the Kurds were systematically dehumanized with 
definitions such as bandits, villains, thugs, and bands to be dealt with only through 
destruction(Üngör, 2012, p. 126; Yeğen, 1999).  
           The Kemalists gained the opportunity to silence any criticism of the press and the 
opposition thanks to the strength taken from the state’s mind, which defined the Sheikh Said 
Resistance as a "Rebellion". They exploited the incident and carried out a wider propaganda 
about the innate insubordination of the Kurds by imposing frightening policies on the local 
people(Üngör, 2012, p. 126). The regime had started to implement more intensive and 
oppressive assimilation policies on the Kurds during the Sheikh Said Resistance. 168-173). 
Firstly, the Law on the Maintenance of Order was enacted on 3 March 1925(Üngör, 2012, p. 
126; Yadirgi, 2017, p. 171). Two courts-martial, one in Ankara, another in Diyarbakır, were 
established within the scope of this law(Üngör, 2012, p. 127). These courts, which were 
entrusted with exceptional powers, closed down all the opposition press and parties, extended 
the state of emergency, and dismissed Fethi Okyar from the Prime Ministry(ibid.). With the 
spread of the Sheikh Said Resistance across the country on 25 February 1925, the government 
had promised "severe measures" against the insurgents, though repeatedly declaring the local 
population to be "naive, innocent and patriotic" to ensure its legitimacy over the Kurdish people 
(ibid.). The government’s response to the insurgents soon involved the local population as 
thousands of villagers were burned in their houses, while others were executed by a firing 
squad, and hundreds of villages were torched and destroyed(ibid.). While precise data is 
unknown, it is estimated that 206 villages was destroyed, 8758 houses was burnt, and 15,200 
people killed as a result of the suppression of the resistance(Ghassemlou, 1965, p. 52 cited in 
Üngör, 2012, p.129).  
            The Sheikh Said Resistance is of great importance in terms of revealing the Kurdish 
policy of the newly established Turkish State. In fact, the mindset of the colonial State, which 
aimed to integrate Northern Kurdistan with the state as the Eastern part of Turkey, was exposed 
through violence along with this resistance. Indeed, the colonial policies on Northern Kurdistan 
continued through stricter plans carried out by the state after the suppression of the Sheikh Said 
rebellion. In this context, the 'Reform Plan for the East' was put into effect by the government 
in the spring of 1926, and then the ‘Settlement Law’ was enacted on May 31, 1926(Üngör, 
2012, pp. 138-150; Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 171-176). The regime targeted the Kurdish tribes in the 
ESA through those planned Turkificiation policies against the Kurds and intended to resettle 
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those groups in Central Anatolia and the West of Turkey, where the majority was the 
Turks(Üngör, 2012, p.138). It was also aimed to Turkify the region by resettling the Turks in 
the ESA lands, which were fertile in agriculture and rich in underground resources(ibid., p.138). 
The Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras revealed this policy by stating that the regime was 
“determined to clear the Kurds out of their valleys, the richest part of Turkey to-day, and to 
settle Turkish peasants there”(ibid., p. 138). The Unionist conscience, which was dominant in 
that period, was based on a social Darwinist progressive approach. According to this approach, 
the power of scientific knowledge, technology and experience allowed human beings to 
construct and improve their society and transform it into a different structure(Yeğen, 1999; 
Üngör, 2012, p. 139). For this progressive approach, social evolution could be only achieved 
through top-down policies(Üngör, 2012, 139). In this notion of social evolution, policies to 
control the population similar to European colonialism were justified and supported as a 
scientific theory (ibid.). This ideological attitude was based a specific notion of time, in which 
the past was considered negative as Ottoman, and the future was considered positive as 
Turkish(Yeğen, 1999, Üngör, 2012, p. 139). Therefore, it was necessary to ensure the progress 
of society through the Turkification of the non-Turks(Yeğen, 1999, Üngör, 2012, p. 139).  
         The Reform Plan for the East and the Settlement Law are an expression of the colonial 
rule that the Kemalist regime intended to establish in Northern Kurdistan(Üngör, 2012, pp. 138-
150; Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 171-176; Yarkın, 2019).  Such laws, plans and confidential reports of 
the government of that period reveal that they were formed to establish colonial administration, 
military dominance, colonial governorship with colonial authority, namely public 
inspectorship, thus, to grant state officials special authority that was not specified in the 
Constitution, intense military "interventions", and to eliminate Kurdish nationalism and 
Kurdish nationalists in the "East”(Yarkın, 2019, p.52).  Again with these policies, the regime 
suggested the assimilation of the Kurds through boarding schools and forced settlement 
policies, the resettlement of the Turks and immigrants(muhacir) living in Anatolia in Armenian 
and Kurdish villages, strict punishment through the execution, imprisonment and exile of the 
Kurds that spoke Kurdish, participated in Kurdish national resistance movements, and 
disobeyed the Turkish state, as well as not allowing local people to work as civil servants (ibid.). 
In his secret report, Cemil Uybadın, who served as the Minister of Internal Affairs between 
1925 and 1927, suggested that "a colonial method of administration"(müstemleke) should be 
established through public inspectors in the "East” in 1925(ibid.). Colonial policy of the regime 
towards the ESA becomes clear in Article 9 of the Settlement Law.  According to Article 9, all 
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the properties of the Kurds, who were forcibly deported from the region, were seized by the 
Turkish government(Üngör, 2012, p 141). Within the scope of this thesis, the social classes of 
the deportees should be examined rather than the quantity of deported Kurds. In that case, it 
would be seen that wealthy families, intellectuals, religious and elite people, who were at top 
of the social pyramid, were deported from the Kurdish region(ibid.). Such policies were 
implemented to separate the Kurdish elite from general Kurdish population by way of 
impoverishment and forced migration and to prevent the formation of national consciousness 
among the Kurds(ibid.). In line with the Reform Plan for the East of the state officials, policies 
based on military, economic, political, cultural and linguistic Turkish supremacy were carried 
out in the ESA. As argued by İsmail Beşikçi, the state colonized the region and Kurdistan 
consisting of four parts was governed as an interstate colony although not having a colonial 
status(Beşikci, 1990). 
However, the social engineering project of the regime did not proceed as expected. The regime 
could not accommodate 600,000 Turks brought from the Balkan and Caucasian countries as it 
planned(Üngör, 2012, p. 142). The reluctance of the Turks to be settled in the region as well as 
the reactions against the government due to the forced migration of local people had an 
influence in this result (ibid.). In addition, the assimilation of the deported Kurds did not 
proceed as smoothly as the regime predicted (ibid, p.143). In a letter he sent to the Chief of 
Staff, Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, a Turkish war veteran in Bolu complained about the deported 
Kurds, stating that the deportees had disappointed him, they were violent and behaved badly to 
him, and moreover, "they refused to Turkify” (ibid.). As it is seen, the social engineering project 
of the regime were causing crises in the social sphere. 
         The policy of elimination and colonization through exile was impoverishing local people 
as well as causing the resources of the region to become inefficient. When Olaf Rygaard visited 
the plains of Diyarbakır in 1928, he made the following observations: “Even more 
impoverished in these areas where their dwellings and meagre acres, laboriously tilled little 
vineyards up in the gorges, had been destroyed and their small sheep and goat flocks had been 
taken from them when the punitive campaign in 1925 laid waste the area. The fear is still in 
their blood.”(Rygaard, 1935, pp. 107-108 cited in Üngör, 2012, p.145). 
          The similar practices of the Kemalist regime lasted until 2 June 1929, when the Law on 
the Distribution of Lands to Needy Farmers in the Eastern Regions numbered 1505 was 
enacted. This law authorized the government to confiscate lands owned by landlords and tribal 
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leaders and redistribute them to "villagers, tribal members, nomads and immigrants”(Üngör, 
2012, p.145). In other words, this law took the properties from their real owners and allotted 
them to the Turks settled in the region. Thus, both the regional capital was Turkified and the 
Kurdish elite was weakened against the regime in parallel with the nationalist economic 
policies(Sönmez, 1995; Üngör, 2012; Yadirgi, 2017). According to the official figures, 2,123 
Turkish families, consisting of 8,017 people, were settled in the region and the regional 
properties were given to these families during this period(Üngör, 2012, p.147). Many Kurdish 
revolts emerged in response to the colonization policies implemented since 1924, but these 
revolts were suppressed violently. In this period, an American scholar carrying out research in 
the region wrote about attacks on tribes: “There were a number of serious Kurd rebellions from 
1925 onwards. These have been ruthlessly crushed and tribal autonomy has practically 
vanished.”(Parker&Smith, 1940, p.12 cited in Üngör, 2012, p. 147). The following statement 
was also made in American diplomatic sources in 1930: “the Turkish authorities plan to 
exterminate the Kurds and to repopulate Turkish Kurdistan with Turks now resident in Soviet 
Russia, notably in Azerbaïdjan, where they are numerous.”(Üngör, 2012, p. 148).  
          A new Settlement Law was put into effect on April 14, 1934, following the abolition of 
the Resettlement Law of 1926, which enabled a fast and planned colonization of Northern 
Kurdistan(ibid., p. 150). The following statement was presented in Article 9 of this new 
Settlement Law that was enacted regarding the tribes, Kurdish elites and other Kurds who 
returned to their region after the abolition of the first Settlement Law: “The law does not accord 
legal recognition to the tribe... all rights based on any decree, document, and decision that have 
been acknowledged so far are abolished. Tribal chieftaincy, lordship, squirearchy and 
sheikhdom, and all of these types of organizations based on any document or tradition are 
abolished”(TBMM ZC, 7 June, 1934, …, cited in Üngör, 2012, p.151). Thus, populous Kurdish 
tribes, elites and nomadic Kurds were separated from their homeland and deported to inland of 
Turkey, the Balkans and Syria to never come back to the region(ibid.). The regime based its 
policies within the scope of this law on a pragmatic and racist opinion that the Kurds could 
never be a nation, and therefore Kurdishness should be eliminated completely and be 
Turkified(ibid.). This law also had a structure targeting not only the Kurdish tribes and elites 
opposing to the regime, but also almost all the Kurds. It was an ethnic cleansing project aimed 
at eliminating the economic and social power of the Kurds by forcing all Kurdish tribes to 
migrate from the region(ibid.). In addition, the regime established relations on mutual interests 
with some Kurdish tribes in the region and carried out separatist activities within Kurdish 
 
 89 
people by using some people against its opponents(ibid.). For example, Pirinçzade tribe in 
Diyarbakır was one of the collaborator tribes(ibid., pp.157-158). The tribal members 
accelerated the forced migration of the Kurdish tribes from the region and became stronger in 
the region by taking over the abandoned lands by collaborating with the Kemalist regime 
against their rival tribes(ibid.). In addition, the regime officials separated and resettled Kurdish 
families in the regions populated by a majority of Turks to prevent them from coming together 
and becoming stronger again(ibid.).  Robert Anhegger described the poverty experienced by 
the Kurds deported to Turkish regions: “simply removed there and distributed over the country. 
They are then dumped anywhere, without a roof over their head or employment. They do not 
know a single word of Turkish.”(Anhegger, 2002, pp. 159-169 cited in Üngör, 2012, p. 158). 
The deported Kurds were also subjected to racist attitudes by the locals and marginalized with 
epithets such as “tailed Kurd!”(ibid., p.159).  
The social engineering project of the Kemalist regime planned to redesign the region, in which 
at least 50% of the population would consist of the Turks(ibid.). In this context, 1938 Turkish 
immigrants were settled in Diyarbakır between 1928 and 1938, and 2,413 Turkish families were 
placed in this region in 1938(ibid., p.162). In addition, 6,045 Turkish immigrants were sent to 
Elazığ, another Kurdish province, as of 1932 (ibid.). During this period, the state confiscated 
the properties abandoned by the Kurds. According to the official figures, the following 
properties were confiscated by the state only in Diyarbakır:  “284 ploughs, 636 oxes, two mares, 
two donkeys, twenty-two shops, sixty-one drags(large four-horse coaches), 51,975 kilos of 
seed, 16,407 acres of land, and 68,907 cents in cash.”(Üngör, 2012, p.163).  
The policies implemented by the regime towards the Kurdish geography throughout the 1930s 
increased discontent among the Kurds against the regime. To eliminate this discontent, the 
Kemalist regime attacked the Kurdish-Alevi Dersim as of the early 1930s(Kieser, 2005, pp. 
579-585; Kieser, 2011; Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 184-185; Yarkın, 2019). In those years, the 
disarmament and forced resettlement of tribes, construction of new roads and establishing 
railroad connection to Elazığ served the strategic aim of Dersim Annexation(Kieser, 2005, p. 
579). Within the framework of the nationalist-secular approach of the Kemalist regime, Dersim 
was a "chronically sick" organ, a "boil", which needed a radical "operation" if not 
amputated(ibid.). These radical racist attitudes would end in 1937 and 1938, with a bloody 
brutality that would lead to the Dersim Genocide(Kieser, 2011; Yarkın, 2019). The regime 
passed the Tunceli Law in 1935 as the first stage of the "reform" plans for the Dersim 
 
 90 
region(Kieser, 2015, p. 581; Yadirgi, 2017, p. 184). This law provided for the establishment of 
Tunceli province, which included the Dersim region(Kieser, 2015, p. 581; Yadirgi, 2017, p. 
184). Abdullah Alpdoğan, who was known as the “Kurd slayer of Koçgiri” by the local people, 
was granted dictatorial power of authority and appointed as an Inspector in order to administer 
the region within the scope of the law(Kieser, 2005, p. 581). Seyit Rıza, who was recognized 
as the religious and social leader of the region by the local people, made a request to Alpdoğan 
for the suspension of the Tunceli Law in 1936. After his request was rejected, he organized a 
resistance against the regime by uniting almost all the tribes in the region(Kieser, 2015, p. 582; 
Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 184-185). The Alevi-Kurdish army that consisted of tribes soon attacked the 
gendarme posts and military units as well as the destruction of bridges and telephone 
lines(Kieser, 2015, p. 582). In return, the Turkish army turned the region into a war zone by 
utilizing all the capabilities of the state(ibid.). On 30 July 1937, Seyit Rıza sent a letter to the 
League of Nations and the British, French and American Foreign ministries due to the unequal 
circumstances and stated: 
The government has tried to assimilate the Kurdish people for years, oppressing them, 
banning newspapers and publications in Kurdish, persecuting those who speak Kurdish, 
forcibly and systematically deporting people (...) There has been a horrible war in my 
homeland for the last three months (...) The Turkish air forces are bombing and burning 
the villages, killing vulnerable women and children (...). Prisons are full of peaceful 
Kurds, intellectuals are shot, hanged or exiled”. He also wrote other letters addressing 
similar issues ( Kieser, 1997, p. 216 cited in Kieser, 2005, p. 582). 
However, the authorities of the League of Nations did not reply to this letter(Kieser, 2005, p. 
582). Then, the superior Turkish forces destroyed the tribes in a bloody way in the late summer 
of 1937 and Seyit Rıza surrendered to the state on 10 September 1937 in order to prevent the 
great genocide in the region(ibid, p. 583).  
However, the local people started another resistance against the police and soldiers, who were 
regarded as the invaders since the beginning of 1938 (ibid.). In response to the resistance of the 
people, the Prime Minister Celal Bayar made the following statements in his speech at the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly on 29 June 1938: “The army will take the duty in Dersim 
and eradicate the problem once and for all through a general screening operation by supporting 
the reinforcement”(ibid.). This statement of the Prime Minister was a confession at first hand 
revealing that a genocide similar to the Armenian genocide in 1915 would be carried out in 
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Dersim(ibid.). An army of 50.000 soldiers backed by the Air Force started a bloody ethnic 
cleansing operation in Dersim(ibid., p.584). At least 10 thousand men, women and children 
were murdered in the operation(ibid.). It is estimated that the actual number is much 
higher(ibid.). Victims of the genocide were not only regime opponents, but all the Alevi-Kurds 
living in the region(ibid.). In fact, even men from Dersim serving the Turkish army were 
sacrificed, all the men in the Karabal, Ferhad and Pilvank tribes were shot and beaten to death 
after they surrendered to the state while women and children were set on fire after being locked 
into haysheds(ibid.). The locals surviving the genocide, for example, the orphan girls of Dersim, 
were given to Turkish soldiers as servants, similar to the settler colonialism practices in Europe, 
the USA and Austria(Yarkın, 2019, p. 58). These children were subjected to violence and sexual 
harassment(ibid.). In addition, these children were sent to boarding schools, where 
Turkification policies were implemented by imitating the colonial administrations in 
Europe(ibid.) The great tragedy in Dersim led to a huge destruction in the region. Along with 
the suppression of the second biggest Kurdish resistance, the Dersim Resistance, the Kurdish 
movement could not organize strongly until the early 1980s(Yeğen, 1999, 2015a). 
        After the Dersim operation, many Armenian and Kurdish place names in the ESA 
provinces were changed into Turkish(Kieser, 2005, p. 582; Üngör, 2012, pp.240-245). The 
CHP, which was the only party in the parliament, examined the 1934 Settlement Law in a report 
dated 1939-1940 and agreed that it was a useful tool (ibid., p.161). “The spirit of the law is 
based on assimilation and internal colonization ... preventing the territorial unity of the Kurds” 
(ibid.). However, despite all these population-related practices, the settlement of the Balkan 
Turks in the Kurdish region could not ensure the ethnic Turkification of the region and the 
project failed (Cagaptay, 2002, p. 228 cited in Bozarslan, 2015, p. 199).  In addition, the 
immigrants settled in the region could not adapt to their new settlement, which led resources of 
the region to become useless. Indeed, internal correspondence clarifies the situation:  
There have been efforts to settle immigrants from everywhere. A population of about 
fifteen hundred toil on very fertile and water-rich terrain. There are three groups of 
immigrants with a gap between them of three to five years... Almost all of them 
complain to government officials about their condition... The people are needy, 
destitute, the fields have not yet been productive. The pastureland has been distributed 




         The economic structure of the ESA was the opposite of the economic approach intended 
to be established by the newly established Turkish state until the beginning of the 1930s. 
Northern Kurdistan/ESA, which was recognized as a periphery economy by the state, had a 
very limited railway network until the early 1930s due to the economic policy focusing on 
central development that was pursued as of the last period of the Ottoman Empire(Sönmez, 
1995, p. 100). After the suppression of Kurdish resistance, the Kemalist regime accelerated its 
economic reform policies towards the ESA. In this period, when the reductionist monopolistic 
state practices were dominant, the regime started to build railway networks connecting the 
Kurdish provinces to the center in order to carry the mineral and agricultural resources to the 
center as well as exporting them and performing military operations in the region(Sönmez, 
1995; Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 175-191). In this period, the Kurdish region had a share of roughly 
15% in total production of the country, while it had a share of 10% in terms of industrial 
organizations(Sönmez, 1995, p. 102). In the region, relatively big 13 businesses benefited from 
the Industrial Promotion Law while the total number of such businesses was 1417 in 
Turkey(ibid., p. 105). This situation arising from the centralist economic policy of the Kemalist 
regime led to an unfair distribution of income between Kurdish regions and the rest of Turkey 
(Sönmez, 1995). In line with monopolistic state policies, the state established mines in Elazığ, 
which was rich in chrome and copper resources while various farm businesses were founded in 
Erzurum, Kars, Urfa, Diyarbakır and Malatya, which were productive in agriculture and in 
livestock(ibid., 110) The state’s industrial investments in the Kurdish region were aimed at 
providing input to the capital of the center(ibid.). The alcoholic beverages and tobacco factories 
of Tekel, a state-owned company, were utilizing grapes and tobacco of the region, while the 
weaving factories were processing cotton(ibid.). Elazığ's chrome and copper were also operated 
for exportation, thus, they were used as a source for the growth of central capital(ibid.). In 
addition, Turkey had a leverage against Europe and the United States during the Second World 
War since chrome and copper mines in Elazığ were used in weapon industry. Trying to stay 
away from the war, Turkey made a huge investment in the weapon industry during this 
period(ibid., pp.115-116). 
The policies of the Turkish state to support the national Turkish investors were also pursued in 
the ESA. A private sector started to be formed under the auspices of the state by selling input 
or manufactured goods to the government enterprises in the region, fulfilling the state tenders 
or manufacturing goods by utilizing the goods produced by the state as input(ibid.). However, 
within the context of the monopolistic economic policy, the government established a union 
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engaging in the trade of certain goods in line with a law enacted in 1936 and it was stated that 
tradesmen who did not join this union would not trade the goods that were the union's area of 
activity(ibid., p.117). Clearly, this law guaranteed that tradesmen would gain some advantages 
by uniting around centralist nationalist economic policies and by serving the survival of the 
state(Sönmez, 1995; Ünlü, 2018). In addition, the mineral resources of the region were opened 
to the investments of international capital. For example, Ergani Bakır(Copper) A.Ş., with a 
capital of 3 million Turkish Liras(TL), was founded in 1924 in partnership with İtibar-ı Milli 
Bankası (National Credit Bank), a state bank, and German Deutsche Bank (Sönmez, 1995,  p. 
114). Indeed, it would be the state companies taking advantage of this law. In 1937, Livestock 
Exporters' Association was established in partnership with İş Bank and Ziraat Bank in 
Kars(ibid., pp.117-118). 
Modern agricultural mechanization and irrigation facilities were inadequate in the ESA, which 
consisted of large agricultural lands, due to the centralist economic policy of the 
government(ibid., pp. 122-124). Moreover, bank loans provided to Turkish farmers by the state 
were not provided to Kurdish farmers(ibid.). For example, the share of Adana region in 
agricultural mortgages to get loan from Ziraat Bank was slightly more than half of Turkey while 
this rate was 2% in the ESA provinces(ibid.).  
All these disadvantaged circumstances in the region developed by the state also led moderately 
wealthy Kurdish investors to invest in the west of Turkey(ibid.). Therefore, employment 
opportunities were not provided to ensure the region's population density effective. 
Accordingly, major labor migration took place as of 1929 to the West of Turkey due to the 
increasing impoverishment associated with this situation and the Kurds entered the market as 
cheap labor(ibid.). 
         In conclusion, Turkification policies were pursued towards the Kurds by means of ethnic 
and political violence, forced migration, massacres and genocides during the single party period 
of the Republican People's Party(CHP) dominated by the Kemalist regime. Both monopolistic 
economic policies and economic policies peculiar to colonial economies were implemented in 
the ESA. Interior and western parts of Turkey were based on central economic organization 
while the ESA was based on peripheral economic organization, and the resources of the region 
was processed to provide input to the center(Bozarslan, 2015, pp.(Bozarslan, 2015, pp. 197-
198). On the other hand, the social engineering project implemented by the Kemalist regime 
based on the pressure and violence caused great discontent among the local people. In the first 
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democratic election of Turkey held in 14 May 1950, the Republican People’s Party had a great 
disappointment as they received 39.5% votes while the Democrat Party won 52.7% of the 
votes(Üngör, 2012, 165; Yadirgi, 2017, p. 191). In Diyarbakır, the DP won 53.7% of registered 
voters, a sign that the population was discontented with the Kemalist regime(Vanderlippe, 
2005, Chap.7,9, …, cited in Üngör, 2012, p. 165). 
6. 2. b. Transition to the Unsteady Democracy Process between 1950-1980 and      
Kurdish Policy of the Period 
          After totalitarian single-party(1923-1945) rule of the CHP, the DP, led by Adnan 
Menderes, came into power, and new policies were adopted in many areas, especially in the 
country's economic policy. The country transitioned to the multi-party period as the Kemalist 
regime's controversial decisions regarding taxes and confiscations since the establishment of 
the state as well as the violations of rights amongst the peasants, working people and capitalists 
reached a critical level that intensified the public reaction(Yadirgi, 2017, p. 191). The Menderes 
Government, which came to power under such circumstances, first transitioned to the liberal 
free market economy instead of monopolist economic policy while adopting an agriculture-led 
development model instead of the industry-oriented development model(ibid., p.192). On the 
other hand, the DP also continued its Western-centric and top-down development policies 
implemented in the Kemalist regime period(ibid., 193). 
         The DP government earned sympathy among the Kurds by paving the way for most of 
Kurdish deportees to return to their regions, especially the Kurdish tribal leaders and religious 
leaders, who were forcibly displaced from their region during the Kemalist regime as well as 
incorporating the Kurdish elite into the Turkish political system(Bozarslan, 2015, p. 380; 
Yadirgi, 2017, p. 193). Claiming that the problems in the Kurdish region/ESA arose from the 
lack of cultural development and negligence of the Kemalist regime, the DP promised 'cultural 
development' to the Kurds(Yeğen, 2015, p. 163). The DP aimed to increase its vote potential 
among the Kurds by promoting Abdülmelik Fırat (1934–2009), the grandson of Şeyh Said, to 
the prestigious position of deputy of the National Assembly(Yeğen, 2015, p 163; Yadirgi, 2017, 
p. 193). In line with the agriculture-led development model, the DP, which pursued policies 
regarding the incorporation of the fertile Kurdish region into the market economy dominated 
by Turkish capitalists, also aimed to prevent the ethnic revolts that might occur in the region by 
incorporating the former Kurdish elite into Turkish political life(ibid.). The entry of the Kurdish 
elite into the Turkish parliament was made possible by the integration of these people with 
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Turkish identity and interests of the state(Bozarslan, 2015, p.380.). During this period, a new 
Kurdish elite also emerged, who denied their ethnic origin unlike their predecessors while they 
also exploited the peasants not as a means to exercise autonomy from the center as in Ottoman 
times, but in order to become more closely integrated with the members of the Turkish ruling 
class as well as establishing closer relations with them(Yadirgi, 2017, p. 193). In addition, the 
Menderes government maintained the totalitarian policies implemented against the Kurds 
during the Kemalist regime (ibid.). Considering that the DP was founded by four deputies 
leaving the CHP, this political "consistency” would not surprise the Kurds(ibid.). 
The investments in the Kurdish region were based on mines and petrol in order to meet the 
energy needs of the Western parts of Turkey such as İstanbul so order to integrate Turkey into 
the world market and division of labor in the world(Sönmez, 1995, p. 129). Investments such 
as transportation and communication networks also allowed to transport the agricultural output 
and mines, and workforce of this region to the Western domestic market and world markets 
(ibid.). The same infrastructure enabled these regions to consume Western industrial goods and 
thus to be included in the national market(ibid.). Although it was not explicitly stated, the 
content and size of the state's investments in the region were determined by the view that the 
East was essentially a region of agriculture, energy, mining and a market for foreign-domestic 
(predominantly İstanbul) industrial goods(ibid.). On the other hand, it is seen that there was a 
huge inequality between the Kurdish region and the rest of Turkey in terms of agricultural 
mechanization despite the investments made during the ten-year period of the DP government. 
In 1962, the total number of tractors in Turkey was 43,747 while only 2,000 of them were in 
the ESA(ibid., 130). Additionally, the state obtained the input requirements of the Turkish 
capital from the Kurdish region by establishing new mines as well as constructing hydroelectric 
power stations in order to provide energy to the industrial enterprises in the West of Turkey 
(ibid., p.  135). During this period, the colonial activities of the state in the region were not 
limited to such practices since oil exploration activities were also carried out in the region in 
partnership with international companies. In this context, the British oil company Shell focused 
on Diyarbakır region, while Turkey Petroleum Corporation(TPAO), a joint venture between 
the public and private sector, intensified its exploration activities in Siirt(ibid., pp. 135-136).  
The DP government supported the tribes and landlords in a way that would not contradict the 
national interests of the Turkish state due to its agriculture-led economic policies and its 
relations with the elites in the Kurdish region(Sönmez., 1995, pp. 144-145; Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 
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194-197). In the landlord system, all lands in a region/village are owned by a person or 
family(Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 194-197). The state's support for landlords increased the number of 
landless peasants and stratified the unfair distribution of income(ibid.). By 1960, Diyarbakır 
became a region, in which unfair land distribution was the highest while the number of landless 
families in the region was more than 50% of the total families(Sönmez., 1995, pp. 144-145). 
Due to the unfair distribution of property in the region, the rate of landless families across 
Turkey increased to 31% in the early 1930s while it was only 6% in 1950(ibid.). Nevertheless, 
state investments in the region did not ensure the establishment of independent industrial 
enterprises and workshops that would create a capitalist group in the region as well as training 
skilled labor by providing employment(ibid.i 147). Private entrepreneurs did not invest in the 
region because the state gave priority to interior and western regions, in which the Turks were 
the majority, in terms of its transportation and communication investments, the ESA was kept 
underdeveloped, the energy and raw materials obtained in the region were utilized for the 
industry in the west, and the costs of machinery and equipment transportation were high(ibid.). 
The policy of the state shaped in the 1950s and limiting the Kurdish region to agricultural 
production did not change the dominance of agriculture in regional income in the 1970s(ibid., 
pp. 150-151). According to the 1978 data, the industrial GDP of the Marmara Region, where 
the Turks were the majority, was 33.7% and it was 10.5% in the ESA, while the rate in trade 
was 20% in Marmara and 7% in the ESA(ibid.). The rate in agriculture was 46.2% in the ESA 
while it was 7.9% in Marmara. The state's view of Kurdish region as "Turkey's Farm" 
increasingly continued between the years of 1960-1980(ibid.). This situation gradually 
increased the poverty in the region. The share of the ESA in GDP, which was 9.56% in 1975, 
decreased to 8.17% in 1979, and 7.68% in 1986(ibid., p 226). 
        The DP's policies towards the Kurds eventually caused the Kurdish Question to re-emerge 
as of 1958 (Bozarslan, 2015, pp. 380-381: Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 192-198). The new Kurdish 
movement that emerged during this period was an intellectual socialist movement, unlike the 
traditional tribal and religious Kurdish movements that occurred during the Kemalist regime. 
The Kurdish movement, which started under the leadership of intellectual Kurdish university 
students, such as Yusuf Azizaoğlu(1917-70) and Musa Anter(1920-92), was an unarmed 
political movement against the assimilationist hegemonic policies of the state and socio-
economic inequality in the Kurdish region(Yadirgi, 2017, p.197). However, the Turkish state 
ended the movement by arresting 49 members of the movement during its germination period 
(ibid.).  The imprisoned Kurdish intellectuals turned the prison into a university environment 
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by taking a step into a new intellectual awakening that would be dominant during the 1970s 
starting from the 1960s and they explicitly stated that Northern Kurdistan was a colony of 
Turkey and the main resistance should be against this colonial structure(Bozarslan, 2015, p. 
381; Ünlü, 2018, p. 293).  
         There were some reactions in the Turkish army and other Kemalist circles against the 
DP's liberal policies and the re-surfaced Kurdish question.  The DP government was overthrown 
by a military coup on 27 May 1960 on the grounds that Turkey needed a new constitution and 
the DP had governed the country unconstitutionally as determined in a commission set up by 
the former commander-in-chief of land forces Cemal Gürsel and the rector İstanbul University 
Sami Onar(Yadirgi, 2017, p. 199). As of this date, Cemal Gürsel, who was in charge of the 
junta government, stated that an urgent action plan should be implemented to eliminate the 
Kurdish movement through pressure and violence(Aydemir, 1973, p. 90 cited in Bozarslan, 
2015, p. 381). Cemal Gürsel warned the Kurds: “There are no Kurds in this country. Whoever 
says he is a Kurd, I will spit in his face.”(Muller, 1996, p.177 cited Sirkeci, 2000, p. 150). The 
junta government carried out violent military commando operations in the ESA against the 
Kurds across the country to cease Kurdish awakening(ibid.).  
Political Kurdish awakening gained momentum as the Justice Party led by Süleyman Demirel 
was elected in 1964 after the junta government(Ünlü, 1997, p. 293). Throughout the 1960s and 
1970s, the intellectual awakening of the Kurds was spreading with the support of socialist youth 
of Turkish ethnic origin such as İbrahim Kaypakkaya, Mahir Çayan and Deniz Gezmiş(ibid.). 
In 1969, socialist Kurdish intellectuals formed the Revolutionary Eastern Cultural 
Hearts(Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları, DDKO) and carried out studies strengthening their 
argument on colonial Kurdistan(Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 204-205). The DDKO served as an 
intellectual leader in many Kurdish organizations, especially the PKK(ibid.). Disturbed by the 
rise of the Kurds in the civil and political spheres, the Turkish army unseated the government 
with a second coup in 1971 after ten years(Bozarslan, 2015, 381; Ünlü, 2018, p. 293). Although 
commando operations that started in the 1960s against the Kurds increased violently, the 
Kurdish intellectuals continued to organize both in prisons and civil area(Bozarslan, 2015, 381; 
Ünlü, 2018, p. 293). 
       The economic policies of the military and short-term civilian governments in the 1960s 
and 1970s primarily aimed at the protection of the domestic market and industrialization 
through import substitution(ISI)(Yadirgi, 2017, p. 201). In order to achieve these economic 
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objectives, the governments of the period made investments through state economic 
enterprises(SEEs) and made abundant use of subsidized credits(ibid.). During this period, the 
products manufactured by the SEEs were used to provide cheap inputs to the private sector 
formed by Turkish capitalists, and the private sector was permitted to borrow from the State 
Treasury at a much lower rate than inflation(ibid.). 
          In the mid-1970s, a group called Apocular(Apoist), which was a shortened name for 
Abdullah Öcalan, formed by the Kurdistan Revolutionaries and leaders, was on the country's 
agenda(Ünlü, 2018, p.296). This group of university students founded Partîya Karkerên 
Kurdîstan(Kurdistan Workers Party, PKK) in 1978 and published a leaflet titled "The Path of 
the Kurdistan Revolution" consisting of their fundamental arguments and goals(Ünlü, 2018, p. 
296). According to PKK, Turkey's colonization activities towards the Kurds were based on 
physical violence as well as involving cultural and "mental colonization” imposed by 
dehumanization institutions(educational institutions (ibid.). Eventually, the PKK would operate 
as a Kurdish organization that would implement counter-hegemony against the Turkish state’s 
hegemonic colonial policies towards Kurdish geography and the Kurds during the period of 
neoliberal policies that emerged around the world in the 1980s. 
6. 3. Turkey's Kurdish Question in the Era of Neoliberalism: From the 1980 
Coup to the AKP’s Kurdish Policy (1980–2010s) 
            Turkey became heavily dependent on foreign subsidies, manufacturing inputs and 
technology in the industrial area due to the ISI giving birth to new labor-intensive industries 
throughout the 1960s and the 1970s and pursued an economic policy that persistently increased 
the balance of production and foreign trade deficit which was not export-oriented(Yadirgi, 
2017, p.214). Foreign debts rapidly increased because of the economic policy that financed 
trade deficits by foreign funds due to inadequate export(ibid.). Eventually, the new economic 
approach had a major failure since it could not provide satisfactory profits for industrialists 
while creating and sustaining a domestic market(ibid.) Therefore, Turkey’s external debt 
increased from $3.3 billion in 1973 to $15.3 billion by 1980(ibid., p. 215). In 1979, inflation 
jumped to 90% due to the increasing budget deficits(Pamuk, 2008, p. 285 cited in Yadirgi, 
2017, p. 215). The failure of economic policy caused the number of unemployed people to rise 
from 600,000 in 1967 to 1.5 million in 1977(McDowall, 2000, p. 411 cited in Yadirgi, 2017, p. 
215). As a result of this economic crisis, a discontent emerged among people as they were 
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disenfranchised by the existing system and this process brought Turkey to the verge of civil 
war by causing political instability and violence(ibid.). 
         When all the political left organizations were shut down and driven underground after the 
military coup of 1971, clashes broke out between left-wing groups and Idealist Hearths or Grey 
Wolves, the youth organization of the racist-nationalist party MHP, which maintained the 
founding ideology of the country. During this period, unlimited freedom and protection given 
to the Grey Wolves group led to an increase in the number of victims in clashes with leftist 
organizations(Ahmad, 2008, pp. 250–254 cited in Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 215-216). It turned out 
that the number of victims, mostly Kurdish university students, arose from around 230 in 1977 
to between 1,200 and 1,500 in 1979. (ibid.). During this period, the protection of the Grey 
Wolves by the state led them to become more encouraged and bring the violence from 
universities to Alevi Kurdish provinces in the ESA. Eventually, a major violence broke out in 
Malatya in April 1978. Then, the Maraş Massacre occurred in December of the same 
year(Poyraz, 2003; Yadirgi, 2017, p. 216). In the massacre organized by the Grey Wolves, 109 
people were killed, 176 were seriously injured while 500 houses and shops were 
destroyed(Poyraz, 2003; Yadirgi, 2017, p. 216). On 31 December 1977, the government fell 
due to the resignation of twelve Justice Party deputies, who criticized the policies of Demirel, 
the leader of the coalition government, as a result of the increasing violence against the 
Kurds(Yadirgi, 2017, p. 216). In January 1978, the Second National Front coalition government 
led by the CHP leader Bülent Ecevit was formed(ibid.). This government immediately put the 
region under martial law as a response to the internal disorder in the ESA(ibid.). In this political 
climate, the Ankara University student Abdullah Öcalan founded the PKK in November 1978, 
with the aim of establishing a Socialist Kurdistan(ibid.).  
          Another important step Ecevit's government took was to reach an agreement with the 
IMF, the World Bank and OECD, provided that it implemented reform plans such as cutting 
government expenditure, reducing subsidies, import and export controls, and lowering interest 
rates(ibid.). The Ecevit government reached an agreement to release 1.8 billion dollars in credits 
provided that it abandoned the ISI policies and transitioned to an export-oriented free market 
economy(ibid.). However, despite this agreement, Ecevit resigned after suffering a humiliating 
defeat in the elections in 19 October 1979, as the CHP government failed to prevent the 
economy from worsening(ibid.). The AP, which established a minority government on 
November 12, announced a new economic reform program including a series of measures on 
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24 January 1980(ibid., p. 217). These economic measures inspired by economic policies of the 
IMF, which were very different from structural adjustment policies formerly pursued by 
Turkey, proved that Turkey fully adopted a neoliberal development strategy(ibid.). These 
measures included an action plan, such as greater liberalization of the trade and payments 
regime as well as increased competition for SEEs and abolition of most government 
subsidies(ibid.). However, in this period, the inexhaustible activities of left-wing organizations 
and DİSK against neoliberalism made it impossible for the government to implement the 
economic package(ibid.). As a result, unique military guardians of the Turkish state staged a 
coup and took power again on 12 September 1980(ibid, p. 118). The Junta regime appointed 
Turgut Özal as the deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs in order to rapidly 
implement neoliberal economic policies(ibid.).  
6. 3. a. The ESA Policy of Turkey during Authoritarian Neoliberal 
Reconstruction Period and the Beginning of the Armed Conflict between the 
PKK and the Turkish State 
           The PKK, which was founded by a group of university students under the leadership of 
Abdullah Öcalan in the middle of major economic and political crises, argued that Kurdistan 
was a colony divided between four states and their main objectives were to free Kurdistan from 
these colonial states(Gunes, 2013, pp. 17-24). Secondly, their one of the primary objectives was 
to ensure fair distribution of land among the peasants by abolishing the system of landlords, 
who were in cooperation with the state, which led to social and economic inequality by putting 
pressure on people in the ESA(ibid.). The founders of the PKK enhanced the movement’s base 
and operations by using networks they established in the ESA and rapidly involving in the 
conflicts between the landlords and peasants by fighting against landlords to defend peasants' 
rights in line with their objectives(Ramano, 2006 cited in Gunes, 2013, p. 18). In addition, the 
PKK’s attacks on the Turkish army and security forces, which showed the limits of the state 
control, further enhanced its credibility among Kurdish people since there was a discontent 
towards the state among the Kurds(ibid.). 13). The PKK's involvement in the peasant-landlord 
dispute strengthened the peasants' status within the dispute as well as transforming the nature 
of the dispute(ibid.). 18). Thanks to its support for the oppressed peasants, the PKK provided a 
new understanding of the position of Kurdish peasants that emphasized economic exploitation 
by Kurdish feudal elites and foreign bourgeoisie in the ESA as well as cultural oppression and 
forced assimilation(ibid.). With these activities, the PKK gave a new political meaning to their 
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struggle by reinterpreting and expressing their demands as part of the liberation of 
Kurdistan(ibid.). The PKK identified peasants not as subaltern individuals subjected to 
exploitation by the landlords and the system but as a part of a class and nation (Kurdish nation) 
with its own political aims and objectives by directing their actions against landlords and the 
system that allowed such oppression(Bruinessen, 1988; Güneş, 2013, p.18). Additionally, the 
PKK also carried out studies about folklore, history, literature, etc. belonging to Kurdish culture 
in order to increase public support and expanded the resistance by carrying out activities aimed 
at reviving Kurdish identity and nationalism(Bruinessen, 1988; Güneş, 2013, p.18; Ünlü, 2015, 
pp. 296-299). They quickly gained great sympathy among the Kurds in Europe with its anti-
colonialist counter-hegemony as well as its activities related to Kurdish culture and history, and 
this sympathy increased with newspapers and journals published by some Kurdish intellectuals 
who took refuge in Europe as a result of the oppression of the state in the 1970s(Bruinesse, 
1988; Güneş, 2013, p.18; ). With all these developments, the new Kurdish resistance gained an 
international recognition after a regional recognition.  
The PKK, whose large number of militants had died under the new military regime in 1980, 
was seen by the junta government as an organization that was eliminated in that 
period(Bozarslan, 2015, p. 382). However, Öcalan, who already left Turkey before the coup 
d'etat thanks to the special conditions of the Middle East, started the guerrilla movement in 
1984 by reorganizing the PKK in the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon, during a decade marked by the 
civil war in Lebanon (ibid.). 
         Neoliberal policies implemented since 1980 have not been able to overcome the persistent 
and large regional inequalities between the ESA and the rest of the country since the ESA has 
remained to be the most disadvantaged area of Turkey after 1980(Yadirgi, 2017, p. 233). 
Between 1993 and 2001, the average GNP per capita in the ESA was about one-third of the 
country(ibid.). According to the GDP data of 2000, the GDP per capita in the ESA was 3,024, 
whereas it was 7,820 in the Aegean region(ibid.). These unequal conditions caused the Human 
Development Index(HDI) in the region to be much lower than other regions. During these years, 
18 provinces from the ESA were among the least developed provinces of Turkey (ibid.). During 
this period, the ESA was the only region that had an average below that of Turkey's average in 
terms of HDI rates (ibid.). In 2000, the HDI in the ESA was 0.64 while it was 0.79 in the Aegean 
region (ibid., p.234). 
 Despite the policies building the ESA as the “farm of the country” in terms of agriculture and 
animal husbandry in parallel with the state's monopolistic economic policies, the ESA was the 
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region most affected by major economic and military crises(Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 218-220). For 
example, Kars, which ranked 18th in animal husbandry in Turkey while it ranked first among 
the ESA provinces in 1965, could not escape the chaos of the 1970s and 1980s, which caused 
Kars to fell down to 40th in 1979 and 48th in 1986(Sönmez, 1995, p. 192). In the 1980s, the 
public investments also revealed the unequal policies of the state in the regions. In the period 
of 1984-1989, which were the ruling years of Özal Governments, public investment of 15.414 
billion TL was made at current prices, and provinces in the ESA received a 14.2% share from 
the investments in this period(ibid., p.195). It is seen that the East had a 7.2% share from Public 
investments in the period of 1973-1977 and 1978-1981, while there was a relative increase in 
the share of ESA in the period of 1984-1989(ibid., p. 196). However, given that these 
investments were mainly made in the energy sector required by the industry in the West, it 
could be said that the state invested in the ESA not for the needs of the region, but for the 
electricity needs of the industry in the West of the country(ibid.). In other words, the 
Southeastern Anatolia Project, in short GAP, was not just an investment made for the region, 
as often mentioned while making propaganda(Yadirgi, 2017, pp 254-258; Sönmez, 1995, p. 
196). When the GAP projects consisting of dams, hydroelectric power stations and irrigation 
facilities were achieved, a total of 24 billion kilowatt-hour hydroelectric energy would be 
produced annually and an area of 1.618 thousand hectares would be irrigated(Yadirgi, 2017, pp 
254-258; Sönmez, 1995, p. 196). Although the area to be irrigated was directly related to the 
region, the electricity to be produced would be used directly in the West or exported(Yadirgi, 
2017, pp 254-258; Sönmez, 1995, p. 196.). More specifically, the economic investments made 
by the state mainly based on energy since the 1980s are a manifestation of the colonial mentality 
exploiting the regional resources for the interests of the Turkish capitalist class in parallel with 
the Kemalist period. Indeed, companies and factories that were established through state 
initiatives in the region in the late 1980s were sold to the municipalities in the region, which 
were also state institutions, or to national Turkish capital companies such as Altay Kollektif, 
Oskar A.Ş, Kemah Gıda(Sönmez, 1995, p. 198). 
        While all these developments were taking place, the PKK reorganized in the Beqaa Valley 
in Lebanon under the leadership of Öcalan and started the Kurdish national liberation 
movement first by killing three people in charge of guarding President Kenan Evren at 
Yüksekova and then killing 8 soldiers(Yadirgi, 2017, p. 219; Ünlü, 2018, p.299). The PKK’s 
methods involved violence, and civilian state employees in cooperation with the colonial state 
such village guards, ağas/aghas and teachers were specifically targeted(Yadirgi, 2017, p. 219). 
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In line with the Village Law enacted in August 1985, the state-sponsored village guard system 
was introduced under the guidance of the aghas to fight in the ESA, and 62,000 local people 
were recruited as village guards to fight the PKK in the same year(Yadirgi, 2017, p. 220). The 
village guard system was the product of the same mentality that also collaborated with the 
Hamidiye Regiments in the ESA in the Armenian Genocide(ibid.).  The state tested the consent 
of local people to its authority with the village guard system. Villages that did not agree to be 
village guards would face the risk of being perceived as PKK supporters(ibid.). Therefore, 
Kurdish villagers were stuck between a possible internal conflict that could take place in their 
region at any time and the state’s pressure on them(ibid.). In July 1987, the Decree Law No. 
285(Decree-Law No. 285 on Governorship of the State Of Emergency of Region), which would 
remain in force until November 2002, was passed and an emergency rule governor was 
appointed to eight Kurdish provinces in the ESA, where the Kurds were politically mobilized 
and provided the PKK to organize well(ibid.). This governorship was equipped with several 
dictatorial powers, including the forced evacuation of villages and pasturage as well as removal 
of freedom of expression(ibid.). In addition to this Decree Law, the number of village guards 
reached 100,000 in the 1990s under the Law No. 413 enacted in 1989(Bozarslan, 2008, p. 353). 
As a result of the strengthening of security and intelligence services, ultra-nationalist right-wing 
militants and some pro-state tribal leaders set up death squads(ibid.). According to official 
statements, both these squads and state-tolerated militants of Hezbollah organization killed 
2000 Kurds, especially Kurdish intellectuals, during the 1990s(ibid.). In response to the state’s 
violence in the region, the PKK reacted violently by catching and executing village guards, 
teachers and other PKK hunters cooperating with the state in the ESA(ibid.). 
         During these years when the guerrilla war was intense, a political and legal Kurdish 
movement emerged, the short-term alliance of Erdal İnönü's SHP (Social Democratic People's 
Party) and the new Kurdish People's Labor Party (PLP) achieved significant results in the 1991 
elections (Bozarslan, 2008, p. 353; Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 222-223). The PLP was shut down by 
the Turkish state after its great success in the elections, like many other successful parties 
(Bozarslan, 2008, p. 353; Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 222-223). Many deputies of the Democracy Party 
(DEP), which was founded subsequently, and Kurdish businessmen were killed by the members 
of death squads, who were officially "unknown (or not reported) murderers" while other 
Kurdish deputies (Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Doğan and Selim Sadak) were imprisoned 
after being dismissed from the parliament(Bozarslan, 2008, p. 353; Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 222-
223). Following the closure of the DEP, its successors, the People's Democracy Party(PDP) and 
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the Democratic People's Party (DPP), received only 5% and 6.4% of the votes. Although they 
could not win any seats in the parliament, they won the municipal elections in several provinces 
in the ESA(Bozarslan, 2008, p. 354). With the formation of the Kurdish political movement, 
Kurdish politicians from different generations having different opinions (except Islamists) 
came together and gathered under a single roof(ibid.).  
         Throughout 1980s and 90s when the neoliberal economy policies were intensively in 
practice, while the capitalist class showed more activity in the country’s western and internal 
parts, the state investments were also made in the same regions(Sönmez, 1995, pp.223-230; 
Bozarslan, 2008, pp.  349-354). In this period when the inequalities among regions gradually 
increased, an intensive migration of workers occurred from the east to the west as a result of 
the increased poverty in the ESA(Sönmez, 1995, pp.223. 223-230).  Simultaneously the Kurds 
took part in cheap labor in the regions to which they migrated (ibid.) Additionally, the poverty 
in region multiplied itself with the lack of the labor force needed in the region, as another result 
of the intensive migration (ibid.). 
        Between 1993 and 1999, the Turkish state changed its understanding of the policies 
towards the Kurds from an ethnic recognition to a separatist ethnic insurgency requiring 
military measures(Yadirgi, 2017, p. 223). The state’s policies for the Kurds in the same period 
gradually drove the problem into violence and carried out a bloody and relentless war against 
the PKK militants and the Kurdish people thought to have sympathy for the militants(ibid.). 
According to the official figures of the state, while the number of Turkish security forces killed 
were 31.000, the number of civilian people and the PKK militants killed were 27.410 during 
the first period of conflict between 1984 and 1999(Sarihan, 2013, p. 94 cited in Yadirgi, 2017, 
p. 223). During this period, the state forced more villages in the ESA for evacuation in order to 
annihilate the PKK. In accordance with a 1993 dated note belonging to Özal, it was planned 
that the villages in the mountainous area in the ESA where the guerrilla were in intensive 
numbers, were to be evacuated calculatedly and irrigation dams were to be constructed so that 
the forcibly displaced people would not return(Yıldız, 2005 p. 29 cited in Yadirgi, 2017, p. 
223). In parallel with Özal’s note, 78.000 people were displaced within the scope of the the 
Ilısu Damn Project in Batman(KHRP, 2005 cited in Yadirgi, 2017, p. 224). Additionally, the 
Turkish security forces burned pasture areas and forests, killed farm animals to prevent the 
peasants from saving their property and aimed to change the social and economic structure in 
the ESA with these practices(Göç-Der, 2002 cited in Yadirgi, 2017, p.  224). According to the 
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reports of the Parliament, 3848 villages out of the 5000 settlements in 1985 in the region were 
evacuated in 1999(Yadirgi, 2017, p. 224). It is stated by the relevant academic works that 3 
million people were displaced in this period(Yildiz, 2005, p. 78 cited in Yadirgi, 2017, p. 224; 
Bozarslan, 2008, p.352). The forcibly displaced people migrating into the country’s inner and 
western parts fell into poverty and participated in the cheap labor(Sonmez, 1995, p. 225). 
Additionally, the cost of the war carried out at that times were more than $100 billion 
(Bozarslan, 2008, p.252). 
         In a process through which an intensive civil war was going on, the PKK’s leader 
Abdullah Öcalan was arrested in Kenya when he was paying visit to European states to 
consolidate his military success with political relations, and sent to Turkey to be tried on 
treason, thereby, sentenced to death in June 1999(Yadirgi, 2017, p. 225). Though it was for a 
short term, the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state came to a halt upon the arrest of 
Öcalan(ibid). The Turkish state demanded the PKK abandon the ESA and their objective to 
establish an independent Kurdistan after the arrest of Öcalan(ibid.) In the same year, Turkey 
started quick reforms on human rights with the European Council’s nomination of Turkey for 
Accession (ibid., p. 227). With the decision by the EC, then the Coalition Government led by 
Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit made reforms on human rights within the scope of the 
Copenhagen Criteria and these legal regulations included stability of democracy as an 
institution, rule of law, respect to human rights and minority rights (ibid.). Coming to the power 
in 2002, the AKP accelerated the reforms for EU Accession and the death penalty for Öcalan 
was abolished(ibid.). All these developments raised hopes for a democratic process without 
conflict towards the Kurdish Question(ibid.). 
6. 3. b. The Second Wave of Conflict and AKP’s Kurdish Policy 
          With the AKP coming to power in 2002, never-before-seen reforms regarding human 
rights were made in Turkey. In order to strengthen their power, the conservative - Islamic AKP 
who couldn’t completely receive the state support as the previous parties in the 80-year state 
history where Kemalism had been institutionalized, looked for the support abroad(EU, 
USA)(Ünlü, 2018, pp. 300-3001). To strengthen their legitimacy both domestic and abroad, the 
AKP launched some are short, others are long-term pluralist democratic political projects such 
as Kurdish Opening, Alevi Opening, Armenian Opening, Cyprus Opening etc. in line with its 
pragmatic objectives(ibid.) However, the time for peaceful solution to Kurdish question was 
over in 2003 when the USA waged war against Iraq and the Kurdistan in Iraq got their official 
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autonomy after the Saddam regime was overthrown, and this caused the Kurdophobia to 
increase again(Yadirgi, 2017, pp.228-229). Regarding these developments coinciding with the 
reforms implemented within the scope of Turkey’s accession to the EU, as a response to the 
call of then the President of the European Commission “to ensure both cultural and political 
rights for the Kurdish people of Turkey” in 2004, the Commander of the Turkish Air Forces 
General Ilker Başbuğ said as follows:  “nobody can demand or expect Turkey to make collective 
arrangements for a certain ethnic group in the political arena, outside of the cultural arena, that 
would endanger the nation-state structure as well as the unitary state structure.”(Yeğen, 2011, 
p. 76). These statements by Başbuğ were precursors of the policies of security and 
discrimination after a short relief in Kurdish policies of the Turkish state. Another reason of 
abandoning reforms towards the Kurds was the understanding that any kind of democratic 
solution to the problem would damage the continuation of the state in its basics(Yadirgi, 2017, 
p. 229). In 2005, The Council of the Europe clearly showed Turkey’s negative position in 
Kurdish question in their Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession: “Turkey continues 
to adopt a restrictive approach to minorities and cultural rights. Although there is a growing 
consensus on the need to address the economic, cultural and social development of the 
Southeast, little concrete progress has been made and the security situation has 
worsened.”(ibid., 2005, p. 42 cited in Yadirgi, 2017, p. 229). Additionally, another sign of the 
weakness of the process was that the EU acted sloppy by just occasionally mentioning at 
Turkey’s Kurdish question and they were not frank on the collective structure and the right to 
territory of the Kurdish people (ibid.). Being then the totalitarian and overreaching head of the 
ruling power of this new period through which the policies and statements in line with the 
Kemalist nationalist ideology were put into practice when it comes to the Kurdish question, 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan did not shake the hands of elected MPs of the Democratic Society 
Party(DTP) on 2 November 2008, and this was a sign showing the discriminatory and 
antagonizing policies to be practiced(ibid.). In this period, Erdoğan was always using the 
statement of “one nation, one flag, one tongue, one country” as response to the demands of the 
Kurds and eventually in 2009 he went back to the rhetoric of “National Unity and Brotherhood 
Project” instead of “Kurdish Opening”, “Democratic Opening” etc.(Yadirgi, 2017, p.  230; 
Ünlü, 2018, p. 310). Retransfer of discriminatory policies against the Kurds into practice caused 
some reaction against the AKP in the ESA. Accordingly in the 29 March 2009 elections, the 
DTP increased their vote rate in the ESA while the AKP’s went down by 15% in the 
region(Yadirgi, 2017, p. 230).  
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         In this tense environment, the AKP government went back to the solution rhetoric of 
2004-2009 which yielded positive results both domestic and abroad, instead of increasing the 
violence in the ESA. Again through the end of the 2009, the Solution process, previously called 
as the ‘Democratic Opening’ was launched between the Turkish state led by the AKP 
government and the Kurdish bloc consisted of the PKK and HDP, successor of the 
DTP(Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 230-232; Ünlü, 2018, pp. 309-312). During this period the Kurdish 
bloc abandoned their independent Kurdistan policy and became active through such processes 
through demands of democratic republic, equal citizenship, and democratic confederalism 
ensuring an autonomous Northern Kurdistan in Turkey(Ünlü, 2018, p. 311). In return for this,  
the Turkish side stated that they would not make concessions on the nationalist and unitarian 
structure of the state by making references to that the Kurds and Turks alike live together in the 
same country since the Ottomans and they both are religious fellows; therefore, their fate is to 
live together under the Turkish state(ibid.). What the Turkish state expected out of the process 
was that the PKK would disarm and abolish itself, thereby the national unity aimed in the 
foundation of Turkey would be reached(Yadirgi, 2017, p. 231). The Solution Process gained 
public visibility in 21 March 2013 in Newroz celebration in Diyarbakır, where the letter written 
by Abdullah Öcalan, who was mentioned as Kurdish popular leader, in prison was read to the 
Kurdish public(ibid.). 
Though not at the constitutional level, the process was conducted at the public and political 
level through various public meetings and assemblies with the people of Turkey to strengthen 
the legitimacy of the process for two years after that date(Yegen, 2015; Yadirgi, 2017, pp.  230-
233; Ünlü, 2018, pp. 309-314). However, the fact that the process was not secured under the 
Constitution by the Turkish side, caused both sides not to take the steps expected from 
them(Yadirgi, 2017, p.231). As a result of the negotiation between the parties on 28 February 
2015, the 10-item Dolmabahçe Agreement were announced, which included recognition of 
equal citizenship for the Kurds, education in Kurdish, opening up institutions on history and 
culture as well as an autonomy in the ESA(Yegen, 2015; Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 231-232). However, 
when it is understood through the surveys made by the AKP that democratization in Turkey 
would not increase their votes, the AKP’s overreaching leader President Erdoğan announced 
that there remained no Kurdish question thanks to the reforms made by them and further stated 
that he doesn’t recognize the Dolmabahçe Agreement, thus he took the first step to end the 
solution process(Yegen, 2015; Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 231-232).  The Kurdish bloc stated in this 
period that the pragmatist AKP government ended the process because they saw that the process 
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is not of service to them(ibid.). The HDP became the first pro-Kurdish party to have surpassed 
the 10% election threshold in Turkey and gained 80 seats in the parliament by receiving 13,1% 
of the total votes(Yadirgi, 2017, pp. 231-232; Ünlü, 2018, p. 313). The regions where HDP 
raised its votes the most in these elections were Turkey's Internal and Western regions(Ünlü, 
2018, pp. 313-314). The main reason for this was that the Kurds who migrated to these regions 
throughout the republic's history, both due to forced migration and job migration, were not 
assimilated but retained their ethnic belonging(Ünlü, 2018, pp. 313-314). As Cedric Robinson 
puts it, people who are expelled from their homeland or immigrate due to financial reasons also 
carry their own ethnic and cultural belonging to the places they emigrated(Robinson, 2000; 
Ünlü, 2018, pp. 313-314). The HDP’s election success caused the AKP to lose major votes 
across Turkey; thus, the AKP completely ended the solution process(Ünlü, 2018, pp. 313-314). 
        As a result of all these developments, a civil war erupted between the PKK and the state 
in the summer of 2015 at an unprecedented violent rate that were not seen since the end of the 
1930s(Yadirgi, 2017, p.231; Unlu,2018, pp. 314-315). That the Kurdish movement making 
achievements in the ongoing Syrian Civil War took control over the Western Kurdistan 
(Northeastern Syria), became influential for Turkey to resort to violence when it comes to the 
policies for Kurds in Turkey(Yadirgi, 2017, p.231; Derisiotis, 2019). According to the 
OHCHR’s 10 March 2017 dated report on the war in the ESA for about 18 months, in addition 
to the grave violations of human rights, Turkish state forces destroyed Kurdish settlements with 
heavy weapons, around 2000 people in total, including 800 Turkish security personnel, and 
1200 civilians and PKK militants and hundreds of the displaced were forced to 
migrate(OHCHR, 10.03.2017). During this period when all of these developments happened, 
the Erdoğan government targeted the Kurdish political movement just as it happened in the 
1990s, imprisoned the HDP’s co-Chairs Figen Yüksekdağ and Selahattin Demirtaş as well, as 
10 other Kurdish MPs (BBC, 04.11. 2016). While those Kurdish politicians are still imprisoned, 
the Erdoğan government’s oppressive, discriminatory and antagonizing policies against the 
Kurds and Kurdish politicians still continue today(Yarkın, 2019).  For example, in the most 
recent 31 March 2019 local elections through which the HDP’s Co-chair Sezai Temelli said 
“We will win in Kurdistan and make the AKP and MHP lose in the west”, the President 
Erdoğan, abandoning his statement that there are Kurdistan region in Turkey, replied as follows: 
“Do you know my brothers that this man is not even a Kurd? But he is an imposter who exploits 
my Kurdish brothers.  What does he say? He says Kurdistan. Oh Sezai, if you want to live in 
Kurdistan, there is one in the north of Iraq. Be gone with you there! Live there!”(Yarkın, 2019, 
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p.62).  In response to the current demands of the Kurdish guerrilla and political movement, 
Erdoğan exploits the state’s archaic Kurdish policy, which deems it as a military security 
problem, by promoting solid nationalism and putting forward the statement of “one language, 
one country, one nation, one flag” (Dersiotis,2019).  
           The AKP’s economic policies towards the ESA are not so different from the ones that 
were put into practice by their predecessors.  Within the scope of the Kirkuk - Ceyhan Oil 
Pipeline Agreement made with the Iraqi Kurdistan during a 3-year process from 2010 and 2012 
when the currently ruling AKP was in power, and other trade agreements, the ESA proved its 
value in terms of Turkey’s economic growth targets(Yadirgi, 2017, 238). In line with this, the 
AKP government increased the petroleum exploration works in the ESA(ibid.). Although the 
neoliberal policies of the AKP provided with visible development in a short period, the current 
account deficit surpassed 70%, while the GDP was 9,8(ibid., pp.236-237). Additionally, the 
development rates in the country did not provide welfare for the general society and the gap 
between the richest and the poorest increased (ibid., p.239). Through the mid-2000, the income 
of the richest 10% of the OECD countries is about 9 times of the poorest 10%(OECD, 2008, p. 
3 cited in Yadirgi, p. 241). The income of the richest 10% in Turkey is 7 times of the poorest 
10%(ibid.). The region in which these equalities were felt hardest was again the ESA just as it 
had been before the AKP period. The unequal development between the ESA and the rest of 
the country continued through the first decade of the 2000s, and 17 provinces in the ESA had 
become the least developed ones(ibid.). Additionally, the employment structure of the ESA 
were remained limited to agriculture and while the overall unemployment rate was 11.9%, the 
unemployment rate in the ESA was 12.1%(Lordoglu & Aslan, 201, p. 129). 129). In the same 
period, there were 12 million and 385 women in the ESA and only 11% of them were employed 
while women employment across Turkey was 25%(ibid., p.127), Poverty in the ESA rose 
because of the destruction as a result of the heavy weapons used by the state forces during the 
18-month civil war that started in the summer of 2015 in the region, and the migration wave 
that happened afterwards(Yarkın, 2019). Today when the Kurdish question continue its 
existence as a long-time wound in its deepest form, the Erdoğan government’s discriminatory 
and violent policies that are peculiar to the 20th century cause the problem to affect Turkey’s 




The fact that the Kemalists opted for a unitary nation-state model as an organizational structure 
since 1923 when the Republic of Turkey was established, and adopted a strict, discriminatory 
and exclusionary form of Turkish nationalism to establish this state structure and the socio-
economic and political effects of these policies on the Kurds and the Kurdish ESA region 
provided the main background for the study. The study focused on the basic historical 
developments that triggered the emergence of the Kurdish issue as well as the political 
preferences and attitudes of the central state authority that caused the underdevelopment in the 
ESA compared to other regions of Turkey and the journey of these preferences and attitudes 
within the historical process. In addition, the factors that led to the state's economic policies 
towards the ESA and the formation, development and stratification of the issue that caused the 
ongoing civil war between the Kurdish movement and the Turkish state, even if it stopped for 
a short period since the establishment of the state (1923), are the other significant components 
addressed in this study. 
              While the thesis study proceeded through this context, the conceptual background of 
the study was formed with a diverse but interrelated theoretical framework. As can be seen in 
the second chapter of this study, to understand and interpret ethnic centralization policies that 
started since the Ottoman Empire and was adopted as a state model in its successor Republic 
of Turkey, nation and nationalism that are the ideological structures upon which nation-states 
are built, are explained both theoretically and as a social phenomenon in the light of the studies 
of significant theoreticians such as Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson, and Gellner, who hold an 
important place in the nationalism literature. From this point of view, it was explained in a 
deterministic way that nation and nationalism are useful concepts for the formation, 
development, and consolidation of nation-states in the geographies where they were 
established, nationalism is an elite and bourgeois ideology in societies where it is adopted and 
continuity is ensured by providing various interests and privileges to its members. 
Subsequently, Immanuel Wallerstein's seminal center-periphery theory was analyzed in detail 
to interpret the economic dimension of these nationalist policies. Then, in light of the theoretical 
background provided by Wallerstein, how members of central identity (Turkish identity) in the 
nation-states are made more privileged than minority identities in the periphery (Kurdish 
Identity) and how the commodities of the center are made more valuable than peripheral 
commodities in economic terms and how the periphery is made dependent on the center were 
explained detail. In addition, the seminal studies of Samir Amin on the countries of the South 
were utilized in order to theoretically interpret the administrative relations between the Ottoman 
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and the Kurdistan region, which was autonomous during the Ottoman Empire period. Based on 
Amin's emphasis on the fact that the Global South was the center of the world before 1596, it 
is seen that the Ottoman Empire reached an agreement for autonomy with Kurdistan under its 
sovereignty in return for the payment of tribute.  Finally, another theoretical approach upon 
which this thesis study is based, has been the studies of different theoreticians on different 
models of internal colonialism theory. When different models on the internal colonialism theory 
are examined, it is observed that these studies emphasize unequal internal factors such as the 
fact that citizens who are members of the central identity in any nation-state are in more 
favorable socioeconomic conditions than the minorities, or that central economic processes are 
more developed than peripheral economic processes, or that commodity exchange between the 
center and the periphery is unequal. In the light of these different models on Internal 
Colonialism, the economic underdevelopment and disadvantaged status of the ESA in the 
Kurdish region of Turkey and the Kurds were grounded theoretically. In addition, some 
thinkers' criticisms on Marxism such as Cedric Robinson and Stuart Hall and their emphasis on 
the factors that cause class stratification within working class arising from race discrimination 
played a key role in the theoretical understanding of the use of Kurds as cheap labor since the 
establishment of the state. 
          In the second chapter, which involves the findings of the study based on this theoretical 
framework, the strict Turkish nationalism policy that started in the late 18th century, gained 
momentum in the 19th century and was pursued by the founding elites of the Republic of 
Turkey in 1923 and all the relevant administrative, socio-cultural and economic, in short, the 
centralization policies based on Turkish identity initiated by the state and society were analyzed 
consecutively within the historical process in detail. In this chapter, the policies of the founding 
elites, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü that put forward Turkishness and did not 
recognize any ethnic identity except from the Turkish identity as well as imposing that being a 
Turk was a condition of benefiting from both economic and socio-cultural capital provided by 
the state were presented in the light sources presented in the studies conducted in this field. It 
was seen that the properties of non-Muslims, especially Armenians and Greeks, were plundered 
and a Turkish merchant and capitalist class was quickly formed with the support of the state. 
The evolutionary process of the policies based on discriminatory and exclusionary Turkish 
nationalism and relevant national economic policies were identified within the historical 
process from the foundation of the state to the present day. The fact that the capitalist class of 
Turkey were deeply tied to the state and this bond was strengthened with an intangible contract 
based on mutual interest through the economic policy implemented by state during the 
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liberalization process after 1950 and involvement process in the neoliberal capitalist world 
market after 1980 were analyzed in the light of the sources of the study. 
          In the third chapter, which is the most important part of this study, a political economic 
analysis was carried out on the socio-economic development of the ESA (Northern) Kurdistan, 
and Turkey where the Kurds make up the second largest population after the Turks with 
approximately 20 to 25 million as shown by the latest research. In the light of the data provided 
by the sources upon which the thesis study is based, it is seen that Kurdistan was dependent on 
the Ottoman Empire in its foreign affairs while it was autonomous in its internal affairs before 
it was divided into four parts after the First World War. The fact that Kurdistan lost its 
autonomous structure and was connected to the center as of the middle of the 19th century, 
when radical changes occurred in the administrative structure of the Ottoman, then it was 
divided into four regions in the Lausanne Conference and its northern region became a part of 
the Turkish state established in 1923 after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire as a result of the 
First World War, reveal that the Kurds have experienced great socioeconomic tragedies in the 
following period. Although the CUP leaders, who made an effort to establish a new state after 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, made a promise to the tribal leaders and other public 
leaders in the Kurdish emirates that the autonomy of Kurdistan would be recognized in the 
newly established Turkish state, Atatürk imposed strict state policies towards the ESA by not 
recognizing the agreements between the Kurds and the CUP after the Treaty of Lausanne signed 
in 1923. The new Kemalist administrators, who exploited the ESA in terms of minerals such as 
oil, copper and chromium in order to strengthen the newly established Turkish state 
economically and to participate in the capitalist world relations of the period, positioned the 
ESA as an peripheral economy and established their economic hegemony on the region through 
very limited investments in agriculture and animal husbandry. In addition, the state made large 
investments in the Central and Western Anatolia regions, where there was a Turkish majority, 
apart from the ESA, and used the resources from the ESA for the raw material supply of these 
industries. Moreover, harsh, discriminatory and violent assimilation and suppression policies 
were pursued against the Kurds' linguistic and cultural values that were different from the 
central Turkish identity since they were seen as an internal threat to the Turkish state, which 
was established on the basis of a unitary nation-state model. The Turkification policies towards 
the region imposed by the Kemalist elites, who carried out a mass ethnic cleansing in the ESA 
through settlement and reform laws, ultimately ignited the Kurdish resistance against the 
Kemalist regime. The fact that the Sheikh Said Resistance, the first Kurdish resistance that took 
place in 1925 during the republic period, was bloodily suppressed with the combat equipment 
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and military advantage of the Kemalist regime, causing great socioeconomic damage to the 
ESA as well as the death of over 100 thousand Kurds, left its mark on the Kurdish people and 
deepened the legitimacy gap between Turkey and the Kurds. After this incident, the Kemalist 
regime continued its suppression and ethnic cleansing policies towards the ESA and resettled 
the Kurds in industrial cities of Turkey as well as utilizing these groups as cheap labor by 
subjecting them to forced migration through dispossession. In response to such policies of the 
state, several Kurdish resistance movements occurred throughout the process and the Seyit 
Rıza/Dersim resistance, which was the second biggest resistance after Sheikh Said, emerged as 
a result of the reactions of the Kurds against the Kemalist regime in 1936. Both Sheikh Said 
and Seyit Rıza/Dersim movements were attempted to be solved by the Kurdish resistance 
leaders through dialogue with the elites of the state before the first armed resistance, but these 
movements turned into armed movements as the state rejected the Kurdish leaders by accusing 
them of treason. Indeed, the Turkish state suppressed the second Kurdish resistance by using 
its military advantage and burning down hundreds of Kurdish villages as well as killing tens of 
thousands of civilian children, women, young and old Kurds, causing great damage to the ESA. 
In short, in the light of the data provided by the sources of the research, it is seen that the main 
reasons that triggered the emergence of the Kurdish resistance stemmed from the policies of 
the Turkish state. In fact, Kurdish intellectuals and activists, who found an opportunity for civil 
protests in line with the partial freedom provided by the 1961 Constitution, carried out a series 
of protests with the people in the provinces of the ESA, but the Turkish state even regarded this 
civil organization as a threat to the survival of the state and imprisoned these groups by arresting 
them. The state's pressure on Kurdish politicians and activists led a group of Kurdish activists 
to seek alternative ways for action in the late seventies, and the PKK was established by these 
activists. When the suppression and unequal economic investments of the military government 
that came to power after the military coup of 1980 deepened the socio-economic destruction in 
the region, a civil war between the PKK and the Turkish state started in 1984 and this hot civil 
war continued until the end of the 1990s. During this period, the state returned the Kemalist 
regime policies of the 1930s through the criminalization policies against the ESA and burned 
down hundreds of Kurdish villages, causing the death of thousands of civilians. In addition, 
evacuation of hundreds of villages by the state in the ESA, implementation of ethnic cleansing 
policies and thus the attempts to ensure the Turkification of the region caused the Kurdish issue 
and the socio-economic underdevelopment of the ESA to deepen during this period. In the post-
2000 era, there was a limited softening process regarding the Kurdish issue when the AKP 
government led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan came to power. However, the Kurdish issue has 
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again become an unsolvable and stratified issue due to the intensification of conflict between 
the PKK and the Turkish state during 2008-2011. The civil war that started in the summer of 
2015 and continued until the beginning of 2016 in the ESA provinces of Turkey. This civil war 
has caused approximately 500 thousand people to end up homeless in the ESA and increase the 
poverty rates in the region, while hundreds of thousands of houses have been destroyed in the 
military operations carried out by the state and hundreds of Kurdish politicians are still kept in 
prisons by the state. 
        In conclusion, the centralization policies around the Turkish identity both ethically and 
economically, which were initiated in the last period of the Ottoman Empire and pursued by 
the Republic of Turkey, the predecessor of these policies by evolving and deepening in various 
areas until today, have caused the beginning of a conflict between the Kurds, the country's 
second largest ethnic group, and the Turkish state, as well as leading to the emergence of the 
issue. The conflict process, which still continues as a result of the Turkish state's Kurdish policy, 
causes the issue and the underdeveloped conditions in the ESA to deepen today. With all these 
aspects, this thesis study has filled an important gap in the literature of Kurdish studies by 
addressing the Kurdish Question and Kurdish poverty in Turkey in the contexts of nationalism, 
economic and ethnic centralization and nation-state phenomena. 
While the findings of this research may serve as a source for many studies to be carried out in 
this field, it also reveals that there are some issues that require further investigation in the field. 
For instance, investigation of discrimination arising from ethnic differences between the 
Kurdish workers and other Turkish workers in the industry and construction sector in the 
western part of Turkey based on field research would make a huge contribution to the field. 
Also, the wages and discrimination faced by the seasonal workers, who come from the ESA to 
the Central and Western regions of Turkey, and their levels of sense of belonging to the state 
may provide a great source in understanding the causes of the Kurdish issue in Turkey. In 
addition, studies to be carried out on the intangible borders between the Kurds living in the 
ESA and the rest of the country (the Kurds' perception of Turkish/Turkishness-the Turks' 
perception of Kurdish/Kurdishness) may also be very effective in understanding both the 









Adaman, F., Akbulut, B., Madra, Y., & Pamuk, Ş. (2014). Hitting the wall: Erdoğan’s    
construction-based, finance-led growth regime. The Middle East in London, 10(3),7-8. 
Ahmad, F. (2014). The Young Turks. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Ahmad, F. (2008). Politics and political parties in Republican Turkey. The Cambridge 
History of Turkey, 4, 226-265. 
Ahmad, F. (2000). Ottoman perceptions of the capitulations 1800–1914. Journal of Islamic  
 Studies, 11(1), 1-20 
Ahmad, F. (1993). The making of modern Turkey (Vol. 264). London: Routledge. 
Althusser, L. (2006). Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (notes towards an 
investigation). The anthropology of the state: A reader, 9(1), 86-98. 
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Poyraz, B. (2013). Bellek, hakikat, yüzleşme ve Alevi katliamları. Kültür ve iletişim, 16(1), 9- 
39. 
Renan, E. (1990). What ls a Nation?. Nation and Narra. 
Rey, P. P. (1971). Colonialisme, néo-colonialisme et transition au capitalisme: Exemple de la  
Comilog au Congo-Brazzaville. FeniXX. 
Rey, P. P. (1973). Les alliances de classes: Sur l'articulation des modes de production. Suivi  
de Matérialisme historique et luttes de classes. FeniXX. 
Rey, P. P. (1975). The lineage mode of production. Group. 
Dupré, G., & Rey, P. P. (1973). Reflections on the Pertinence of a Theory of the History of  
Exchange. Economy and Society, 2(2), 131-163. 
Rygaard, O. A. (1935). Mellem tyrker og kurder. George Allen & Unwin Limited. 
Sarihan, A. (2013). The two periods of the PKK conflict: 1984-1999 and 2004- 
2010. Understanding     Turkey’s Kurdish Question, Plymouth, Lexinton Books, 89-102. 
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Ülken, H. Z. (1992). Türkiye’de çağdaş düşünce tarihi [History of modern thought in  
Turkey]. İstanbul: Ülken Yayınları. 
Üstel, F. (2004). " Makbul Vatandaş" ın Peşinde: II. Meşrutiyet'ten Bugüne Vatandaşlık  
Eğitimi. İletişim yayınları. 
Üstel, F. (1997). Türk Ocakları, 1912-1931 (Vol. 47). İletişim. 
Van Bruinessen, M. (1992). Agha, shaikh, and state: the social and political structures of  
Kurdistan. Zed books. 
Van Bruinessen, M. (1994). The Suppression of the Dersim Rebellion in Turkey (1937-38). 
Van Bruinessen, M. (1988). Between guerrilla war and political murder: The workers' party  
of Kurdistan. Middle East Report, 40-50. 
Velho, O. G. (1976). Capitalismo autoritário e campesinato: um estudo comparativo a partir 
da fronteira em movimento: Difel. 
Velho, O. G. (1979). The state and the frontier. The Structure of Brazilian Development, 18-
35.  
Vladimir, I. (1956). Lenin, The Development of Capitalism in Russia. In: Moscow: Progress. 
Wallerstein, I. (1974). The Modern World-System I. Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of 
the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century, With a New Prologue: 
University of California Press. 
Wallerstein, I. (1980). The Modern World System, Vol. II, Mercantilism and the Consolidation 
ofthe European World-Economy, 1600-1750 (New York, 1980). WallersteinThe 
Modern World System, 2.  
 
 121 
Wallerstein, I. (1989). The modern world-system, Vol. III: The second great expansion of the 
capitalist world-economy,-s. In: San Diego: Academic Press. 
Wallerstein, I. (2004). Would-Systems Analysis: An Introduction: duke university Press. 
Wallerstein, I. (2011). The modern world-system IV: Centrist liberalism triumphant, 1789–
1914 (Vol. 4): Univ of California Press. 
Wolpe, H. (1975). The theory of internal colonization: the South African case. Paper presented 
at the Collected Seminar Papers. Institute of Commonwealth Studies. 
White, J. (2013). Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks, Princeton. NJ: Princeton  
University. 
Yadirgi, V. (2017). The political economy of the Kurds of Turkey: from the Ottoman empire  
to the Turkish republic. Cambridge University Press. 
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